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ABSTRACT
SIYUN YU: STOCHASTIC MODELS FOR RESOURCE ALLOCATION,
SERIES PATIENTS SCHEDULING, AND INVESTMENT DECISIONS
(Under the direction of Vidyadhar G. Kulkarni.)
We develop stochastic models to devise optimal or near-optimal policies in three different
areas: resource allocation in virtual compute labs (VCL), appointment scheduling in healthcare
facilities with series patients, and capacity management for competitive investment.
A VCL consists of a large number of computers (servers), users arrive and are given access
to severs with user-specified applications loaded onto them. The main challenge is to decide
how many servers to keep “on”, how many of them to preload with specific applications (so
users needing these applications get immediate access), and how many to be left flexible so
that they can be loaded with any application on demand, thus providing delayed access. We
propose dynamic policies that minimize costs subject to service performance constraints and
validate them using simulations with real data from the VCL at NC State.
In the second application, we focus on healthcare facilities such as physical therapy (PT)
clinics, where patients are scheduled for a series of appointments. We use Markov Decision
Processes to develop the optimal policies that minimize staffing, overtime, overbooking and
delay costs, and develop heuristic secluding policies using the policy improvement algorithm.
We use the data from a local PT center to test the effectiveness of our proposed policies and
compare their performance with other benchmark policies.
In the third application, we study a strategic capacity investment problem in a duopoly
model with an unknown market size. A leader chooses its capacity to enter a new market.
In a continuous-time Bayesian setting, a competitive follower dynamically learns about the
favorableness of the new market by observing the performance of the leader, and chooses its
capacity and timing of investment. We show that an increase in the probability of a favorable
market can strictly decrease the leaders expected discounted profit due to non-trivial interplay
between leaders investment capacity and timing of the dynamically-learning follower.
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CHAPTER 1: Introduction
Stochastic models are extensively used in devising resource allocation policies in many fields,
such as call centers, healthcare systems, cloud computing, production systems, etc. Resource
allocation plays a critical role in balancing the demand and supply, with the goal of optimizing
the economical or social benefits.
Discrete and continuous stochastic models provide appropriate tools to quantify the per-
formance of policies in these applications, including service quality, management profit and
cost, etc. Queueing models are useful in service systems where queues arise from the mismatch
of supply and demand. They can be used to obtain implementable policies to manage these
systems. Continuous models such as Brownian models are useful in describing the uncertain
behaviour of system evolution in response to control policies, and can be used in devising
optimal control policies to manage such systems.
In this dissertation we use both discrete and continuous stochastic models to allocate re-
sources in three different applications. In the rest of this chapter, we introduce the background
and motivation for each one of them.
1.1 Application 1. Server Configuration in Cloud Computing.
A cloud computing system provides computing service (such as sharing data and processing
resources) through internet to clients. It allows companies to decrease the IT related infras-
tructure and management costs, at the same time get access to storage or a flexible collection
of software applications through a simple web-based interface. In such systems, the service
providers are computer servers, while the customers are the clients who generate requests of
accessing the computing resources. The clients may belong to different classes and their arrival
rates may vary with time. The configuration of the computer capacity allocated to the client
for a given type of computing service can be controlled to guarantee the service quality.
In Chapter 2, we study a special case of cloud computing system: the campus-wide Virtual
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Computing Lab (VCL). Such a system provides users remote access to their desired set of
software applications. There are usually hundreds or even thousands of software applications
that the users may choose from. Some examples of application are “Matlab on Windows 7”,
“Maple on Windows XP”, and “Arena and CPLEX OPL” etc. Currently UNC-Chapel Hill
and NC State both host hundreds of computer servers for students, faculty, and researchers.
Each user is granted full control of the assigned server. If two users request the same software
application, they will need two different servers loaded with that application.
The servers in the VCL may be on or off. The on servers may be preloaded with specific
applications, or left flexible. When a user requests a server with a specific application, and
one such server preloaded with that application is available, the user request can be satisfied
immediately. If such a server is not available, we can load the application on a flexible server
and make it available to this user. However, this loading operation creates a delay and degrades
service somewhat. Turning an off server on usually takes too long to do in response to a user
request, and hence if all servers are busy, the user leaves without service, which is the worst
outcome for the user. The number of on servers can be changed during the day in an exogenous
fashion in response to anticipated demand.
The main issue for the VCL is to decide on how many servers should be kept on (the rest
are left off to save energy). Further, we need to decide how many of the on servers should be
preloaded with which applications, and how many servers should be left flexible. The service
quality can be measured in terms of the fraction of the users who get immediate access, the
fraction that gets delayed access, and the fraction that gets rejected.
We use machine learning algorithms to predict the demand rates, queueing models to do the
resource allocation, and simulation to evaluate the performance of several policies using real
data collected from the NC state VCL over three years. We conclude that under the proposed
policy, the required service quality can be satisfied while more than half of the servers can be
turned off thus significantly reducing the operating costs.
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1.2 Application 2. Appointment Systems for Series Patients
In a health care unit, the service providers are nurses, doctors, etc, while the customers
are patients. The nurses and doctors can be specialized to serve multiple classes of patients.
The number of nurses and doctors on duty can be controlled to satisfy the patients demands
so as to provide a certain quality assurance. The patients can belong to multiple classes, and
their arrival rates may vary with time; they may need multiple visits to the clinic, (as in a
physical therapy (PT) setting); they may have preferences about appointment schedules, and
may display no-show and cancellation behaviors.
In Chapter 3 and 4, we focus on special clinics such as physical therapy, where patients are
scheduled for repeated visits at the time of admission. Such patients are called series patients.
Patients in need of physical therapy are referred by the physician to the physical therapy clinic.
A clinic administrator schedules a first appointment for an initial examination. Based on the
diagnosis of the patient, a plan of care is determined by the physical therapist. Such a plan
includes the frequency of the visits, total number of visits, and duration of each visit. Based
on the plan of care, an administrator in the clinic generates an appointment schedule. The
frequency, duration and length of the appointment time for the follow up visits vary greatly
depending upon the patient’s diagnosis and/or specific needs as well as the referring physician’s
orders.
In Chapter 3, we consider a model where the plan of care for a patient is set up at begin-
ning, so once the patient is evaluated, the number of visits is known. Under this assumption,
the randomness comes from the initial evaluation, after which the series of appointments are
scheduled without uncertainty. In Chapter 4, we study an alternate model where the random-
ness occurs after each visit of a patient. Specifically, whether a patient needs the next visit is
evaluated after every appointment. These two models capture different features of the series
patients, depending on whether their treatment can be predetermined or needs to be modified
based on their recovery status.
The major challenge in such health units is to appropriately and consistently match supply
and demand of physical therapy services. Each new patient creates a string of follow up
visits, which creates additional demands on the capacity of the clinic.We develop a Markov
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Decision Process model that can be used to compute an optimal appointment schedule for each
patient. Unfortunately, the large state space makes this method impractical computationally.
However, this model helps us devise a simple heuristic policy, called the index policy, that can
be obtained by using policy improvement algorithm. We use simulation to show that the index
policy provides better performance than other benchmark policies used in practice.
1.3 Application 3. Investment Capacity and Timing Management
When companies plan to introduce a new product or a new technology to the market, the
actual demand is uncertain at the very beginning. A common scenario is that, after one firm
(called the leader) initiates an investment, the competitors (called the followers) start observing
the performance of this leader firm and make their decisions accordingly. In particular, there
are two most critical decisions for the follower firms to make, the first is the investment capacity,
that is how much to invest so as to better suit the unknown market demand, the second is
the investment timing, that is when to enter the market so as to make profit with enough
knowledge about the market.
We are particularly interested in competitive relations between the leader and follower firms.
Once the follower enters the market, it takes part of the market share from the leader, and
after that the overflow from either of the firms cannot be fulfilled by the other party, even if
the other party has extra supply. This is an appropriate model for products or technologies
that have a high customer loyalty so that once the customers subscribe to one of the brands,
the chance for them to switch brands is very small. One example is the competitive relation
between Apple and Amazon. Both firms recently invested in the development of smart speakers,
a smart device controlled by human voice so that the users can play music, control echo-home
systems, call taxis, etc. Since the two companies use different operating systems, all the built-
in applications and other supportive devices (cell phone, smart TVs) are not compatible with
each other. Therefore it is costly for the customers to switch the brands.
In Chapter 5, we build models for the duopoly game of investment with capacity and timing
decision options. We assume that the investment is costly, and the firms’ earning processes are
based on their initial investment capacity. The uncertain demand of the new market could be
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one of the binary status: high and low. A leader enters the market at the beginning of the
horizon, and a follower starts its observation of the leader’s earning process and decides on
when and how much to invest. The leader, knowing that the follower will adopt the optimal
investment strategy based on the leader’s action, optimizes its strategy about how much to
invest at the beginning.
The following chapters present the details of each of the above three problems. The review
of the relevant literature is included in each chapter separately. We create stochastic models
of the physical problems and discuss the collection and analysis of data that is needed to seed
the models. We use tools from Markov decision processes, index policies, queueing theory,
stochastic control, Bayesian learning to formulate the models and analyze them. We also use
statistical tools from machine learning to analyze the data and estimate the parameters of the
models. We then describe our current results and our plan for the future work.
5
CHAPTER 2: Statistical Forecasting and Queueing Models for Virtual
Computing Labs
2.1 Introduction
The Virtual Computing Lab (VCL) is a cloud computing service that provides users remote
access to their desired set of software applications. There are usually hundreds or even thou-
sands of software applications that the users may choose from. Some examples of applications
are “Matlab on Windows 7”, “Maple on Windows XP”, “Matlab and MS Excel on Windows
7”, “Arena and CPLEX OPL”, etc. The VCL was first developed at North Carolina State
University (NC State) and is now an open-source project at the Apache Software Foundation
- http://vcl.apache.org. An increasing number of institutions are hosting VCL servers, for ex-
ample, UNC-Chapel Hill and NC State currently have hundreds of such servers for students,
faculty, and researchers. From the perspective of modeling, we do not distinguish between the
terms - “virtual computer” and “virtual machine”, instead we use the generic term “server”.
Each user is granted full control of the assigned server. If two users request the same software
application, they will need two different servers loaded with that application.
A server in the VCL may be preloaded with a specific application, or left flexible. A user
gets immediate access to a server preloaded with the desired application if one is available.
Otherwise, the user has to wait for several minutes until a flexible server is loaded with the
desired application. In this chapter we are concerned with the issue of deciding how many
servers should be preloaded with which applications, and how many servers should be left
flexible. We call the preloaded and flexible servers the on servers, and the rest of the servers
the off servers that are turned off for cost saving (both energy and management). The service
quality is measured by the fraction of the users who get immediate access, and the fraction
that get delayed access, while the system cost is measured by the number of on servers.
Although our research is motivated by the VCL application, the methodology developed
here is of general applicability in any service center with sufficiently flexible servers. It is also
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applicable to software as a service (SaaS) in cloud computing. In such large-scale computing
environments, the energy consumption is an important issue, both economically and environ-
mentally. Hence, it is important and relevant to dynamically allocate “the right number of on
servers with the right capabilities”.
In many VCLs such as those at UNC-Chapel Hill and NC State, all servers are always on
and there are no flexible servers. For example, the VCL at NC State has about 800 servers
and 1600 applications; the current policy ranks the applications by the frequency with which
an application is requested, and each of the 400 most popular applications are preloaded on
two servers (each preloaded server has exactly one application). In general, assume the VCL
has a total of M servers and is capable of handling N types of application. A user who desires
type n (1 ≤ n ≤ N) application is called a type n user. A type n user arriving at the system
receives instant service if a server preloaded with application n is available. Otherwise, the
user is delayed and needs to wait until the system manager (an automated software) chooses
a k-preloaded server (k 6= n), removes application k and loads application n. If no server
is available then this user is blocked (rejected). After a user finishes the session, the system
manager wipes the server clean, and then reloads it with the same or another application.
A server allocation plan (SAP) decides how many servers should be pre-loaded with which
applications, how many servers should be kept flexible, and how many should be turned off.
An SAP is called dynamic if these numbers change with time; otherwise it is called static.
It makes sense to consider dynamic SAPs to accommodate time-varying demand rates. Such
time-varying demand is an inherent feature to the VCL system. This is caused by the seasonal
demand induced by the semesters, the days of week, and the time of the day. In this chapter,
we propose a dynamic SAP with the objective of minimizing the system cost while achieving
the targeted service quality.
We shall begin with a static SAP assuming constant arrival rates. We keep dn servers
preloaded with application n (i.e. the dedicated type n server pool, 1 ≤ n ≤ N), f servers
flexible (i.e. the flexible pool), and M−f−∑Nn=1 dn servers off. Figure 2.1 illustrates the server
network diagram. When a type n arrival occurs (with rate λn), this user is given a server from
the dedicated pool for application n, if one is available. Otherwise a server from the flexible
pool is loaded with application n and assigned to this user. In the latter case the user needs to
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Figure 2.1: VCL Servers Network Diagram
wait a few extra minutes for the loading operation. If no flexible servers are available, the user
leaves the system without service, even if there are idle servers in other dedicated pools. When
a type n user finishes service from the dedicated pool, the released server is wiped clean and
is reloaded with the same application to keep dn a constant. Similarly, when a user finishes
service from the flexible pool, the released server is left flexible to keep f a constant.
We then design a dynamic SAP based on the above static SAP. This is accomplished by
dividing the whole time horizon into small periods, and implementing the static SAP over each
period. This is called the stationary independent period by period (SIPP) approach. Under
dynamic SAP, the parameters dn (1 ≤ n ≤ N) and f vary from period to period, but remain
constant within each period. Thus the number of off servers will vary from period to period.
We use three queueing models to quantify the probabilities that an incoming user is delayed
or blocked. The three models are of increasing complexity and account for different statistical
aspects of the arrival processes. We also propose a modified SIPP (MSIPP) approach which
uses a better estimate of the arrival rates. In Section 2.7 we recommend the most beneficial
combination of a queueing model and statistical forecasting technique that results in a desirable
dynamic SAP.
8
Our proposed policy uses a dynamic SAP (see Section 2.7 for details) under which at most
10% users are delayed and at most 0.1% of the service requests are blocked. The policy only
uses a maximum of 300 on servers at any time, resulting in substantial energy savings. In
contrast, Lee (2013) shows that, under the current policy followed by the VCL at NC State,
over 11% of the users are delayed and no users are blocked but all the available servers are
always kept on. This makes our proposed policy extremely attractive.
It is clear that we need the forecasts of the arrival rates λn (1 ≤ n ≤ N) for each period
in order to execute our SAP. We explore two statistical methods to forecast the future arrival
rates: the moving average (MA) method and the singular value decomposition (SVD) method.
These arrival rate forecasts are then used as inputs to the queueing models to estimate the
blocking probabilities. For the input parameters to the queueing models, we use either the
mean arrival rate forecast or the upper bound of the 95% prediction interval of the mean
arrival rate.
The remainder of the chapter is as follows. We provide a literature review on the related
topics in Section 2.2. Section 2.3 introduces the structure of the data, and highlights the
challenges posed by time-varying demands. We formulate our static SAP model in Section 2.4.1
and construct three static queueing models in Section 2.4.2. Algorithms are developed there to
quantify the constraints in the allocation model. Section 2.4.3 explains our procedure of creating
the dynamic SAP based on the static SAP introduced in Section 2.4.2. Section 2.5 introduces
two ways of forecasting future arrival rates, and Section 2.6 describes how we conduct discrete
event simulations using real data and presents the results. Section 2.7 makes recommendations
about the most implementable policy as the combination of the best forecasting method, the
estimation approach, and the queueing model. Finally, Section 2.8 summarizes the chapter and
discusses how we can extend the current work to applications beyond VCL.
2.2 Literature Review
One can think of the VCL as a server farm. There is a large literature on the topic of
resource allocation in server farms. Gandhi et al. [2010, 2009, 2011] defined four states of the
servers: off, setup, idle, and on (busy). Comparing with our system, their idle servers are
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similar to our dedicated idle servers, where the user receives immediate service; their servers
in setup state (switching from off to on) are similar to our flexible idle servers, where the user
has to wait for some extra setup time. Two performance measurements are usually considered
in a server farm setting: waiting time and power consumption. In their work, Gandhi et al.
used queueing model and simulations to derive these metrics. One of their conclusions is that
keeping the servers idle is superior for reducing waiting time, and turning the servers off is
superior for reducing power. Adan et al. [2013] used a constant setup cost instead of a setup
time to discourage switching between off and on, which simplified the state space and resulted
in a switching-curve structure of the optimal policy.
Our model differs from the above server farm models in two important aspects. First, in the
papers mentioned above, the users are homogeneous and the systems are stationary, while in
our system, there are multiple types of users with time-varying arrival rates and service times.
Second, the server farm literature deals with waiting times and power consumption, while our
model focuses more on the fraction of delayed or blocking users. The use of dedicated servers
is essential to reduce the fraction of delayed servers.
In this chapter we address three main features of the VCL systems: (1) time-varying de-
mands, (2) multi-type demand structure, and (3) availability of data to forecast future demand.
We shall review the relevant literature below in each of these areas.
The phenomenon of time-dependent arrival is commonly seen in many service systems, and
it is critical to staff them at appropriate levels to cope with this variation. There is a large
literature dedicated to this problem. For an in-depth review on determining the staffing levels
in the presence of time-varying demand, see Green et al. [2007], Whitt [2007], Liu and Whitt
[2011, 2012]; Liu et al. [2014].
One approach to modeling the time-varying demand is to use stationary models in a non-
stationary manner. It is achieved by dividing the working period (workday or workweek) into
shifts, hours, quarter-hours, etc, and then applying a series of stationary queueing models
over each planning period. This method is called the stationary independent period by pe-
riod (SIPP) approach in Green et al. [2001]. However its performance highly depends on the
system parameters such as the arrival rate, the mean service time and the service quality, see
Thompson [1993] and Puhalskii et al. [2010]. As a counter example in Green et al. [2001],
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when the Markovian model with sinusoidal arrival rates is considered in the simulation, the
SIPP approach underestimates the staffing levels. Thompson [1993] and Green et al. [2001,
2007] have addressed this issue and discussed several solutions such as a lagged SIPP, which
essentially shifts the arrival rate curve to the right by a fixed amount.
In our work, we apply approaches similar to SIPP to deal with the time-varying demand
issue. Furthermore, we propose stationary dependent period by period (SDPP) approach that
takes into account the customers that remain in the system from the previous period. The
SDPP approach outperforms the regular SDPP approach in the service quality while using
fewer servers.
The second feature is the existence of the multiple types of users. This heterogeneity in the
sources of demands creates the critical issue of whether to use dedicated (specialized) or flexible
resources. When the servers have sufficiently overlapping capabilities and work as a single
super-server, the best possible performance can be achieved by the complete resource pooling
strategy. See, for example, Harrison [1988, 2000]. Between the extremes of full-flexibility
and full-specialization, different limited-flexibility structures can be constructed. Jordan and
Graves [1995] are the first to show that well-designed limited flexibility can be as good as full
flexibility. These principles are further justified by Akcsin and Karaesmen [2007], Iravani et al.
[2007] and Bassamboo et al. [2008]. They also propose methods to evaluate different flexibility
structures. Our model considers the combination of dedicated server pools and a flexible server
pool, in order to provide immediate service as much as possible while guaranteeing an overall
service quality.
Finally we address the statistical features of the VCL system. As pointed out by Chen and
Henderson [2001], where the staffing problem is studied under a Police Communication Center
setting, designing a staffing level policy needs an accurate forecast of arrival rates. A handful
of efficient forecasting approaches have been developed for call centers. For a comprehensive
review, see Aksin et al. [2007] and Ibrahim et al. [2016]. Typically, arrival data in call centers
are aggregated within each short time periods, such as 15-minute or 30-minute intervals, and
the target of forecasting is implemented over such periods, see Jongbloed and Koole [2001].
This is consistent with our SIPP and SDPP modeling approaches. Similar techniques are used
in Weinberg et al. [2007], where a multiplicative effects model is constructed to forecast Poisson
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arrival rates over intervals of 15, 30, or 60 minutes length, with a one-day lead time. More
recently, Shen and Huang [2008] propose a statistical model for forecasting call volumes within
short time periods of a given day and also provide approaches to account for intraday forecast
updating. Their singular value decomposition (SVD) based method outperforms existing fore-
casting methods. Our work adopts their SVD forecasting model to the VCL setting. Numerical
experiments show that it leads to better service quality over the standard moving average (MA)
method.
2.3 Data
The VCL data set from NC State University contains information about all user requests
from August 1, 2008 to July 31, 2011. In total there are 595,000 service requests for 1,643
different applications. For the ease of presentation, we sort the applications by their frequency
of use in descending order. The usages vary considerably for different applications, where the
top two applications account for 18.88%, the top ten applications account for 42.63%, and the
top 400 applications account for 97.30% of the total requests. On the other hand, each of the
bottom eight hundred applications is used no more than ten times over the three-year period
that we consider. The detailed information is presented in Table 2.1. The VCL has around
700 to 900 servers. (The information about the exact number of servers is not given in our
data set. The real time information about the number of on/off servers is given on the VCL
website.) We present below some details of the arrival and service time data.
Cumulative Relative Frequency (%)
Top 1 9.57%
Top 2 18.88%
Top 10 42.63%
Top 50 71.15%
Top 100 82.27%
Top 200 91.66%
Top 400 97.30%
Top 800 99.38%
Top 1643 100.00%
Table 2.1: Cumulative Relative Frequency of Arrivals
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2.3.1 Arrivals
Figure 2.2 (a) plots the aggregated hourly arrivals from August 1, 2008 to July 31, 2011.
To provide a better idea of arrival pattern in finer time scales, we use Panels (b) and (c) to
show the average hourly arrivals in each hour of the week (starting with Sunday midnight)
and each hour of the day (starting with midnight) respectively. We also present the same set
of graphs for individual applications as comparison. For illustration, Figure 2.3 is shown here
for Application 1, while Figures A.1 and A.2 (see Appendix A.1.1) are for Applications 10 and
100.
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Figure 2.2: Aggregated Arrivals
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Figure 2.3: Arrivals of Application 1
We observe that arrivals show a predictable, repeating pattern. The semesterly, weekly,
and daily cycles are quite clear on both aggregated and individual application levels. In Fig-
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ure 2.3(b) we see that for application 1 the arrival volumes are low on Saturdays and high on
Fridays. During the day, the first peak occurs around 3PM, followed by a second peak around
10PM. This is true in the aggregated case (Figure 2.3(c)) and for most of the applications. We
observe that not all the applications were available in the VCL on the initial date of 08/01/2008.
For example, application 10 was not available until 08/18/2010 (Figure A.1 in the appendix).
Using the aggregated arrival data we also plot the mean and standard deviation against the
time of day, grouped by the day of week, as shown in Figure 2.4. We observe the heteroscedas-
ticity phenomenon - both the mean and the standard deviation depends on time. Besides,
the magnitude of the standard deviation is almost at the same level of the mean; hence the
variance exceeds the mean, which implies that the observations are over-dispersed with respect
to a Poisson distribution.
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Figure 2.4: Mean and Standard Deviation of Aggregated Arrivals by Day of Week
2.3.2 Service Times
Running the analysis on the service time data, we find that about 3% of the service times
(i.e. 1327 arrivals) are less than 1 minute. The very short service times are questionable in the
setting of software online service. One possible explanation is the accidental shut down of the
system which would force the users to log off. Besides, there is a four-hour check initiated by
the server, and if the user is not active, he/she is automatically logged off. If the user is active
he can request extensions in two hour increments.
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In Figure 2.5 we plot the empirical cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the service
times for applications 1, 10, 100, along with the corresponding CDF of the exponential distri-
bution with the same mean. The plots suggest that an exponential assumption on the service
time distribution is reasonable. (Though we do not need this exponential assumption in most
of our queueing models.)
0 5 10 15
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Application 1
ECDF of Service Times
CDF of Exponential with mu=1.2
0 2 4 6 8 10
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Application 10
ECDF of Service Times
CDF of Exponential with mu=1.6
0 2 4 6 8 10
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Application 100
ECDF of Service Times
CDF of Exponential with mu=1
Figure 2.5: Empirical CDF of Service Times and Exponential CDF
2.4 Queueing Models and Staffing Policies
As described in Section 2.1, we consider a VCL with M servers, N applications, and N
dedicated server pools (of sizes d1, d2, · · · , dN ), one flexible server pool of size f , and the rest
being off servers (Figure 2.1). In this section we develop server allocation plans (SAP) for the
VCL. In Section 2.4.1, we first assume that the arrival rates for the applications are constant,
and present the formulation of a static SAP. Then in Section 2.4.2, we consider three queueing
models for the VCL system and derive the corresponding static SAP. In Section 2.4.3, we
extend the static SAP to dynamic SAP using stationary independent period by period (SIPP)
and a modification version that allows dependence between periods of (SDPP).
2.4.1 Problem Formulation - Static SAP
Under the static SAP, we are interested in policies which assign dn dedicated servers
preloaded with application n (1 ≤ n ≤ N), allow f servers to be left flexible, and turn off
the remaining M − f −∑Nn=1 dn servers. The trade-off here is between minimizing energy
consumption cost, which is directly reflected by the number of on servers, and guaranteeing
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certain service quality (to be quantified later).
Note that when a user gets a dedicated server, the wiping and reloading operations take
place at the end of the service (after the user leaves the system); if a user gets a flexible server,
the loading operation takes place before the service starts and the wiping operation takes place
after the service finishes. Thus in both cases the service times are augmented by the wiping
and loading operations.
Let the delay probability α be the fraction of the users who do not receive immediate service
upon arrival, and the blocking probability β be the fraction of the users who leave the system
without service. Our aim is to identify the smallest d1, · · · , dN and f that can satisfy the
following service level constraints:
α < α∗, (2.1)
and β < β∗, (2.2)
where α∗ and β∗ are the design parameters. For example, we consider α∗ = 0.05 and β∗ = 0.001.
Below we describe three queueing models to quantify the above constraints.
2.4.2 Queueing Models for Static SAP
In this section, we consider three queueing models of increasing complexity to help size the
dedicated pools and the flexible pool: M/G/c/c that assumes Poisson arrivals, MX/M/∞ that
uses compound Poisson arrivals and accounts for overdispersion, and finally M(t)/G/∞ that
uses non-homogeneous Poisson arrivals and captures the continuously time-varying arrival rate
feature. We compare their performances using simulation in Section 2.6.
2.4.2.1 M/G/c/c Queue.
In this model, we assume that the type n requests form a Poisson process (PP) in the
dedicated server pool with rate λn. The service time for each specific application is generally
distributed with mean sn. If a type n preloaded dedicated server is available when a type n
user arrives, its service starts immediately and lasts for an amount of time with mean sn plus
the wiping and loading time with mean un. If such a preloaded server is not available, then the
16
user is delayed (or lost). Thus we model the dedicated and flexible pools as M/G/c/c queues.
The details are given below.
 Dedicated Pool.
Let dn be the number of dedicated servers assigned to application n. Thus we think of the
number of type n users in the dedicated pool as an M/G/dn/dn queue. The offered load of
type n over this interval is then given by
an = λn(sn + un).
We assume that the system is in steady state so that the probability of type n users not
receiving immediate service is equal to the probability of type n users being blocked from the
dedicated pool for application n, which is given by the well known Erlang-B formula (see, for
example, Cooper (1972)):
Pd(dn, an) =
(an)
dn
dn!
/
dn∑
k=0
(an)
k
k!
. (2.3)
We call Pd(dn, an) the probability of delay. Now, the probability that an arrival is of type
n is λn/
∑N
k=1 λk. Hence the overall probability of delay is given by
∑N
n=1 λnPd(dn, an)∑N
n=1 λn
, (2.4)
which provides an approximation of α. Hence we formulate the following optimization problem
for the dedicated pools:
Problem P1
minimize
N∑
n=1
dn,
subject to
∑N
n=1 λnPd(dn, an)∑N
n=1 λn
< α∗.
Note that the Erlang-B formula in Eq.2.3 is a convex function in dn (see Messerli (1972)).
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In addition, it can also be expressed recursively as follows (Cooper (1972)):
Pd(0, an) = 1,
Pd(k, an) =
anPd(k − 1, an)
anPd(k − 1, an) + k , ∀k = 1, · · · , dn.
These two properties yield the following greedy algorithm to solve P1.
Algorithm 1: Greedy Algorithm to Solve P1
for n = 1 : N do
dn ← 0;
Pd(dn, an)← 1;
δ(n)← λn[1− Pd(1, an)];
end for loop
α←
∑N
n=1 λnPd(dn, an)∑N
k=1 λk
;
while α ≥ α∗ do
n∗ ← arg max
n
δ(n);
dn∗ ← dn∗ + 1;
δ(n∗)← λn∗ [Pd(dn∗ , an)− Pd(dn∗ + 1, an∗)]
α← α− δ(n∗)/
N∑
n=1
λn;
end while loop
This yields the optimum (d1, · · · , dN ) that satisfies Eq 2.1.
 Flexible Pool.
We see that the arrival process to the flexible pool is a superposition of the overflows from
all the dedicated pools. The overflow process from an M/M/c/c queue can be accurately
18
approximated by an interrupted Poisson process (Kuczura (1973)). However, each dedicated
pool we consider in Section 2.4.2.1 is an M/G/c/c queue. In addition, the system we consider
has hundreds of dedicated pools. The approximation of the aggregate process of hundreds of
interrupted PP would be intractable. Hence, we choose to simply approximate the aggregate
arrival process to the flexible pool by a PP. Let λfn be the rate of overflow from nth dedicated
server pool, which can be computed as
λfn = λnPd(dn, an).
Hence the arrival rate of the aggregate process to the flexible pool is given by
λf =
N∑
n=1
λfn.
The mean service time in the flexible pool is a weighted sum of the mean service times of each
type n plus the mean loading time:
sf =
∑N
n=1 λ
f
n(sn + un)∑N
n=1 λ
f
n
. (2.5)
Then the offered load to the flexible pool is given by
af = λfsf =
N∑
n=1
λfn(sn + un).
Again, assuming the system is in steady state, the probability of a user being blocked from
the flexible pool is given by the Erlang-B formula:
Pb(f, af ) =
(af )
f
f !
/
f∑
k=0
(af )
k
k!
.
Note that the probability that a user leaves the system without service is equal to the
probability that a user is blocked from the flexible pool. We call it blocking probability. Hence,
to satisfy Eq.2.2, we solve the following optimization problem:
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Problem P2
minimize f,
subject to Pb(f, af ) =
(af )
f
f !
/
f∑
k=0
(af )
k
k!
< β∗.
(2.6)
Determining the minimum f that satisfies Eq.2.6 is straightforward since Pb(m, a) is a
decreasing function in m.
2.4.2.2 MX/M/∞ Queue.
Recall the overdispersion issue with the arrival data discussed in Section 2.3. To address
this issue, we use Compound Poisson Process (CPP) to model the arrival process for both
the dedicated server pool and the flexible server pool. We construct the CPP arrival process
{Y (t), t ≥ 0} as follows:
Y (t) =
Z(t)∑
k=1
Dk
where {Dk : k ≥ 1} are positive independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) Geometric
random variables with parameter p, and {Z(t)} is a PP with rate θ, which is also independent
of {Dk}. Then we have
E (Y (t)) = θtE (D) = θt/p, (2.7)
and
Var (Y (t)) = θtE
(
D2
)
= θt(2− p)/p2. (2.8)
Thus the variance of the process is (2−p)/p times the expectation. Since (2−p)/p is always
greater than one for 0 < p < 1, this is consistent with the overdispersion seen in the real data.
Now we assume that the service times are i.i.d. exponential with mean s and use MX/M/∞
queue to model the number of users in a dedicated pool. This model has been analyzed in the
Chapter 6 of Chaudhry and Templeton (1983), where it has been shown that in steady state,
the number of users in this queue follows a negative binomial distribution NB(r, 1− p), where
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r = θs/(1− p) (which may not be an integer). To be precise, if X ∼ NB(r, 1− p) we have
P (X = k) =
(
k + r − 1
k
)
pr(1− p)k, k ≥ 0.
We see that instead of a Poisson distribution of the number of users in the M/M/∞ queue,
our MX/M/∞ model produces a negative binomial distribution for the number of users. In
fact, in the case of modest overdispersion, the negative binomial distribution is a standard model
and a good alternative to the Poisson distribution, as introduced in studies like Cameron and
Trivedi (2013).
 Dedicated Pool.
Assume the dedicated pool for application n forms an MX/M/∞ queue with parameters θn
and pn. Let rn = θnsn/(1 − pn). Inspired by the Erlang-B loss formula, which is in fact a
truncated Poisson distribution, we propose to use the truncated negative binomial distribution
to approximate the probability of delay for type n users:
Qd(dn, rn) =
(
dn + rn − 1
dn
)
(1− pn)dn
/
dn∑
k=0
(
k + rn − 1
k
)
(1− pn)k, (2.9)
where the numerator is the steady state probability that there are exactly dn users and the
denominator is the probability that there are at most dn users in the M
X/M/∞ queue.
The overall probability that a typical arrival not receiving immediate service can be obtained
by replacing Pd(dn, an) in Eq.2.4 with Qd(dn, rn), which leads to an optimization problem sim-
ilar to P1. To use the same algorithm for solving this truncated negative binomial version of
P1, we need the convexity of the function in Eq.2.9 in dn. Our numerical studies show that
this convexity holds, although we have not been able to prove this analytically.
 Flexible Pool.
The overdispersion issue in the flexible pool is even more critical, because the arrival process is
the aggregate overflow process from the dedicated pools. We therefore assume that the arrival
process to the flexible pool is a CPP with parameters θf and pf . They can be approximated
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as follows:
θf =
N∑
n=1
θnQn(dn, rn), (2.10)
1
pf
=
1
θf
N∑
n=1
θn
pn
Qn(dn, rn). (2.11)
Also we have rf = θfsf/(1 − pf ), where sf can be obtained by Eq. 2.5. Then the blocking
probability is given by
Qb(f, rf ) =
(
f + rf − 1
f
)
(1− pf )f
/
f∑
k=0
(
k + rf − 1
k
)
(1− pf )k.
It is straightforward to determine the minimum number of flexible servers to satisfy the criterion
2.6 because we can show that the truncated negative binomial version ofQb(m, a) is a decreasing
function in m (see Appendix A.1.2).
2.4.2.3 M(t)/G/∞ Queue.
In Section 2.3 we see that the arrival rates are time dependent, therefore it would be ap-
propriate to model the arrival process with a non-homogeneous Poisson process (NHPP), thus
yielding an M(t)/G/c/c queue. However, we have analytical solution to this system only when
c = ∞. Hence we use the M(t)/G/∞ model, and then truncate the steady state distribution
at c to get an approximation for the steady state distribution of the M(t)/G/c/c model. With
the assumption that the arrival rate function over the horizon has a finite upper bound, we
show that there exists an upper bound of the mean number of users over the infinite horizon,
and we choose this bound as the parameter to quantify α, the probability of delay in the ded-
icated pool. However, this model is not feasible in the flexible pool, since it induces the time
dependence of service times.
 Dedicated Pool.
Let λn(t) be the time-varying arrival rate of application n defined on [0,∞), with an upper
bound of Λ. Assume the service time for type n users follows a CDF Gn(·) that is time
independent and has mean sn. This CDF can be approximated by the empirical CDF using
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the corresponding service times data, as shown in Section 2.3. The main M(t)/G/∞ result,
due to Palm (1988) and Khinchin et al. (2013), is that the number of type n users at time t
has a Poisson distribution with mean given by
mn(t) =
∫ t
0
(1−Gn(u))λn(t− u)du. (2.12)
Note that if the actual service time has an upper bound (in our VCL case the service times do
not go beyond 12 hours), the above mean is in fact an integral over a finite interval, say from
t− 12 to t. Also with the assumption of the finite upper bound on λn(t), we see that
mn(t) ≤
∫ ∞
0
(1−Gn(u)) · Λdu = sn · Λ, for ∀t ∈ [0,∞).
Therefore, there exists an upper bound on mn(t), defined by
mn = max
t∈[0,∞)
mn(t).
The probability of delay for type n users at time t can be approximated by the truncated
Poisson distribution, which is again given by the Erlang-B formula:
Pd(dn,mn) =
(mn)
dn
dn!
/
dn∑
k=0
(mn)
k
k!
. (2.13)
Note that using mn in the above equation ensures that the probability of delay is the maximum.
The sizing problem for the dedicated pool is exactly the same as the one discussed in Sec-
tion 2.4.2.1, only with mn instead of the offered load an. We do not repeat the details here.
 Flexible Pool.
In the flexible pool, since the composition of the user types varies with time, the service time
distribution is also time-dependent. Hence we use the M/G/c/c approach introduced in Section
2.4.2.1 to estimate the blocking probability and solve the sizing problem.
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2.4.3 Dynamic SAP
As observed in Section 2.3, the user arrival rates are highly time dependent. Hence we
introduce a dynamic version of SAP, which adjusts the sizes of the server pools periodically.
The main idea is to divide the entire time horizon into small planning periods. To estimate
the arrival rates, we first apply the traditional stationary independent period-by-period (SIPP)
methodology by assuming that the smaller planning periods are independent, and the system
is in steady state over each period (see Section 2.4.3.1). Due to the relatively longer service
times (compared to the lengths of the periods) at VCL, these assumptions can be violated
easily. Hence we modify this approach to account for the dependence between the consecutive
periods (see Section 2.4.3.2).
We introduce the following notation for the description of the dynamic SAP. Let {τi, i ≥ 1}
be a given increasing sequence starting with τ1 = 0. For example we use τi = i − 1 (i ≥ 1, in
hours). We call the interval [τi, τi+1) the ith period. Let dn,i, 1 ≤ n ≤ N be the number of
servers in the dedicated pool for application n over the time interval [τi, τi+1), and fi be the
corresponding number of servers in the flexible pool. Therefore our dynamic SAP is defined by
{(fi, d1,i, · · · , dN,i), i ≥ 1}.
For the M/G/c/c queue of Section 2.4.2.1, we replace the notations such as λn, sn, an
with the notations λn,i, sn,i, an,i, which indicate the arrival rate, service time, and offered load
respectively, of application n over the ith period. Then the sizes of the dedicated server pools
(d1,i, · · · , dN,i) are determined by applying Algorithm 1 over the ith period. Similarly, for the
flexible pool, we use notation λfn,i, λf,i, sf,i and af,i instead of λ
f
n, λf , sf and af for the ith
period, and we are able to determine the size fi period by period.
For the MX/M/∞ queue of Section 2.4.2.2, we use the parameters θn,i, pn,i and rn,i sepa-
rately over the ith period. Again we apply Algorithm 1 over each period to determine the sizes
of the dedicated pools by simply replacing all Pd(dn,i, an,i) by Qd(dn,i, rn,i). For the flexible
pool, we replace notations θf , pf and rf with the periodic version of θf,i, pf,i and rf,i, and the
size fi can be obtained period by period.
For the M(t)/G/∞ queue of Section 2.4.2.3, the upper bound of mn is computed by maxi-
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mizing over the ith period. That is
mn,i = max
t∈[τi,τi+1)
mn(t),
and we replace the notation mn with mn,i over the ith period. The period-by-period sizing of
the dedicated pools follows naturally using Eq. 2.13. We size the flexible pool using the same
procedure of the M/G/c/c queue.
2.4.3.1 Traditional SIPP.
The traditional SIPP approach approximates the arrival rate λn,i of application n over the
ith period by
λˆn,i =
1
τi+1 − τi
∫ τi+1
τi
λn(t)dt.
Since we assume that λn(t) is a constant equal to λn,i over [τi, τi+1), we have
λˆn,i = λn,i. (2.14)
One drawback of the SIPP method is that it requires the independence between adjacent
periods. Thus the efficacy of this method is highly dependent on the system parameters such
as the magnitude of the arrival and service rates (Green et al. (1991)), which can result in
mis-sizing the service systems. We find a similar issue in our numerical experiments. Thus we
introduce the following modification to SIPP (denoted by SDPP).
2.4.3.2 Modified SIPP (SDPP).
As discussed in Section 2.3, typical service times range from 30 minutes to four hours.
Hence many of the arrivals in one interval would continue to be in the system over the next
interval due to relatively long service times compared to the length of the interval. This
contradicts the SIPP assumption. Hence, we propose the Stationary Dependent Period by
Period (SDPP) approach that accounts for the dependence between the consecutive intervals
(see similar treatment in Massey and Whitt (1994)).
Let Bn(t) be the number of type n users who are using servers from their dedicated pool
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at time t, and Fn(t) be the number of type n users who are using servers from the flexible
pool at time t. Also Bn(t) + Fn(t) is the number of type n users in the system at time t. Let
Sn be the representative service time of a type n user. If a user arrives at the system during
[τi−Sn, τi+1), the sojourn time in the system will overlap [τi, τi+1). Hence we adjust the arrival
rate of type n over the ith period to
λmod(n,i) =
∫ τi+1
τi−Sn
λn(t)dt
/
(τi+1 − τi + Sn)
=
[∫ τi
τi−Sn
λn(t)dt+
∫ τi+1
τi
λn(t)dt
] /
(τi+1 − τi + Sn)
=
[∫ τi
τi−Sn
λn(t)dt+ (τi+1 − τi)λn,i
] /
(τi+1 − τi + Sn)
Since we do not assume any specific distribution of service times, even the expectation of
the integral in the above equation ∫ τi
τi−Sn
λn(t)dt (2.15)
is intractable in general. However, we can interpret Eq.2.15 as the total number of arrivals
over [τi−Sn, τi), and since Sn is a representative service time, all these arrivals are expected to
be in the system at time τi. Hence we approximate the integral by Bn(τi) + Fn(τi), the actual
number of type n users in the system at time τi. More specifically we approximate λmod(n,i) by
λˆmod(n,i) = [λn,i +Bn(τi) + Fn(τi)]
/
(τi+1 − τi + sn), (2.16)
where sn is again the mean service time of application n.
2.5 Forecasting Future Arrival Demand
To implement the dynamic SAP in practice, we need to forecast future arrival demand,
denoted as λn,i in the above sections. Here we introduce two forecasting methods that will be
compared in our numerical study section. The baseline method is the moving average (MA)
method, and the more sophisticated one is the singular value decomposition (SVD) method
introduced by Shen and Huang (2008).
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We introduce the common notation used in this section. Let T be the number of days. Each
day is divided into P periods. For example, we use P = 24 hourly periods in our numerical
experiments. Let xt,i be the number of arrivals during the i-th period of day t, t = 1, · · · , T ,
i = 1, · · · , P . The vector xt = [xt1, · · · , xtP ] records the hourly arrival volumes on day t. Given
the historical data x1, · · · , xT , the following sections discuss the two methods to forecast the
next-day demands xT+1.
2.5.1 Moving Average Forecasting
Let w be the rolling horizon, which is the number of historical days used for forecasting.
Specifically, considering the daily patterns in our data, we forecast the arrival demand over
each ith period of day T + 1 as the average of the same time periods of the previous w days.
That is
xˆ
(1)
T+1,i =
1
w
T∑
t=T−w+1
xt,i, i = 1, · · · , P, T > w.
To accommodate the variation in the demand and achieve a higher service quality, we also
propose an inflated estimate using the sample standard deviation:
xˆ
(2)
T+1,i = xˆ
(1)
T+1,i + 1.96
√√√√ 1
w − 1
T∑
t=T−w+1
(xt,i − xˆ(1)T+1,i)2.
The above estimate will be an approximation of the upper bound of the 95% prediction interval
of the mean arrival rate forecast.
One important issue in the MA method is to decide the size of the rolling horizon w. The
larger the window, the less influence the short term daily fluctuation will have, and more clearly
we can see the long term effects. However, a larger w would make the MA method less sensitive
to the non-stationary phenomenon. Our numerical studies use w = 30 days.
2.5.2 SVD Forecasting
Here we apply the inter-day forecasting method introduced in Shen and Huang (2008). To
be consistent with the MA method, we also use w historical days. Let X = [x>T−w+1, · · · , x>T ]>
be the historical data matrix used in the forecasting of arrivals on day T + 1 (here the sign >
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stands for transpose). The singular value decomposition (SVD) of the X can be expressed as
X = USV >, where U records the row information (the daily (inter-day) pattern of the original
X), and V records the column information (the time of day (intra-day) pattern of the arrivals).
We write the three decomposition matrices in the form of column vectors and diagonal elements:
U = (u1, · · · , uP ), V = (v1, · · · , vP ), S = diag(s1, · · · , sP ), where s1 ≥ s2 ≥ · · · ≥ sP . Then it
follows
xt = (s1ut,1)v
>
1 + · · ·+ (sPut,P )v>P .
To summarize the inter-day features while reducing the dimension of data profiles, we extract
the first K singular vectors from V , which is similar to the techniques used in the principle
component analysis. By setting skut,k = βt,k, we get the following approximation
xt ∼= (s1ut,1)v>1 + · · ·+ (sKut,K)v>K
= βt,1v
>
1 + · · ·+ βt,Kv>K .
The last step is to forecast arrivals on day T + 1. Since there are obvious day of week
patterns shown in the data, we include zi = 1, · · · , 7 as a categorical covariate controlling for
the day of week effects in the AR(1) time series model to obtain βT+1,k, 1 ≤ k ≤ K:
βT+1,k = ak(zT+1) + bkβT,k + T+1,k. (2.17)
Next, the arrival vector on day T + 1 is modeled as
xT+1 = βT+1,1v
>
1 + · · ·+ βT+1,Kv>K + T+1, (2.18)
whose mean can be estimated by
xˆ
(3)
T+1 = βT+1,1v
>
1 + · · ·+ βT+1,Kv>K .
We use the first semester arrival rates of application 1, 3 and 4 as test data to obtain
the scree plots (Shen and Huang, 2008) in Figure 2.6, and find that K = 2 or 3 gives good
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forecasting results.
Scree Plot of Application 1 Scree Plot of Application 3 Scree Plot of Application 4
Figure 2.6: Scree Plots
Because the SVD forecasting approach assumes no probabilistic models, Shen and Huang
(2008) propose a nonparametric bootstrap method to derive the prediction interval of the
forecast. Using our data, we apply the same method by first bootstraping the errors from
time series model (2.17), and obtain the series {βˆbT+1,1, · · · , βˆbT+1,K}, 1 ≤ b ≤ B, where B is
the number of bootstrap samples. Then by bootstrapping the errors in the forecasting model
(2.18), we obtain B forecasts of xT+1. For an upper bound of the 95% prediction interval,
we use the end point of the 97.5% empirical percentiles of {x1T+1, · · · , xBT+1}, and denote that
estimate by xˆ
(4)
T+1.
Note that the SVD method involves regression on the decomposed data matrix, which is
not efficient when the historical arrival volumes are close to zero. This happens to be the case
for applications ranked 100 and lower in terms of total requests, whose hourly arrival rates are
usually less than one. We therefore pool the lower ranked applications into few groups, and
forecast the aggregated arrival rates within each group. We then split the forecasted group
total arrival rates using the Bernoulli splitting rule, and obtain the hourly arrival rates for each
individual application.
In the rest of the chapter, we use λ
(j)
n,i to denote the forecasted arrival rate of application n
over the ith period using the jth forecasting method illustrated above (j = 1, 2, 3, 4 as in the
notations xˆ
(j)
T+1).
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2.6 Numerical Experiment
In this section, we report on the numerical experiments conducted to implement and com-
pare the performance of the dynamic SAP using the three queueing models. The first queueing
model (M/G/c/c) assumes that the arrival process is Poisson over each period. We use sta-
tistical tests from Brown et al. [2005] to validate this assumption, and show that overall there
is no evidence to reject the null hypothesis that the arrival process is NHPP with piecewise
constant (PC) arrival rates. See Appendix A.1.3 for details. This PC arrival rate function can
also be used in the dynamic SAP calculation with the M(t)/G/∞ model.
To implement the dynamic SAP, we forecast arrival rates λn,i using the methods introduced
in Section 2.5. We assume that the mean service times sn,i are time-independent and simply
take the sample mean sn for application n as the estimate of sn,i for all the periods. The
approaches we use to estimate other parameters such as θn,i, pn,i of the M
X/M/∞ queue are
introduced later.
We simulate the system with the trace data from the VCL to compare the efficacy of all
the methods introduced earlier. Each simulation setup can be described by four attributes
described below:
Attribute 1. Forecasting Method: MA vs. SVD;
Attribute 2. Forecasting Level: Mean vs. upper bound of 95% prediction interval;
Attribute 3. Estimation Method: SIPP vs. SDPP;
Attribute 4. Queueing Model: M/G/c/c queue vs. MX/M/∞ queue vs. M(t)/G/∞ queue.
Thus there are a total of 2× 2× 2× 3 = 24 simulation setups.
As a general parameter setting, we assume the targeted global probability of delay α∗ is
5%, and the targeted global blocking probability β∗ is 0.1%. There are 400 dedicated pools
and one flexible pool. To forecast the arrival rates, we choose the length of rolling horizon
w = 30 days, and assume that there are P = 24 hourly periods in a day. Applying methods
described in Section 2.5 for each application, we obtain four different sets of forecasts λ
(1)
n,i and
λ
(2)
n,i using the MA method, λ
(3)
n,i and λ
(4)
n,i using the SVD approach (λ
(1)
n,i and λ
(3)
n,i are at the
mean forecasting level, and λ
(2)
n,i and λ
(4)
n,i are at the upper bound of 95% prediction interval
level). Besides, we estimate the mean service time sn by the sample mean of all the recorded
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service times of application n, and we set loading time un = 5 mins for all the applications.
To determine the number of servers assigned over the ith interval, we let τi = i− 1 (i ≥ 1,
in hours), and record the number of type-n users using the dedicated servers (Bn(i − 1)) and
the flexible servers (Fn(i− 1)) at the end of the earlier period. Then the SIPP method and the
SDPP method yield the following estimates:
λˆn,i = λ
(j)
n,i,
λˆmod(n,i) = [λ
(j)
n,i +Bn(i− 1) + Fn(i− 1)]/(1 + sn).
2.6.1 M/G/c/c Queue.
In this case, all of the estimated arrival rates are used directly as the input to the greedy
algorithm of Section 2.4.2.1. We record the numbers of users blocked from all of the dedicated
pools (overflows) and use them to forecast the arrivals to the flexible pool. The same procedures
are used as those applied to the dedicated pools. The simulation results are presented in Figure
2.7.
The three plots on the left show the results using the mean forecasting level, while that
right ones use the upper bound of 95% prediction interval. Panels (a) and (b) show the average
probability of delay over the 24 hours in a day. We see that using the SVD forecasting method
produces lower probabilities, and SDPP outperforms SIPP. In panel (a) we find all of the results
are above the target level of α∗ = 5%, which means our policies underestimate the number of
servers needed. With the upper bound of 95% prediction interval, in panel (b), the two curves
using the MA forecasting methods again fail to meet the target level. The other two curves
using the SVD forecasting method are very close to, and hit our target 5% during the off-peak
hours (3am-8am), but during the peak hours, the probability of delay goes up to 9%.
In Figure 2.7, Panels (c) and (d) plot the average blocking probability over the 24 hours. At
the mean forecasting level, we see that policies using SDPP have the best performance, though
none of them hit the target β∗ = 0.1%. In Panel (d), all of the blocking probabilities are much
lower, even though only the policy using MA combined with SDPP method frequently hits the
target.
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We also plot the average number of on servers (dedicated + flexible) over the 24 hours in
Figure 2.7(e) and (f). Policies using the SVD forecasting method usually allocate more servers
during the off-peak hour, which explains the lower probabilities of delay in (a) and (b). Besides,
SDPP methods require less on servers than SIPP, while achieving the similar performance as
shown in panel (b). Hence, for this queueing model, considering Attributes 1-3, we recommend
the upper bound of 95% prediction interval as forecasting level, SDPP method, combined with
SVD for dedicated pools and MA for flexible servers.
2.6.2 MX/M/∞ Queue.
Let σ2n,i be the variance of the number of arrivals. From Eq. 2.7 and 2.8 we see that
pn,i = 2/(
σ2n,i
λn,i
+ 1), (2.19)
θn,i = λn,ipn,i,
which suggests,
rn,i = λn,isnpn,i/(1− pn,i).
Note that Qd(dn,i, rn,i) is a function of rn,i and pn,i, and hence can be viewed as a function
of λn,i and pn,i. Again we estimate λn,i using one of the combinations of our forecasting and
estimation methods, while we estimate pn,i separately by computing the sample mean and
variance of the corresponding hourly arrivals of the preceding 30 days, before plugging it into
Eq. 2.19.
Furthermore, for a small fraction of the cases where pn,i > 0.99, we use the Erlang-B loss
formula to approximate the blocking probability instead of Eq. 2.9 to avoid computational
instability. This makes sense since the Poisson distribution is the limiting case of the negative
binomial distribution NB(r, 1− p) when p→ 1 (or equivalently, as r →∞).
We collect the historical hourly overflow to the flexible pool and estimate λf,i and pf,i in the
same way as for the dedicated pools. These parameters can also be computed using Eq. 2.10
and 2.11.
We do not include here the complete simulation results to compare Attributes 1-3 since
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they are quite similar to those shown in Figure 2.7. (See Appendix A.1.4 for the corresponding
figure.) Again, we find that the best policy uses 95% forecasting level, SDPP, combined with
SVD forecasting for the dedicated pools and MA forecasting for the flexible pool. We will
present the differences among the various queueing models (Attribute 4) later in Section 2.7,
by using the same Attributes 1-3 for all queueing models.
2.6.3 M(t)/G/∞ Queue.
In this case, we first obtain the arrival function λn,i(t) by formulating a piecewise linear
function using the hourly estimates λˆn,i (or λˆmod(n,i)). Then we approximate the CDF of the
service time of each application by its own empirical CDF. Finally we compute the integral in
Eq. 2.12 numerically, and obtain mn(t), the mean number of busy servers of application n at
time t. We use the same techniques for the flexible pool as in the case of M/G/c/c queue. We
arrive at the same conclusion in comparing Attributes 1-3. See Section 2.7 for the comparison
among the three queueing models.
2.7 Recommendations
Combining the results from the 24 simulation setups, we make the following recommenda-
tions about the server allocation plan for the VCL:
(1) The SVD forecasting method results in a higher service quality than the MA for the
dedicated pools. This can be explained by the time series model used in the SVD method,
which include the day of week effects and the correlation within days. However for the more
complicated arrival process in the flexible pool, the MA method simplifies the forecasting
procedure and achieves better service quality.
(2) We notice the problem of the underestimation of the number of server allocated when
we use the average forecasts. We believe the potential sources of this are the non-stationarity
and over-dispersion in the arrival data. We therefore use a conservative forecasting level at the
upper bound of the 95% prediction interval to allow for the potential variations. The simulated
fraction of the users not receiving immediate service (probability of delay) at this level is closer
to the target level. The sizing of the flexible pool at this level successfully achieves the target
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service level (probability of blocking).
(3) The SDPP approach is highly recommended over the standard SIPP: our results show
that SDPP always provides lower probability of delay while using significantly fewer servers
(see Panel (f) in Figure 2.7). This is expected since SDPP incorporates the most recent data
from the system to update the decision for the next period. Fortunately, SDPP is only slightly
more computationally intensive than SIPP.
(4) To compare the three queueing models, we plot their performance in Figure 2.8 using
the above recommended approaches: the upper bound of the 95% prediction interval, SDPP,
combined with SVD for the dedicated pools and MA for the flexible pool. The figure shows that
for the dedicated pools (Panel (a)), the performances of the three queueing models are quite
similar. Since the M/G/c/c queue is the most computationally efficient model, we recommend
to use this model to quantify the probabilities of delay in the dedicated pools. For the flexible
pool (Panel (b)), we recommend the MX/M/∞ queueing model, which is a good approximation
to the MX/M/c/c queue. Since the flexible pool is essentially accommodating the aggregate
overflows from all of the dedicated pools, the over-dispersion issue is more obvious, which is
taken care of by the CPP of the MX/M/∞ queue model. The observations from the simulation
results indeed show lower blocking probabilities than those obtained using the other queueing
models.
2.8 Summary and Extensions
Motivated by the server allocation problem in the VCL, we model the system using two types
of server pools – the dedicated pools where pre-determined types of applications are preloaded
on certain dedicated servers, and the flexible pool where different applications are loaded on
demand. We formulate an optimization problem to minimize the number of on servers, subject
to pre-specified service level constraints. The service level includes the probabilities of a user
being delayed or blocked from the system. We construct three queueing models to quantify the
service quality constraints, and develop algorithms to identify the corresponding static SAP
which is further extended to a dynamic SAP. We extend the traditional SIPP approach and
propose a modified versoin SDPP to handle the time-varying demand.
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We then consider two methods – MA and SVD – to forecast future arrival rates given
historical data, at two forecasting levels: the mean level and the upper bound of the 95%
prediction interval level. We evaluate the performance of the dynamic SAP by conducting
discrete event simulation experiments. We run statistical tests to justify the assumption of the
piecewise constant arrival rate function over the planning horizon.
Overall, our recommended dynamic SAP keeps no more than 300 servers on during the
peak hours and about 150 servers on during the off-peak hours, which is a significant saving
over the 700-900 servers currently being kept on by the VCL using its policy. Furthermore,
under our policy, at least 90% of the users receive immediate service from the dedicated server
pools, and 99.9% of them are guaranteed a service from the flexible pool with no more than 5
extra minutes of waiting.
For future work, we are interested in modeling the VCL system using Markovian decision
processes, where decisions on the allocation of the servers and the admission of the users can
be chosen to optimize a long run cost. In that case, we can allow switching between different
types of dedicated servers, or between dedicated servers and flexible servers; we can even
allow rejecting a user even when servers are available. Costs of switching servers and rejecting
different types of users can also be incorporated.
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Figure 2.7: Simulation Results of M/G/c/c Queue
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Figure 2.8: Comparison of Three Queueing Models
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CHAPTER 3: Staffing and Scheduling for Health Care Facilities with Series
Patients: Model I
3.1 Introduction
The United States spends more per capita on healthcare than many other developed coun-
tries, and also has one of the highest growth rates on health care spending. The health care
sector recently accounted for 17.3% of the GDP. The Institute of Medicine, in a recent report,
estimated $750 billion in unnecessary health spending in 2009 alone, of which $130 billion has
been attributed to inefficient delivery of care. There is a large opportunity for health care
organizations to improve efficiency, quality, and timeliness of delivery of health care.
A healthcare organization’s appointment scheduling system can affect both timeliness of
access to health services, as well as the efficiency of the healthcare operation. Timely access
to a healthcare service is important from a clinical perspective, as well as from a patient
satisfaction perspective. Scheduling systems also have the goal of matching demand with
capacity in order to utilize resources efficiently. An appointment schedule also regulates the
demand, i.e., patients visits, so as to minimize cost of operation.
While there has been significant research in the area of patient scheduling (see Smith-
Daniels et al. (1988), Cayirli and Veral (2003), and Gupta and Denton (2008) for excellent
surveys), most of prior literature has focused on scheduling patients with single appointments.
Repeat visits by patients are usually treated in such models as distinct and independent visits.
Our research focuses on determining capacity and scheduling “series” patients. Series patients
are patients who need to be scheduled for multiple visits. In our research, we focus on specialty
care clinics with such series patients. The issue of series patients arises in several specialty
health services such as physical therapy, radiotherapy/chemotherapy for cancer, kidney dialysis,
diabetes treatment, orthodontic treatment (braces), etc.
Our research is motivated by our interaction with a large health network in Indiana. In many
specialty care clinics such as physical therapy, patients at the time of admission are scheduled
38
for repeated visits. At the beginning of the day, a batch of patient referrals is delivered from
hospitals to a specialty care clinic. A clinic administrator contacts each patient and tries to
schedule a first appointment for an initial examination. The health network with whom we
interacted with requires that an initial evaluation examination should be scheduled within 48
hours from referral. In the case that there is appointment slot available for a new patient in
this time window, the patient’s first examination is scheduled. Once he or she is evaluated,
the plan of care for the patient is specified by a physician. The plan of care determines days
between subsequent visits, total number of visits, and duration of each visit. Based on the
plan of care, an administrator in the clinic generates an appointment schedule. The frequency,
duration and length of the appointment time for the follow up visits vary greatly depending
upon the patient’s diagnosis and/or specific needs as well as the physician order. Follow up
visits are to be scheduled in a timely manner as well (2-3 days after the evaluation).
The health network we interacted with is currently unable to appropriately and consistently
match supply and demand of physical therapy services. Each new patient creates a string of
follow up visits. The follow up visits absorb a lot of the capacity on the schedule, making
it difficult to get new patients in within the 24-48 hour required time frame at this health
network. Thus, they are not able to consistently get new patients scheduled within 24-48 hours
of referral. Many times, they are not able to consistently offer timely follow up appointments
to their patients.
The primary goal of a our work is to devise a model for matching supply and demand
through scheduling, as well as determining capacity, for a health service area that has series
patients. Our model determines appropriate capacity to meet the demand of new patients (in
the required time frame) as well as recurring visits (in the required time frame). We incorporate
both revenue considerations as well as regular and overtime staffing costs in our model.
The key contributions of this work are as follows: This is one of the first work that provides
an analytical characterization of a health care facility with series patients to the best of our
knowledge. This chapter focuses on determining the staffing and scheduling for healthcare
facilities with series patients who need to be scheduled for multiple visits. We use a newsvendor
type model for the optimal staffing problem, and show that the optimal number of service
slots scheduled each day satisfies a simple equation. The series patients’ scheduling problem is
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formulated as an MDP model. A key analytical contribution is to prove it to be uni-chain. This
yields the existence of an optimal policy that maximizes the long run average profit, and also
an algorithm to compute this optimal policy. Due to the large state space, instead of solving
for the optimal policy, we propose several implementable policies. To test the effectiveness of
our proposed policies in a real-world setting, we use data from a local PT center to compare
the performance of the proposed policies. We find that the Index policy provides the best
improvement in the average profit and requires minimal effort in implementing, and hence, is
recommended for practice.
One critical assumption we make in this chapter is that we know the exact number of visits
a patient will need before we do the scheduling. We call this Model I. In the next chapter we
shall study Model II, where we do not know the number of visits before scheduling. Model I
is appropriate when the patients arrive with a recommendation that they be seen for a fixed
number of visits (which may vary from patient to patient). This is commonly the case when the
patients are seeking the treatment for work related injury and the number of visits is proscribed
by labor regulations. It is also common in many types of chemotherapy where the patient is
scheduled for a fixed number of repeat visits, say three or six. Model II is appropriate when
the number of visits of a patient depends upon the progress the patients shows as a result of
a treatment, and hence the number is a random variable whose distribution is known, but the
realized value is not known.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the relevant
literature. In Section 3.3, we introduce the structure of the model with series patients, and
describe the problems involved with staffing and scheduling policy. In Section 3.4, the staffing
model is formulated as a newsvendor type problem, and in Section 3.5 the scheduling model is
formulated as an MDP. We then propose several implementable policies in Section 3.6, where
some properties of the MDP models are proved and the procedures of the MDP based policies
are given in full detail. Using the data from local physical therapy (PT) center, we conduct
numerical experiments and compare the performance of different policies via simulation in
Section 3.7. A conclusion and future extensions of our work are provided in Section 3.8. All
proofs are available in the Appendices.
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3.2 Literature Review
The operations research literature on healthcare management on facility staffing and ap-
pointment scheduling is extensive. Cayirli and Veral [2003] provides a comprehensive survey of
research on appointment scheduling in outpatient services. In the review paper by Gupta and
Denton (2008), the most common types of health care delivery systems are described. They
also discuss the appointment scheduling issues that can arise due to the impacts of arrival and
service time variability, patient and provider preferences, available information technology, and
so on. For the review of the related field of network revenue management, see Talluri and
Van Ryzin [2006] and Chiang et al. [2006].
Typically the problems of health care system staffing and scheduling have been studied
separately. From the staffing perspective, we are particularly interested in using newsvendor
type models considering the uncertain demands and limited capacity. In a very complete
work on nurse staffing problem by Kao and Queyranne [1985], a single period, time-varying
demand model is solved as a newsvendor type problem. To solve the problem of determining
nurse staffing levels in a hospital environment, Green et al. [1991] combined the empirical
investigation of the factors affecting nurse absenteeism rates with an analytical treatment of
nurse staffing decisions using a variant of the newsvendor model. Davis et al. [2014] applied
asymmetric cost functions representing overstaffing and understaffing nursing costs. In our
staffing model, we use a variation of newsvendor model for daily profit, considering an upper
bound on overtime slots. When it comes to the sizing of inpatient care units, most of the above
literature assumes that a patient requires a single medical or nursing unit throughout the entire
stay. We make the same assumption that all the series patients require a single service slot
per visit. See section 3.4. Health care facility staffing and scheduling problems under patients
no-shows or cancellations are studied in Luo et al. [2012]; Feldman et al. [2014]; Qu et al. [2007];
Green and Savin [2008], etc. We do not consider patient no-shows/cancellations in our model
From the scheduling perspective, the problem is generally more complicated, since we need
to think both from a patient perspective (demand) with concerns of quality and time of service,
and from a hospital perspective (supply) with concerns of revenue and cost. Luo et al. [2015]
modeled the appointment system by two tandem queues, and derived performance measures
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such as service utilization and customer long-run average waiting times in both queues. Kolesar
[1970] investigated Markov chains and linear programming to determine number of admissions
to schedule to maximize average occupancy or minimize overflows. One popular topic discussed
in scheduling problems is patient classification. Different studies used different methods of
classification for scheduling purposes such as new/return, variability of service times, and type
of treatment procedure. These factors are studied in Klassen and Rohleder [1996]; Rohleder
and Klassen [2000], and Bosch and Dietz [2000]. In our scheduling model, the patients will
be classified by the number of total appointments needed, and the algorithm of scheduling
suggests that it is better to always make the scheduling decision for the patients with the least
appointments requests first.
Moreover, there is also a significant body of literature integrating staffing and scheduling
problems together. For example, Abernathy et al. [1973] developed an integrated model for
staffing and scheduling nursing units using stochastic programming with chance constraints
for demand uncertainty and service level objectives. Using a linear programming model, Ittig
[1978] demonstrated how to decide the number of physicians of each type, patient group-
physician assignments, and population acceptance rate to maximize services provided subject
to operating budget and physician supply. Hancock et al. [1978] studied the interrelationships
between admissions scheduling, hospital occupancy, and facility size with a simulation model
that assumed Poisson emergency arrival rates. Rath et al. [2015] analyze the joint staffing and
scheduling decision for surgery operating rooms. In this chapter, we first propose the staffing
policy and scheduling policy separately, then we integrate the two parts in the numerical
experiments.
3.3 The Model
In this section we describe the model of a health care clinic with series patients. New
patients call ahead to make a series of appointments. Let Bn be the number of new arrivals
(calls) on day n, and let Vi be the number of repeat visits needed by the ith patient. We shall
assume that {Bn, n ≥ 0} are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) random variables
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with common probability mass function (pmf)
φj = P (Bn = j), j ≥ 0, (3.1)
and {Vi, i ≥ 1} is a sequence of i.i.d. random variables with common pmf
pk = P (Vi = k), k ≥ 1. (3.2)
and common complementary cdf (cumulative distribution function)
fk = P (Vi ≥ k) =
∞∑
j=k
pj , k ≥ 1.
Furthermore, {Vi, i ≥ 1} are independent of {Bn, n ≥ 0}.
Let Bn,k be the number of new arrivals on day n who require exactly k repeat visits.
Then, given Bn = b, we see that [Bn,1, Bn,2, Bn,3 · · · ] is a multinomial random variable with
parameters b and p = [p1, p2, p3, · · · ], that is,
P ([Bn,1, Bn,2, Bn,3 · · · ] = [b1, b2, b3, · · · ] | Bn = b) = b!
∞∏
k=1
pbkk
bk!
, (3.3)
if
∑
bk = b, and zero otherwise. We shall find it convenient to introduce the following notation
to describe the arrival stream. Let
An,k =
∞∑
i=k
Bn,i, k ≥ 1
be number of new arrivals on day n who need at least k repeat visits (k = 1, 2, . . . ;n = 1, 2, · · · ).
Let
An = [An,1, An,2, An,3, · · · ].
Thus {An, n ≥ 0} is a sequence of i.i.d. random vectors, taking values in A given by
A = {a = [a1, a2, a3, · · · ] : ak ≥ ak+1, ak ∈ Z+ for k ≥ 1}, (3.4)
43
where Z+ as the set of non-negative integers. From the definition of An,k, it is obvious that
An,1 = Bn is the total number of arrivals on day n. Furthermore, from Equation 3.3, we get
An,k −An,k+1 ∼ B(Bn, pk),
and
An,k ∼ B(Bn, fk),
where B(m, p) denotes the binomial distribution with parameters m and p.
When a patient arrives (calls) on day n, he/she has to be given the first appointment on
day m ∈ {n + 1, n + 2, · · · , n + T}, where T is a given positive integer, and if he/she needs k
repeat visits, they are scheduled on days m,m+ T,m+ 2T, · · · ,m+ (k − 1)T . Thus there are
no same day appointments and no walk-ins. Also, once the day of the first appointment for a
patient is decided, it automatically fixes the entire appointment schedule for that patient for
all her repeat visits. The rule that dictates how the first appointment is scheduled is called the
scheduling policy.
Let Dn be the total number of patients that are scheduled to be seen on day n. We assume
that each of these patients requires exactly one one-hour appointment (called the slot). Thus
Dn is the demand for the number of slots on day n, which depends on the scheduling policy.
The detail of scheduling model will be given in Section 3.5.
Next we describe the staffing policy. We shall assume that the clinic has a fixed number of
permanent employees that together can offer q slots on each day, and this cannot be changed
dynamically in response to the daily demand. The clinic does have the flexibility of asking
the employees to put in overtime to handle the random variations in demand for the slots.
However, industry regulations specify an upper bound on overtime. For example, one cannot
schedule more that 15% overtime for a physical therapist. We introduce a parameter γ ≥ 1
with the following interpretation: if the clinic has q slots from its regular employees, it can get
a total of γq (regular + overtime) slots from them. Thus for a physical therapy clinic we have
γ = 1.15. The staffing policy decides the q. We refer to Section 3.4 for the detail our staffing
model.
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Clearly, both the optimal staffing and scheduling policies depend on the costs and revenues
involved. Hence we now describe the cost structure. Let c be the cost of offering one regular
slot. Note that we always incur a fixed cost cq per day, regardless of how many regular slots
are actually used to serve the patients. Let p be the revenue from one appointment. Every
patient served in the overtime slot costs c′ > c. If the total demand for the day exceeds the
total slots γq, the excess demand (called the overflow demand) produces no net revenue (that
is, the cost of serving one patient from the overflow demand is p, the same as the revenue). We
also assume that there are delay costs incurred as follows: if a new customer arriving on day n
is given her first appointment on day n+ t (1 ≤ t ≤ T ) it costs cd(t). We assume that
0 = cd(1) ≤ cd(2) ≤ · · · ≤ cd(T ).
This delay cost function can be used to represent many realistic scenarios, including the
healthcare facility that motivated our problem context. Let p(q, pi) be the long run net profit
per day (assuming it exists) if staffing level is q and scheduling policy is pi. The goal is to find
the optimal (staffing level, scheduling policy) pair (q∗, pi∗) (assuming it exists) such that
p(q∗, pi∗) ≥ p(q, pi)
for all pairs (q, pi). This is an intractable problem to solve in one go. Hence in Section 3.4 we
assume that pi is fixed and solve for the optimal staffing level q∗ = q∗(pi) such that
p(q∗, pi) ≥ p(q, pi)
for all staffing levels q. Then, in Section 3.5, we assume that q is fixed and solve for the optimal
scheduling policy pi∗ = pi∗(q) such that
p(q, pi∗) ≥ p(q, pi)
for all scheduling policies pi. The problem of finding the optimal staffing and scheduling simul-
taneously is discussed in Section 3.7.
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3.4 The Optimal Staffing Policy
In this section we describe a newsvendor type formulation to determine the optimal staffing
policy q, assuming that a given scheduling policy pi is followed. Let Dn be the demand on day
n generated by this policy. In Section 3.5 we shall describe in detail how Dn depends on the
scheduling policy pi. Let F be the steady state distribution of Dn as n → ∞. Clearly F will
depend on the scheduling policy. Let D be a generic random variable with cdf F . We shall
choose q to maximize the expected daily profit in steady state.
Note that we always incur a fixed cost cq, regardless of how many regular slots are actually
used. When the q < D ≤ γq, we satisfy the D − q demands by using the overtime slots. If
D > γq, we do not get any revenue from that overflow demand. Let ρ(D, q) be the net daily
profit if the staffing level is q, and (random) demand is D. Based on the above description, we
see that, ρ(D, q) is given by
ρ(D, q) = pmin(D, γq)− cq − c′max(min(D, γq)− q, 0)). (3.5)
In Figure 3.1, we see that the marginal profit of serving one slot is p when D < q. Then
the marginal profit decreases by c′ when q ≤ D < γq, since we are using overtime slots and
this will cost c′. After the demand exceeds the total capacity D > γq, we see that there is
no marginal gains by admitting more patients. This case can be thought as those patients are
referred to other clinic due the limited capacity.
Let the expected daily profit be denoted by:
G(q) = E(ρ(D, q)) = E
(
pmin(D, γq)− cq − c′max(min(D, γq)− q, 0)) .
Note that
p(q, pi) = G(q)− expected delay cost under pi.
Since the delay cost does not depend on q, finding the q that maximizes p(q, pi) is the same as
finding the q that maximizes G(q). We proceed to that next.
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Figure 3.1: Daily Net Profit as Function of D
Using the cdf F of D, G(q) can be expressed explicitly as follows:
G(q) = p
∫ γq
0
(1− F (x)) dx− cq − c′
∫ γq
q
(1− F (x)) dx. (3.6)
The optimal staffing level q∗ is the value of q that maximizes G(q). Although D and q are
integer valued, it is easier to treat them as continuous quantities to obtain the results about
q∗ as in the theorem below (see proof in Appendix A.2.1).
Theorem 3.1. Assume the pdf of D exists and p ≥ c′ ≥ c, then profit function G(·) is concave.
Then G(·) is maximized at q∗, where q∗ be the unique solution to
(p− c′)γ
(p− c′)γ + c′F (γq) +
c′
(p− c′)γ + c′F (q) = ζ, (3.7)
where
ζ =
(p− c′)γ + c′ − c
(p− c′)γ + c′ . (3.8)
Furthermore, q∗ satisfies
F−1(ζ)
γ
≤ q∗ ≤ F−1(ζ). (3.9)
The hard part in finding q∗ is the computation of the steady state demand distribution F .
In Section 3.6 we shall study a class of policies for which this is relatively easy to do.
47
Remark 3.1. Since q is an integer, we can rewrite Equation 3.9 as
dF
−1(ζ)− γ + 1
γ
e ≤ q∗ ≤ bF−1(ζ)c.
Remark 3.2. When γ = 1 (that is, no over time allowed), the result in Theorem 3.1 reduces
to the standard newsvendor formula.
Remark 3.3. Let the expectation of demand be µ. We can show that if ζ < F (µ) then q∗ < µ,
that is, the optimal number of slots assigned each day is less then the expected daily demand.
On the other hand, if we have ζ > F (γµ), then q∗ > µ, which means we need more slots then
the expected demand.
3.5 Optimal Scheduling Policies
In this section we assume that the staffing level q is fixed. Our aim is to find a policy that
maximizes the long run expected net profit per day. We do this by formulating the problem as
a discrete time Markov decision process (MDP).
The state of the appointment schedule at the beginning of day n ≥ 0 is described by a
matrix Xn = [Xn(k, t)], where Xn(k, t) is the number of patients who have appointments (not
necessarily their first) on day n + t, and have at least k visits remaining. Xn takes values in
the set X :
X = {x = [x(k, t)] : x(k, t) ≥ x(k + 1, t), x(k, t) ∈ Z+ for k ≥ 1; t = 1, . . . , T} . (3.10)
Let An be the arrival vector during day n. Note that in practice, the scheduling decisions are
made for each new patient at the time of her arrival, depending on the state of the appointment
schedule at that time. This, unfortunately, leads to more complicated models. Hence we
simplify the situation by assuming that the entire An vector is observable at the beginning of
day n (every new patient calls early in the morning) and we decide their schedule based on Xn
and An. This creates a tractable model and it leads to policies that can be implemented on
a patient by patient basis. Thus the scheduling problem reduces to deciding how many of the
An,k new patients should be given their first appointments on day n+ t, for 1 ≤ t ≤ T .
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Accordingly, we define Yn(k, t) as the number of patients who arrived on day n, asked for at
least k repeat visits, and are given their first appointment on day n+ t. Let Yn = [Yn(k, t)] be
the matrix representing the scheduling action taken on day n. For the given realization a ∈ A,
let
∆(a) = {y ∈ X : ye = a},
where e is a column vector of all ones. Clearly, given An = a, we have Yn ∈ ∆(a).
The state of the system at the beginning of day n is the combination of scheduling state and
the arrival vector, namely, (Xn, An). The decision on day n is Yn ∈ ∆(a) given that An = a.
Next we describe the transition of state under cyclic scheduling.
For z ∈ X , define the matrix Tz = [Tz(k, t)] as follows:
Tz(k, t) =

z(k, t+ 1) if t = 1, . . . , T − 1, k ≥ 1;
z(k + 1, 1) if t = T, k ≥ 1.
We see that, given Xn = x and Yn = y, the state of the scheduling on day n+ 1 is given by
Xn+1 = Tx+y.
To compute the immediate reward, we first need to know the demand for day n, which is
the number of appointments scheduled on day n+ 1, and is given by
Dn = Xn−1(1, 1) + Yn−1(1, 1), n ≥ 1. (3.11)
Note that demand on day 0 is undefined, and is not given by the initial state X0. The immediate
reward for day n, given the state Xn = x, and the decision Yn = y, is given by:
r(x, y) = ρ(x(1, 1) + y(1, 1), q)−
T∑
t=1
cd(t)y(1, t), (3.12)
where the first term gives revenue minus the staffing cost using the function ρ from Equation 3.5,
and the second term gives the delay cost incurred from assigning y(1, t) number of new arrivals
their first appointment t days later. Note that we suppress the dependence of r(x, y) on q to
49
simplify the notation.
Since {An, n ≥ 0} are iid vectors, we see from the above description that {((Xn, An), Yn), n ≥
0} is a discrete time MDP. The objective is to maximize the long-run net profit per day. Let pi
be a stationary policy, and the long-run average profit under pi is given by (assuming the limit
exists)
ppi(x, a) = lim
n→∞
1
n
Epi
 n∑
j=1
r(Xj , Yj)|X1 = x,A1 = a
.
Let
p∗(x, a) = sup
pi
ppi(x, a), ∀(x, a) ∈ X ×A,
where the supremum is taken among all stationary policies. We call pi∗ the optimal policy if it
achieves the above supremum:
ppi
∗
(x, a) = p∗(x, a), ∀(x, a) ∈ X ×A.
Next, we restate the known results from Tijms (2004) as to when such an optimal policy
exists and how to obtain it. It is known that an average profit optimal policy exists if there is
a constant g and a function v : X ×A → (−∞,∞) satisfying the following equation, called the
Bellman equation:
v(x, a) + g = max
y∈∆(a)
{r(x, y) + E(v(Tx+y, A))}, (x, a) ∈ X ×A. (3.13)
If there exists a solution to the above equation, the p∗(x, a) = g for all states (x, a). Let
S(x, a) = argmax
y∈∆(a)
{r(x, y) + E(v(Tx+y, A))}, (x, a) ∈ X ×A. (3.14)
Then the policy that chooses any decision from S(x, a) in state (x, a) is optimal. We next state
an important property of our MDP (see proof in Appendix A.2.2).
Theorem 3.2. Suppose
φ0 = P (Bn = 0) > 0.
Then the MDP {((Xn, An), Yn), n ≥ 0} is uni-chain and aperiodic.
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It is known that if an MDP is unichain, there exists a solution to the Bellman equation,
and hence the optimal average profit policy exists. It can be numerically computed as follows:
Let v0(x, a) = 0 for all (x, a) ∈ X ×A, and
vn(x, a) = max
y∈∆(a)
{
r(x, y) + E(vn−1(Tx+y, A))
}
, (x, a) ∈ X ×A, n ≥ 1.
Here the expectation on the right hand side is taken with respect to A which is a generic
random vector representing the new arrivals on a day. Next define
mn = min{|vn(x, a)− vn−1(x, a)| : (x, a) ∈ X ×A},
Mn = max{|vn(x, a)− vn−1(x, a)| : (x, a) ∈ X ×A}.
Then it can be shown that
vn(x, a)− ng → v(x, a), (x, a) ∈ X ×A (3.15)
and
mn ≤ g ≤Mn.
These results yield a simple algorithm than can be used to numerically compute the optimal
average profit g with a margin of error bounded by an  > 0, and the optimal policy pi∗. It
terminates in a finite number of steps if the state space is finite.
3.5.1 Structural Properties of the Optimal Policy
In this subsection we study the structural properties of the optimal policy. We ignore the
integrality constraints inherent in the above formulation to simplify our results. So we abuse
the notation in this subsection and use X and A as given by the Equation 3.4 and Equation 3.10
without the integrality constraints.
Recall that the immediate reward in Equation 3.12 can be written as
r(x, y) = R(x+ y) + f(y)
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where R(x + y) = ρ(x(1, 1) + y(1, 1), q) is concave in x + y, and f(y) = −∑Tt=1 cd(t)y(1, t) is
linear in y.
We can further simplify the notation by letting gn(x + y) = E(vn−1(Tx+y, A)). Then in
step 2 of the algorithm, we are in fact solving the following optimization problem P (n):
P (n) : vn(x, a) = max
y
{gn(x+ y) +R(x+ y) + f(y)}
s.t. y ∈ X , (3.16)
ye = a (3.17)
Note that the constraint 3.17 is linear in y, so the feasible set given by 3.16 and 3.17 is convex,
by which we can establish the concavity of vn for any n ≥ 0 below (see proof in Appendix A.2.3):
Theorem 3.3. For any n ≥ 0 and a given arrival vector a ∈ A, the value function vn(x, a) is
concave in x ∈ X .
It follows from Equation 3.15 that v(x, a) is concave in x. We have stated earlier that a
stationary Markovian policy pi∗ that chooses an action y(x, a) ∈ S(x, a) in state (x, a) is an
optimal policy. The next theorem gives the structural properties of pi∗ that follow from the
concavity of v. In particular it gives a result about how an optimal solution in state (x, a)
changes if the state (x, a) is perturbed to (x+ h, a) (see prove in Appendix A.2.4).
Theorem 3.4. Let x1 ∈ X , a ∈ A and y1 ∈ S(x1, a). Let h satisfy:
(a) x2 = x1 + h ∈ X , and
(b) y1 ± h ∈ X , and
(c) he = 0.
Then there exists an optimal decision y2 ∈ S(x2, a) satisfying
y2 = y1 − h. (3.18)
Note that we consider the decision variable in the equivalent optimization problem to be x+y
as a whole, and show that under certain conditions, the change in x will not affect the optimal
x+ y. For example, consider h with h(1, t) = +1, h(1, s) = −1 for some s, t ∈ {1, · · · , T} (and
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all the other components of h are zero). Then x2 is obtained by shifting one of the patients on
the schedule x1 from day s to day t. If we also have y1(1, t) > 0, y1(1, s) > 0 then Theorem 3.4
implies that y2(1, t) = y1(1, t)− 1, y2(1, s) = y1(1, s) + 1, that is the optimal policy will assign
one less patient on day t but one more on day s to keep x1 + y1 = x2 + y2.
Remark 3.4. In the Theorem 3.4, we assume the change only happens in x, while the arrival
vector a does not change. The next theorem gives a result about how the optimal solution
changes if the state changes from (x, a) to (x+ h, b).
Theorem 3.5. Let x1 ∈ X , a ∈ A and y1 ∈ S(x1, a). Let h satisfy:
(a) x2 = x1 + h ∈ X , and
(b) y1 ± h ∈ X , and
(c’) b = a− he ∈ A.
Then there exists an optimal decision y2 ∈ S(x2, b) satisfying
y2 = y1 − h.
As an example, denote a = [a1, a2 · · · ], and b = [b1, b2 · · · ]. Let b1 = a1−1 while h(1, t) = +1
for some t (and all the other components of h are zero), that is we have one less of arrival but
one more appointment scheduled on day t. Again if y1(1, t) > 0, then by the above conclusion,
the optimal decision with state x2 will simply be achieved by assigning one less patient on day
t, that is y2(1, t) = y1(1, t)− 1 and x1 + y1 = x2 + y2 still holds.
It is clear that it is not feasible to derive the -optimal policy pi for any realistically sized
problem, since the size of X × A is infinite. Even if we make it finite by assuming no patient
requires more than K number of repeat visits, and we never keep more than M patients on the
schedule, the size is still too huge to compute the policy numerically, for reasonable values of T ,
K, N and M . For example, even if each patient visits the facility no more than twice and if the
schedule repeats every five days, it would still require a solution to a 10 dimensional problem.
Hence, in the following section, we study several heuristic policies that are easy to implement
in practice. This section derived structural results which gave insights on the properties of the
optimal policy. Many of the implementable heuristic policies studied in the next section are
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also shown to have the same structural properties.
3.6 Implementable Policies
In this section, we describe several implementable policies including Next Day policy (as a
special case of Randomized policy), Shortest Queue policy, Max-Marginal Profit policy, Min-
cost Flow policy, and Index policy. Except Index policy, the other four policies share the same
structural property of the optimal policy, and use increasingly more information regarding the
system state and the future demand in decision making. Both Min-cost Flow policy and Index
policy are based on our MDP formulation, and Index policy leads to a good approximation to
Min-cost Flow policy while requiring less computation efforts.
3.6.1 Randomized policy (RP)
We start with a baseline policy that schedules the first appointment of every new patient
arriving on day n to day n+ t (1 ≤ t ≤ T ) with probability of βt, where
∑T
t=1 βt = 1. This is
done independently of the arrivals and the current state of the appointment schedule. Under
this policy, given an arrival vector An, we have
Yn(k, t) ∼ B(An,k, βt), for t = 1, · · · , T ; k ≥ 1,
as the allocation decision made for day n ≥ 0. Since An,k ∼ B(Bn, fk), it can be shown that
Yn(k, t) ∼ B(Bn, fkβt), for t = 1, · · · , T ; k ≥ 1. (3.19)
We begin by evaluating the distribution of the demand Dn under RP (see Equation 3.11).
The main result is given in the following theorem. First we introduce some relevant notation.
For any n ≥ 1, there is a unique t = tn ∈ {1, 2, · · · , T} and k = kn ≥ 1 such that
n = (k − 1)T + t.
They are given by
kn = dn/T e, tn = n− (kn − 1)T.
54
We also find the following set notation useful:
Sn = {(k, t) : k ≥ 1, 1 ≤ t ≤ T, (k − 1)T + t ≤ n}.
Theorem 3.6. Suppose X0 = x and let Dn be the demand on day n under the RP with
parameters [β1, β2, · · · , βT ]. Let
Φ(z) = E(zBn)
be the generating function of Bn. Then
Dn = x(kn, tn) + Zn, n ≥ 1, (3.20)
where the random variable Zn has the generating function given below:
E(zZn) =
∏
(k,t)∈Sn
Φ(zfkβt − fkβt + 1), (3.21)
Corollary 3.1. Suppose {Bn, n ≥ 0} are i.i.d. random variables with mean λ. Also assume
{Vi, i ≥ 1} are i.i.d. random variables with mean m. If the number of patients on schedule on
day 0 is finite, we have
lim
n→∞E(Dn|X0 = x) = limn→∞E(Zn) = λm.
This is to be expected: the expected number of new arrivals in a day is λ, and each of them
requires m repeat visits on average. Hence the expected total number of new slots requested by
all the new arrivals in a day is λm. It holds under all the stationary policies that the expected
demand for appointment slots per day in steady state must be λm.
Corollary 3.2. Suppose {Bn, n ≥ 0} are i.i.d. Poisson random variables with parameter λ,
denoted as P(λ), and the {Vi, i ≥ 1} are i.i.d. random variables with mean m. Let
λn = λ
∑
(k,t)∈Sn
fkβt. (3.22)
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Then
Zn ∼ P(λn).
Furthermore, if there are a finite number of patients on schedule on day 0, Zn, and Dn
converge to a P(λm) random variable as n→∞.
As a special case, we now introduce the next day (ND) policy under which all of the new
patients arriving on day n are given their first appointments on day n+ 1. It is obtained from
RP by setting β1 = 1. Under ND policy, we have
Yn(k, t) =

An,k, if t = 1;
0, if 2 ≤ t ≤ T.
From Theorem 3.6 we see that
E(zZn) =
kn∏
k=1
Φ(zfk − fk + 1).
In particular, if the daily arrivals are i.i.d. P(λ), we can use Corollary 3.2 to see that
Dn = x(kn, tn) + P(λ
kn∑
k=1
fk), (3.23)
and, in the limit when n→∞, Dn converges to a P(λm) random variable.
Since cd(1) = 0, the long run expected delay cost per day for ND policy is zero. Thus,
among all the state-independent RP’s, the ND policy minimizes the delay cost.
3.6.2 Shortest Queue (SQ) policy
Note that the decisions under the RP’s are independent of the schedule state. In this section
we consider the shortest queue (SQ) policy that uses the information of the current scheduling
state to a limited extent. Suppose the state of the schedule is x when a new patient arrives.
Then x(1, t) represents the total number of patients already scheduled on t days into future,
56
1 ≤ t ≤ T . The SQ policy assigns the arrival to a slot m(x) days into the future, where
m(x) ∈ argmin{x(1, t) : 1 ≤ t ≤ T}.
(If the argmin set on the right hand side of above equation has more than one element, m(x)
can be chosen to be any one of them.) Hence, SQ policy chooses a day with the smallest x(1, t)
among 1 ≤ t ≤ T . Since the SQ policy is state dependent, the distribution of the daily demand
in steady state is very hard to compute even under further assumptions on the arrival stream
such as i.i.d. Poisson or Geometric arrivals. However, it can be easily implemented in practice
as well as in simulation.
3.6.3 Max-Marginal Profit (MP) policy
One clear drawback of the SQ policy is that it ignores the revenue or cost from serving
patients, as well as the delay costs. In this section we develop a policy that addresses this
drawback. Suppose the current day is n and state of the schedule is x. Assume a new patient
arrives and we need to assign this patient to day n+ t (1 ≤ t ≤ T ), and no more new patients
arrive. This changes the demand on day n + t from x(1, t) to x(1, t) + 1, and incurs a delay
cost of cd(t). To begin with we ignore the increase in the demand in later cycles due to this
assignment.
The marginal increase in net profit over the first cycle from this assignment is thus
ψ(x, t) = ρ(x(1, t) + 1, q)− ρ(x(1, t), q)− cd(t).
Using the definition of ρ in Equation 3.5, we can show that
ψ(x, t) = pδ(x(1, t) < γq)− c′δ(q ≤ x(1, t) < γq)− cd(t), (3.24)
where δ(A) = 1 if the condition in A is satisfied and zero otherwise. This policy assigns the
new arrival to day n+m(x), where
m(x) ∈ argmax{ψ(x, t) : 1 ≤ t ≤ T}.
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That is, the policy selects the t that maximizes the function ψ(x, t) for the given state
x of the schedule and schedules the first appointment on day n + t. We call this policy the
Max-marginal Profit (MP) policy. We would expect a better performance of this policy than
ND and SQ policies, since it considers the current schedule status as well as the revenue and
cost.
As in the SQ policy, the demand distribution under the MP policy is intractable, and needs
to be estimated by simulation.
In the above policy, we do not use the information about the type of the new arrival. If we
know the arriving patient is of type k, we can further modify the MP policy as follows. We
continue to assume that there are no more arrivals after this patient. Thus when we assign the
incoming patient to day n + t, it increases the demand on day n + t + (j − 1)T (1 ≤ j ≤ k)
from x(j, t) to x(j, t) + 1. Hence the marginal increase in net profit over the next k cycles from
this assignment is given by
ψk(x, t) =
k∑
j=1
(ρ(x(j, t) + 1, q)− ρ(x(j, t), q))− cd(t)
=p
k∑
j=1
δ(x(j, t) < γq)− c′
k∑
j=1
δ(q ≤ x(j, t) < γq)− cd(t). (3.25)
As before we choose to assign the new arrival to day n+mk(x), where
mk(x) ∈ argmax{ψk(x, t) : 1 ≤ t ≤ T}.
We call this policy the modified Max-marginal Profit (MMP) policy. It is unclear if MMP
is better than MP. Indeed, we show in Section 3.7 that we do not benefit more from MMP than
MP policy.
3.6.4 Policy Improvement Heuristics: Index policy
The MP and MMP policies both account for the current state of the schedule as well as
the cost structure. However, they ignores the future arrivals and the impact of the current
decision on future admissions. Now we develop policies that address this concern. This leads
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us to consider the procedure of policy improvement.
We use fy to denote the policy that takes action y at the beginning of day 0 but from day
1 on uses the ND policy. Let f ′ be the policy if we choose y optimally. Its expected total profit
with n periods to go is given by
vnf ′(x, a) = max
y∈∆(a)
vnfy(x, a) = max
y∈∆(a)
{
r(x, y) + E(vn−1ND (Tx+y, A))
}
(3.26)
where the last expectation is taken over all the random arrivals A.
Using Equation 3.20, and utilizing the fact that the ND policy has zero delay cost, we see
that
E(vn−1ND (x,A)) = END
n−1∑
j=1
ρ(Dj , q) | X0 = x,A0 = A

=
n−1∑
j=1
E (ρ(x(kj , tj) + Zj , q) | X0 = x,A0 = A))
=
n−1∑
j=1
gkj ,tj (x(kj , tj)), (3.27)
where
gk,t(z) = E(ρ(z + Z(k−1)T+t)), (3.28)
We state the important property of the g functions in the next theorem.
Proposition 3.1. Assume p ≥ c′. Then, for k ≥ 1 and t = 1, · · · , T , gk,t(z) of Equation 3.28
is a concave function in z.
From Equation 3.27, maximizing the right hand side of 3.26 is equivalent to maximizing:
vnfy(x, a) = ρ(x(1, 1) + y(1, 1), q)−
T∑
t=1
cd(t)y(1, t) +
n−1∑
j=1
gkj ,tj (Tx+y(kj , tj))
=
n∑
j=1
g˜kj ,tj (x(kj , tj), y(kj , tj))
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where
g˜k,t(w, z) =

ρ(w + z, q) if k = 1, t = 1;
gk−1,T (w + z) if k ≥ 2, t = 1;
gk,t−1(w + z)− cd(t)zδ(k = 1) if k ≥ 1, 2 ≤ t ≤ T.
Therefore, given the initial state of X0 = x and A1 = a, the optimization problem discussed
above can be formulated explicitly as follows:
max
y
n∑
j=1
g˜kj ,tj (x(kj , tj), y(kj , tj)) (3.29)
s.t. y ∈ ∆(a)
It’s obvious that all the g˜k,t(w, z) are concave functions in z from Proposition 3.1.
It is possible to solve the above optimization problem by converting it to a min cost flow
problem on directed networks with general costs (positive as well as negative). We show that
formulation in the next subsection. Here we describe a greedy procedure as a suboptimal but
simple implementable policy, which (as we see in Section 3.7) works very well in practice.
We need the following notation:
y˜(k, t) = y(k, t)− y(k + 1, t), k ≥ 1, t = 1, · · · , T
a˜k = ak − ak+1, k ≥ 1.
Note that we can construct y from y˜ and a from a˜. The greedy procedure starts with y˜
and the corresponding y being the zero matrices, and in a1 steps builds a matrix y ∈ ∆(a). In
each step one of the elements of y˜ increases by one. The procedure is “greedy” in that at each
step it chooses to increment the element that is feasible and yields the maximum change in the
the objective function. The procedure is described in detail below. First we define the index
function:
Ik(x, t) =
k∑
j=1
g˜j,t(x(j, t), 1)− g˜j,t(x(j, t), 0),
which gives the change of the objective function in Equation 3.29 if y˜(k, t) is incremented by
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1. In general, we have the explicit expression for the index function:
Ik(x, t) =
k∑
j=1
(p− c′)Fj,t(γq − x(j, t)− 1) + c′Fj,t(q − x(j, t)− 1)− cd(t), (3.30)
where Fj,t(·) is the cdf of the random variable Z˜j,t given by:
Z˜j,t =

0 if j = 1, t = 1;
Z(j−2)T+t, if j ≥ 2, t = 1;
Z(j−1)T+t−1, if j ≥ 1, t ≥ 2.
Note that the generating function of variable Zn is given in Equation 3.21.
This index function is especially easy to compute when the new arrivals are i.i.d. Poisson.
By Equation 3.23, we can show that Z˜k,t are Poisson random variables with rate of λk,t given
by:
λk,t =

0 if k = 1, t = 1;
λ
∑k−1
j=1 fj , if k ≥ 2, t = 1;
λ
∑k
j=1 fj , if k ≥ 1, t ≥ 2;
Using the index function we describe the following greedy procedure:
Greedy Procedure:
 Given x, a, set K = max{k : ak > 0};
 Initialize y, y˜ to be 0;
 For k = 1 to K do:
– While
∑T
t=1 y˜(k, t) < a˜k do:
* Determine the index t∗ as follows:
t∗ ∈ argmax {Ik(x, t) : 1 ≤ t ≤ T} . (3.31)
* Set y˜(k, t∗) = y˜(k, t∗) + 1. Update y accordingly, and set x = x+ y.
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– End while loop;
 End for loop.
Thus, when the above algorithm terminates, the final y is in ∆(a).
Remark 3.5. The above algorithm indeed produces the optimal solution if x(k, t) = 0 for all
k ≥ 2, and all 1 ≤ t ≤ T . See Ibaraki and Katoh (1988), and Bretthauer and Shetty (1995).
However, in general the greedy algorithm produces a suboptimal solution.
We can use the above algorithm to construct a scheduling policy that operates as follows:
when an arrival of type k occurs, we first observe x, the current state of the schedule. Then we
compute Ik(x, t) for all 1 ≤ t ≤ T and then find the t∗ as in Equation 3.31. Then we schedule
the first appointment of this new arrival t∗ days later. This is called the Index policy. It is clear
that this policy uses the information about the schedule, the current arrival, the cost structure,
and accounts for the future arrivals, and the influence of the current decision on future costs.
Hence we expect this policy to do better than those considered so far in the earlier part of this
section.
Proposition 3.2. The index in Equation 3.30 has the following properties:
p1: If k1 ≤ k2, then Ik1(x, t) ≤ Ik2(x, t), for ∀x, t;
p2: If t1 ≤ t2 and for ∀k we have x(k, t1) = x(k, t2), then Ik(x, t1) ≥ Ik(x, t2), for ∀k;
p3: If x1(k, t) ≤ x2(k, t) for ∀k, t, then Ik(x1, t) ≥ Ik(x2, t);
The interpretation for p1 is straightforward: given the same current scheduling state,
scheduling one more patient of type k2 to t days later is more profitable than that of a type
k1 to the same day, since k1 < k2 and type k2 patient needs more appointments. Property p2
suggests that, if we have the same number of patients already scheduled on some day n + t1
and day n + t2, it would be more profitable to assign the incoming patient to the earlier day,
considering the delay costs in non-increasing in t. From p3 we see that the marginal profit of
admitting one more patient is greater if we have a lighter schedule.
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3.6.5 Policy Improvement Heuristics: Min-Cost Flow (MF) policy
Equation 3.29 can be solved to optimality by formulating it as a min-cost network flow
problem with KT +K + 1 nodes and 2KT arcs. The schedule x provides the constraints, the
arrival a provides the flow, and g˜k,t provides the costs. This can be solved by the successive
shortest path algorithm of Bazaara and Jarvis (1977) in O(a1K
3T 2) steps. The details of the
network and the algorithm are given in the Appendix A.2.11.
We can show that when there is only one patient (of any type) arrives, the successive
shortest path procedure reduces to the greedy procedure. In this trivial case, MF policy makes
the same decision as the Index policy.
Moreover, MF policy assumes that the entire arrival vector for the current day is known
before first appointments are assigned. This is typically not practical in real applications,
where the appointment decision has to be made once a new patient arrives (calls). We study it
nevertheless, because the theory of MDP states that it is provably better than the ND policy
in maximizing the expected profit per day. We cannot make any such claim for the Index
policy. One would naturally expect this policy to outperform the Index policy, but at the cost
of higher computational load.
3.6.6 Structural Properties of the Implementable Policies
Now we study the structural properties of the implementable policies introduced above. It
is interesting to note that, except for the MF policy, all the other policies can be thought of
as index policies with their own index functions. For example, the ND policy uses the index
function
INDk (x, t) = I
ND(t) = −c(t), 1 ≤ t ≤ T,
which does not depend on k or x. The SQ policy uses the index function
ISQk (x, t) = −x(1, t), 1 ≤ t ≤ T,
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which does not depend on k, and uses only the first row of x. The MP policy uses the index
function
IMPk (x, t) = ψ(x, t), 1 ≤ t ≤ T,
where ψ(x, t) is defined in Equation 3.24. Note that this function is independent of k and uses
only the first row of x, and also incorporates the revenue and cost. The MMP policy uses the
index function
IMMPk (x, t) = ψk(x, t), 1 ≤ t ≤ T,
where ψk(x, t) is defined in Equation 3.25. Note that this function depends on k and uses the
first k rows of x, and also involves the revenue and cost. Each of these policies f chooses an
mk(x) ∈ argmax{Ifk (x, t) : 1 ≤ t ≤ T},
and gives the first appointment to the type k arrival mk(x) days into the future. We reserve
the term “Index policy” to mean the policy that uses the index defined in Equation 3.30. Note
that the policies ND,SQ,MP, and MMP use increasingly more information about the state
(x, a) in making decisions. Hence we expect that they will perform increasingly closer to the
optimal policy. We shall numerically evaluate this hypothesis in the next section.
In the remainder of this section we shall investigate if these policies have structural prop-
erties similar to that of the optimal policy as studied in in Section 3.5.1.
For the policies such as SQ, MP and Index policies, note that each decision is made right
after each new arrival, hence any optimal y derived accordingly has at most one positive com-
ponent in each row. However, the conditions (a) and (b) in the Theorem 3.4 implying that as
long as h 6= 0, at least two components in the same row of the initial optimal solution y have
to be positive.
In order to explore the structure for implementable policies, we need to force the arrival
vector a to be with more than one new arrival (a1 > 1). Accordingly, we fix a randomly
arriving order of the a1 patients, and assume that we update the scheduling state for each
arrival, without changing the earlier assignments. Let yf (x, a) be the final allocation obtained
by adding up all the a1 successive single-arrival decisions made by the policy f . Finally, we
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compare the decision yf (x1, a), yf (x2, a) based on the same arriving order. The main result is
given in the theorem below.
Theorem 3.7. The conclusions in Theorem 3.4 and 3.5 hold under SQ, MP, MMP and MF
policies.
It is possible to construct a numerical counter-example to show that the Index policy does
not have this structural property. However the Index policy requires less computation efforts,
and we will show numerically that it is a good approximation of MF policy.
In the next section we study a real-life small-scale physical therapy clinic and compare the
performance of the polices of this section numerically.
3.7 Numerical Examples with Real Data
To evaluate and compare the performances under different implementable policies, we run
simulations with the data from a local PT center. We collect the exact appointment dates of
395 patients who started their service between July 1st 2013 and June 30th 2014 at this center.
We first estimate φj(j = 0, 1, 2, · · · ), the pmf of the number of daily new arrivals (see
Equation 3.1). In Figure 3.2, we find that there are at most six new patients admitted on
any given day in this data set, while admitting one or two new patients per day are the most
common cases. We ignore the days on which the clinic was closed while computing the number
of days with no new arrivals. The data show that the daily average number of new patients to
the PT center is about 1.2. We also find that the empirical distribution is very close a Poisson
distribution with rate 1.2, so we assume that the number of new arrivals are Poisson random
variables. We do not test the independence, but simply assume it. We use this assumption in
the simulation.
Next we estimate pk, (k = 1, 2, 3, · · · ), the pmf of the number of visits by a patient (see
Equation 3.2). The data shows that only 9 out of 395 patients required more than 20 appoint-
ments. We ignore them so that the maximum number of visits for any patient is K = 20. In
Figure 3.3, we find that more than 70% of patients need more than one appointments, and of
these, most need 2 to 4 visits in total, while only a few patients need as many as 15 to 20 visits.
We use these frequencies of patients who need k visits as the estimate of pk, (k = 1, 2, 3, · · · ).
65
Number of First Apointments Per Day
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
R
el
at
iv
e 
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
Rel Freq of Number of First Appts Per Day
pmf of Poisson(1.2)
Figure 3.2: Distribution of Number of Daily
(First) Appointments
Total Number of Visits k
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
Es
tim
at
ed
 P
ro
ba
bi
lity
 p
k
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
Figure 3.3: Distribution of Total Number of
Appointments Per Patient
We do not fit any parametric distribution to this pmf, since it is not needed.
In all our simulations, we use a weekly cycle model with T = 5, and assume 15% overtime
slots are allowed (that is, γ = 1.15). We also consider a linear delay penalty in the number of
days delayed, namely cd(t) = 25(t− 1), for t = 1, · · · , 5. Specifically, we simulate two systems:
the actual system, with λ = 1.2 and a larger (fictitious) system with with λ = 6. In both
systems we assume that the pmf of the number of visits is as found in data. Note that this
leads to the expected number total visits per day in the two systems to be µ = 5.6043 for
λ = 1.2 and µ = 28.0213 for λ = 6.
We consider two choices for the reward/cost parameters:
Case A: p = 100, c = 20, and c′ = 30, since we usually pay 50% higher than the regular
salary for overtime work. This yields ζ = 0.8190 (see Equation 3.8.) We numerically solve
Equation 3.7 to obtain q∗ = 6 when λ = 1.2 and q∗ = 29 when λ = 6. Thus we have q∗ > µ,
which is consistent with Remark 3.
Case B: p = 100, c = 70, and c′ = 80. This yields ζ = 0.320 which yields q∗ = 3 when
λ = 1.2 and q∗ = 24 when λ = 6. Thus we have q∗ < µ, which is again consistent with Remark
3.
For each of these four cases, we simulate six implementable policies: Min-cost Flow policy
(MF), Index policy (IP), Max-Marginal Profit policy (MP), Modified Max-Marginal Profit
policy (MMP), Shortest Queue policy (SQ) and the Next Day policy (ND). Note that the
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staffing level q is optimal for ND, but need not be so for the other policies.
We run 100 replications of the system, each replication is for 350 working days (including
100 days of warmup period.) We compute the average daily profit under all the policies, using
the same sample path of the arrival stream for all the policies in each replication. All the
results described above are given in Tables 3.1 and 3.2 in cases A and B. In each table, the
‘Mean’ column records the average daily profit under the six policies. The ‘Dif Mean’ gives the
difference of the average daily profit under the MF policy and each other policy. The ‘LB’ and
‘UB’ columns give the lower and upper bounds on the 95% confidence interval of this difference.
Set λ = 1.2, q = 6 λ = 6, q = 29
Policy Mean Dif Mean LB UB Mean Dif Mean LB UB
MF 414.92 0 0 0 2155.82 0 0 0
IP 414.11 0.81 0.44 1.18 2155.79 0.03 −0.33 0.38
MP 414.71 0.22 −0.33 0.76 2137.68 18.19 16.24 20.14
MMP 413.94 0.99 0.40 1.57 2137.35 18.47 16.45 20.49
SQ 391.42 12.50 21.82 25.19 2126.89 28.93 26.19 31.67
ND 364.24 50.68 49.74 51.63 1681.66 474.16 471.81 476.51
Table 3.1: Daily Average Profits and Differences from MF Policy in Case A
Set λ = 1.2, q = 3 λ = 6, q = 24
Policy Mean Dif Mean LB UB Mean Dif Mean LB UB
MF 100.81 0 0 0 740.14 0 0 0
IP 100.77 0.04 −0.15 0.22 740.73 −0.59 −1.034 −0.14
MP 97.54 3.27 2.79 3.75 604.57 135.58 130.66 140.50
MMP 82.37 18.45 18.03 18.84 587.40 152.74 149.10 156.38
SQ 95.62 5.19 4.35 6.03 711.07 29.07 25.90 32.25
ND 40.50 60.31 58.95 61.67 273.76 466.38 462.62 470.14
Table 3.2: Daily Average Profits and Differences from MF Policy in Case B
We conclude from the above tables that the IP and MF policy perform almost the same,
and both are better than SQ policy and ND policy. In the small system (left half of the tables),
the MP policy is almost as good as the IP and MF policies, since the 95% confidence interval
of the mean difference is close to or includes 0. In the large system (right half of tables), the
MP policy does not perform as well as IP and MF policies, the difference is not that clearcut
in Case A (about 0.8%), but is significant in Case B (about 22.3%). Note that the MMP is
67
always no better than MP, one explanation for this situation is that, even though under MMP,
we know more information about the new patient type k than that under MP, we have to make
the assumption that there won’t be any new arrivals for the following k weeks, which is more
unrealistic than the assumption that there won’t be new arrivals for the next week under MP.
The superiority of the IP and MF policies is more pronounced in Case B as compared to
Case A. That is, when the staffing level is less than the mean demand, the IP and MF policies
are more superior to other policies. With all these considerations, we recommend the use of
the IP in general. MF policy is also as good, but it is not implementable in practice, since it
requires the knowledge the entire day’s demand to be known before any appointment scheduling
is done, and also, it involves a lot more computation in the form of min-cost flow problem.
We can also use simulation to find the optimal staffing level for each policy as follows. We
choose a scheduling policy, say the Index policy, run simulations with different the staffing
levels q, and find the one that maximizes the average daily profit. In Figure 3.4 and 3.5, we
show the simulated results of applying this procedure in the larger system (λ = 6). In case
A, we vary q in the range {24, 25, · · · , 34} and find that the simulated estimate of the average
daily profit is maximized at q = 28, which is one less than the q∗ = 29 derived as optimal for
the ND policy. Similarly in case B, we vary q in the range {20, 21, · · · , 29} and find average
daily profit is maximized at q = 25, which is one more than the q∗ = 24 derived as optimal for
the ND policy.
So we conclude that, in Case A (q∗ > µ), the optimal staffing level q selected by simulation
is smaller than, but close to the q∗ obtained by the staffing model in Section 3.4 using the
demand distribution from the ND policy. The reduction in profit from using this approximate
staffing level is rather small (less than 1%). On the contrary, in Case B (q∗ < µ) , the simulated
optimal q is greater than, but still close to the estimated q∗ by staffing model under ND policy.
Similar phenomenon is observed under all the other policies. In brief, the simulation results
show that the actual optimal staffing levels are closer to the expected demand µ, compared
with the estimated q∗.
A key contribution of this chapter is that we model “series” patients. An alternate solution
to this problem is to ignore the “series” nature of patient appointments and to treat each
appointment as an independent arrival. We ran numerical experiments to demonstrate the
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Figure 3.4: Average Profits under Index Policy
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Figure 3.5: Average Profits under Index Policy
as a Function of q in Case B with
λ = 6
benefit of taking into account the “series” nature of patient appointments. To do so, we ran
simulations with identical settings, but using the Index policy assuming that the daily demand
comes from patients with single appointment visits (K = 1 instead of K = 20 under the current
setting) and inflating the arrival rate correspondingly to keep the total appointments requested
identical to the system with series appointments. The results show that in both Case A and
B, treating the series appointments as independent arrivals lowers the daily profit by 2% - 5%
compared to the index policy that explicitly considers the series nature of appointments. The
optimal staffing levels q are also slightly different by ignoring the series nature of appointments,
in Case A the optimal q decreases by 1, while in Case B the optimal q increases by 1. Thus,
capturing the “series” nature of patient appointments is important from a practical perspective.
3.8 Conclusions and Extensions
This work is motivated by the phenomenon that in many specialty care clinics patients
need a series of appointments to fully complete their treatments. We studied the staffing and
scheduling problems for these series patients. We used a variation of newsvendor model for
the optimal staffing problem. We showed that the optimal number of slots assigned each day
satisfies a simple equation and can be obtained numerically. With different parameter sets,
this optimal staffing level can be either greater or smaller than the average daily demand.
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We further assumed that each patient needs a random number of total visits with a con-
stant inter-visit time. We modeled the scheduling system by an MDP, with the state being
a combination of the current schedule and the arrival vector. Since computing the optimal
policy is intractable due to the size of state space, we proposed the following implementable
policies: Next Day policy (as a special case of Randomized policy), Shortest Queue policy,
Max-Marginal Profit policy, Min-cost Flow policy, and Index policy. Except Index policy, the
other four policies share the same structural property of the optimal policy, and use increasingly
more information regarding the system state and future demand in decision making. However
the Index policy leads to a good approximation to the Min-cost Flow policy, can be used on a
patient by patient basis, and it is computationally efficient.
Using the data collected from a local PT center, our simulation study showed that the Index
policy performs very well compared with the other policies under different parameter settings.
Hence, we recommend the Index policy for general use, since it generates the most average
profit while requiring less computational efforts to implement.
There are a number of ways to extend our results and our model. First, in this chapter we
assumed that all the patients visit the clinic exactly once per T days, and request the same
service session length of one slot per visit. However, in practice the inter-visit time and the
length of service session can vary from patient to patient (as we have observed in our PT center
data), and can even be random. Thus it would be interesting to develop and analyze the models
that account for these aspects. In next chapter, we modify the scheduling model by assume
random number of visit and the patient will be assigned next visit after each visit. We obtain
the similar Index policy that achieve significant improvement from Next Day policy.
Second, our current scheduling decision is made under the assumption that we accept all the
newly admitted patients, assuming there will always be “external” physical therapists available
when the demand exceeds the maximum“internal” supply of regular plus overtime slots. One
possibility is to allow rejection of new patients at each epoch. If we accept a patient, we
need to decide the optimal appointment schedule for her. Finally, we could include patients’
cancellations and rescheduling in the future work, because we do observe these phenomena in
the data.
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CHAPTER 4: Staffing and Scheduling for Health Care Facilities with Series
Patients: Model II
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we modify both the staffing and scheduling models based on those con-
structed in Chapter 3. We first introduce the overflow penalty, which is the cost of admitting
more patients than the total supply available (regular and overtime slot). For the scheduling
model, instead of assigning the fixed number of visits at the beginning of each patient’s initial
visit, now we assume the number of visits are random. Based on the evaluation of the patient
after each visit, the physical therapist decides if the patient needs the next appointment, or
discharge from the system. Due to this modification, we need a new scheduling state to de-
scribe the system, and a different formulation of Index policies and other heuristic policies. We
do not repeat the literature review section since this chapter shares the same background of
Chapter 3. In the rest of this chapter, we modify the revenue and staffing cost function in Sec-
tion 4.2, and formulate the new scheduling model in Section 4.3. The heuristic policies based
on the MDP models are introduced and analyzed in Section 4.4, and the numerical experiments
are conducted in Section 4.5. The summary and conclusion are given in Section 4.6.
4.2 The Model II
Most of the model assumptions and notation in Model II are the same as in Model I. Here
we only mention the differences. We use An to denote the number of new patients who arrive
(or call) on day n to make appointments. In model I we used An as a vector, but here it is a
scalar. This change of notation is made so that the state of the system will still be denoted
by Xn, An, as explained below. We shall assume that {An, n ≥ 0} are i.i.d. random variables
with common probability mass function (pmf)
φj = P (An = j), j ≥ 0. (4.1)
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Figure 4.1: Daily Net Profit as Function of D
When a patient arrives (calls) on day n, he/she has to be given the first appointment on day
m ∈ {n+1, n+2, · · · , n+T}, where T is a given positive integer, without knowing the number
of visits the patient will need. The rule that dictates how the first appointment is scheduled is
called the scheduling policy.
In this chapter we are interested in finding a scheduling policy that maximizes the long run
average net profit. The net profit can be thought of as the revenue from the patients minus
the staffing cost, overtime cost, overbooking cost and the delay cost. The first three costs are
the same as in Model I. We describe the last one below.
The revenue p, and the costs c and c′ are the same as in model I. Here we introduce an
additional cost called the overbooking cost: If the total number of of slots demanded for the
day exceeds the total regular plus overtime slots γq, each excess slot needed beyond γq is called
an overbooking, and has to be routed to another clinic or handled in some other way. This
costs c′′ > c′. We call c′′ the overbooking cost.
With this modification, the net profit ρ(D, q) of Equation 4.2, with generic demand D and
fixed staffing level q, becomes
ρ(D, q) = pD − cq − c′max(D − q, 0)− (c′′ − c′) max(D − γq, 0). (4.2)
We plot this function in Figure 4.1, with D being a general demand.
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4.3 Optimal Scheduling Policies
In this section we shall formulate the scheduling problem as a discrete time Markov decision
process (MDP) that can be used to find a policy that maximizes the long run expected net
profit per day.
We first describe the state space of the MDP. Recall that each patient needs one slot every
T days. Let K be the maximum number of revisits a patient can have. The state of the
appointment schedule at the beginning of day n ≥ 0 and before the arrivals of new patients
is described by a matrix Xn = [Xn(k, t)], where Xn(k, t) (k = 1, · · · ,K, t = 1, · · · , T ) is the
number of patients who have their kth appointment on day n+ t. Let N = {0, 1, 2, · · · }, and
X = {x = [x(k, t)] : x(k, t) ∈ N for k = 1, . . . ,K; t = 1, . . . , T} ,
Thus Xn ∈ X for all n ≥ 0. (Note that this definition differs from that in Model I.)
We assume that all new patient calls occur at the beginning of the day. Thus An, the
number of new calls on day n, is known at the beginning of day n. This simplification creates
a tractable model and leads to policies that can also be implemented on a one-by-one arrival
basis. Thus the state of the system on day n is given by (Xn, An), and the state space is X ×N.
Next we describe the action space. The scheduling problem is to decide how many of the
An new patients should be given their first appointments on day n + t, for 1 ≤ t ≤ T . It
is convenient to introduce the follwing notation. Let Yn(1, t) be the number of new patients
who are given their first appointments on day n + t, and Yn(k, t) = 0 for 2 ≤ k ≤ K. Hence
Yn = [Yn(k, t)] is a matrix representing the scheduling action taken on day n. For a given
realization of An = a ∈ N, we have Yn ∈ ∆(a), where
∆(a) =
{
y ∈ X :
T∑
t=1
y(1, t) = a, y(k, t) = 0 for k = 2, . . . ,K, t = 1, . . . , T
}
.
Next we describe the transition probabilities of the MDP. For this we need a probabilistic
model of the number of visits needed by a patient. We assume that the number of visits
needed by the patients are i.i.d. random variables taking values in N. Let V be a generic
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random variable representing the number of visits needed by a patient. Let
fk = P (V ≥ k + 1), 0 ≤ k ≤ K − 1. (4.3)
Let αk = fk/fk−1, 1 ≤ k ≤ K − 1. Thus, if on day n, z number of patients had their k-th
visit, the number of those who will return on day n+ T for their (k + 1)st visit is a Bin(z, αk)
random variable.
Suppose (Xn, An) = (x, a), and the action taken on day n is Yn = y ∈ ∆(a). At the end
of day n, the scheduling state is updated to x+ y, and at the beginning of day n+ 1 the new
scheduling state is Xn+1 = Tx+y, where the (k, t)th entry of the matrix Tx+y is given by:
Tx+y(k, t) =

x(k, t+ 1) + y(k, t+ 1), if t = 1, . . . , T − 1, k = 1, . . . ,K;
0, if t = T, k = 1;
Bin(x(k − 1, 1) + y(k − 1, 1), αk), if t = T, k = 2, . . . ,K.
Note that Tx+y(1, T ) = 0 because Xn+1 is the state before the new arrivals come in and all the
existing patients have completed the first visits on day n.
Finally, we compute the expected one-step reward. We shall use the notation X(·, t) to
mean the sum of the tth column of the matrix X, that is
X(·, t) =
K∑
k=1
X(k, t).
We first look at demand on day n, which is given by
Dn = Yn−1(1, 1) +Xn−1(·, 1), n ≥ 1. (4.4)
The immediate reward for day n is defined to be the expected net profit on day n+ 1, that is,
r(Xn, Yn) is the difference between ρ(Dn+1) and delay cost. This shifting of the rewards does
not cause any problem since we are interested in long run average net profit per day. Thus,
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the one-step reward, given the state Xn = x and the decision Yn = y, is given by:
r(x, y) = ρ (y(1, 1) + x(·, 1))−
T∑
t=1
cd(t)y(1, t). (4.5)
Since {An, n ≥ 0} are i.i.d., and the number of visits by the patients are i.i.d., we see from
the above description that {((Xn, An), Yn), n ≥ 0} is a discrete time MDP. The objective is to
maximize the long-run average profit. As in Chapter 3 we get the following
Theorem 4.1. Suppose φ0 = P (An = 0) > 0 and the number of visits is at most K for each
patient, then the MDP {((Xn, An), Yn), n ≥ 0} is uni-chain and aperiodic.
Proof of Theorem 4.1. Let pi be any stationary policy and (x, a) ∈ X ×N be any initial
state. Note that the number of patients in the system can be modeled as a discrete time infinite
server queue, hence the system is recurrent. This implies that state (0, 0) is recurrent. Now we
show that with a positive probability, the system can reach state (0, 0) from any state (x, a)
in a finite number of steps. With probability φKT0 there are no arrivals over the next KT
days, and since αK = 0 all of the existing patients leave the system by KT days. Besides,
under any policy we have φKT0 > 0. This completes the proof of uni-chain. Furthermore the
probability of transitioning from state (Xn, An) = (0, 0) to (Xn+1, An+1) = (0, 0) in one step
is the probability that An+1 = 0, which is again φ0 > 0. This proves aperiodicity.
It is known that if an MDP is unichain, there exists a solution to the Bellman equation,
and hence the optimal average reward policy exists. It can be numerically computed by classic
algorithms such as value iteration and policy iteration.
However neither of these algorithms are feasible to derive the optimal or -optimal policy
for any realistically sized problem in our case. With reasonable values of T and K, the size
of the space state is too huge to compute the policy numerically. For example, even if each
patient visits the facility no more than twice and if the schedule repeats every five days, it
would still require a solution to a 10 dimensional problem. Hence, in Section 4.4, we study
several heuristic policies that are easy to implement in practice. Specifically, we focus on a
policy-improvement heuristic, which utilizes the policy improvement algorithm and improves
on a tractable policy.
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4.3.1 Special Case: Geometric Number of Visits
Now we consider a special case by assuming that the number of visits needed by the patients
are iid Geometric random variables with parameter α¯. That is
P (V = k) = α¯k(1− α¯), k = 1, 2, · · · .
Here we let K =∞. Note that this implies that if there are z patients visiting today, Bin(z, α¯)
of them will return after T days, and the rest are discharged. This simplifies the model a lot
since we don’t need to record the number of completed visits, instead all we need to track is the
total number of patients on the schedule for each day t ∈ {(1, · · · , T}. We abuse the notation
and let Xn(t) be the number of patients who are scheduled for a visit on day n+ t, (1 ≤ t ≤ T ),
and let Xn = [Xn(1), Xn(2), · · · , Xn(T )]. We have
Xn ∈ X = {x = [x(t)] : x(t) ∈ N for t = 1, · · · , T},
The decision vector is now given by Yn = [Yn(1), Yn(2), · · · , Yn(T )], where Yn(t) is the number
of new arrivals on day n who are given their first appointment on day n + t. The transition
vector Tx+y ∈ X is given by
Tx+y(t) =

x(t+ 1) + y(t+ 1), t = 1, . . . , T − 1,
Bin(x(1) + y(1), α¯), t = T.
Similarly, Eq. 4.4 and 4.5 reduce to
Dn = Xn−1(1) + Yn−1(1),
r(Xn−1, Yn−1) = ρ (Xn−1(1) + Yn−1(1))−
T∑
t=1
cd(t)Yn−1(t).
Unfortunately, even with this simplification, solving numerically for the optimal policy is
still not feasible. But in the heuristic policies, it significantly reduces the computation costs
without degrading the performance measurement as the full model with different αk. The
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details are given in Section 4.5.
4.4 Implementable Policies
In this section, we describe several implementable policies including the Next Day Policy
(NDP), the Shortest Queue Policy (SQP), and the Index Policy (IP), with or without geometric
assumption for the number of visits. The first two policies are straightforward and easily
implementable, require less information of the current state and the revenue structure. The
state-independent policies like NDP are attractive because it is easier to compute the demand
distribution in steady state under them, and hence one can easily find an optimal staffing level
q. IP utilizes the MDP model, performs one-step improvement on the NDP, and achieves higher
profits at a modest increase in the computational effort, especially with geometric assumption.
4.4.1 Next Day Policy (NDP)
The Next Day Policy (NDP) simply assigns all of the new arrivals to the next day, therefore
it does not need any information about the current state of the system. It minimizes the delay
cost among all the policies. However, it ignores the overtime and overbooking costs.
First, we introduce some relevant notation. For any 1 ≤ n ≤ KT , there is a unique
t = tn ∈ {1, 2, · · · , T} and k = kn ∈ {0, 2, · · · ,K − 1} such that
n = kT + t.
They are given by
kn = bn/T c, tn = n− knT.
Now we evaluate the distribution of demand Dn under such policy.
Lemma 4.1. Suppose X0 = x and the daily arrivals are iid Poisson with rate λ. Let Dn be
the demand on day n under the NDP. Also assume that the number of visits by the patients
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are i.i.d. random variables with complementary cdf given by Eq. 4.3. Then
Dn =

Poisson
(
λ
∑kn
i=0 fi
)
+
∑K−kn
i=1 Bin (x(i, t), fkn+i−1/fi−1) , 0 ≤ kn < K;
Poisson
(
λ
∑K−1
i=0 fi
)
, kn ≥ K.
(4.6)
It is clear from the above that for n > KT , the distribution of Dn is Poisson with mean
λE(V ), independent of X0. This is to be expected: the expected number of new arrivals
in a day is λ, and each of them requires EV repeat visits on average. Hence the expected
total number of new slots requested by all the new arrivals in a day is λE(V ). In fact, these
observations are true for any state-independent scheduling policy.
Let D be a Poisson random variable with mean λE(V ). Then, using Eq. 4.2, it is easy to
see that the long run average profit under NDP is given by
G(q) = E(ρ(D)) = pE(D)− cq − c′E(max(D − q, 0)− (c′′ − c′)E(max(D − γq, 0)). (4.7)
This is a variation of a newsvendor type objective function. If D is a continuous random
variable, and we treat q as a real-valued variable, it is easy to show that this is a convex
function of q. However, when q and D are integer valued, it need not be convex. However,
it is straight forward to find the q that maximizes it. Thus for the NDP (or for any state-
independent policy) it is easy to find the optimal static staffing level.
In the special case, when V follows a Geometric distribution, we have αk = α¯ for all k ≥ 1,
hence the probability parameter fkn+i−1/fi−1 reduces to α¯kn for every i ≥ 1. Therefore Dn
reduces to the sum of one Poisson and one Binomial random variable:
Dn = Poisson
(
λ
1− α¯kn+1
1− α¯
)
+ Bin
(
x(t), α¯kn
)
,
In this case Dn converges to D as n→∞. The long run average expected profit, as a function
of q, is still given by Eq. 4.7.
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4.4.2 Shortest Queue Policy (SQP)
The shortest queue policy (SQP) that uses the information of the current scheduling state to
a limited extent. Suppose the state of the schedule is x when a new patient arrives. Then x(·, t)
represents the total number of patients already scheduled on t days into future, 1 ≤ t ≤ T .
The SQP assigns the arrival to a slot tsq(x) days into the future, where
tsq(x) ∈ argmint {x(·, t) : 1 ≤ t ≤ T} ,
and then updates the matrix x. If the argmin set on the right hand side of above equation
has more than one element, tsq(x) can be chosen to be any one of them. Thus, SQP chooses a
day with the smallest currently scheduled appointments among the next T days. This policy
attempts to minimize the overtime and overbooking costs by evening out the load among the
next T days, but it ignores the delay cost. Since the scheduling decisions under SQP are state
dependent, the distribution of the daily demand in steady state (and hence the long run average
profit) depend on q, and is very hard to compute even under further assumptions such as i.i.d.
Poisson arrivals or Geometric number of visits. Finding the optimal q is complicated for the
same reason. However, SQP can be easily implemented in practice as well as in simulation.
4.4.3 Index Policy (IP)
The aforementioned SQP and NDP are straightforward and easily implementable, but they
ignore the revenue structure, future arrivals and the impact of the current decision on future
costs and revenues. To develop policies that address this concern, we consider the procedure
of policy improvement based on the tractable value function under NDP.
We first need the bias function vNDP and long run average revenue gNDP for NDP. We
have already computed the long run average revenue in Eq. 4.7, namely
gNDP = G(q). (4.8)
The next lemma gives the expression for the bias function.
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Lemma 4.2.
vNDP (x, a) =
KT∑
n=1
E(ρ(Dn)|X0 = x,A0 = a)− gNDPKT, (4.9)
where Dn is as given in Eq. 4.6.
Proof: Let
φm(x, a) =
m∑
n=1
E(ρ(Dn)|X0 = x,A0 = a),
be the total expected profit over the first m days under the NDP policy. Let D be a Poisson
random variable with mean λE(V ). Since Dn ∼ D for n > KT , we have, for m ≥ KT
φm(x, a) =
KT∑
n=1
E(ρ(Dn)|X0 = x,A0 = a) + (m−KT )E(ρ(D)),
=
KT∑
n=1
E(ρ(Dn)|X0 = x,A0 = a) + (m−KT )G(q), (from Eq. 4.7)
=
KT∑
n=1
E(ρ(Dn)|X0 = x,A0 = a)−KTgNDP +mgNDP , (from Eq. 4.8).
From Tijms [2003] we know that
φm(x, a) = vNDP (x, a) +mgNDP + o(m),
where o(m) is a function that goes to zero as m→∞. This implies the Lemma.
The policy improvement step involves computing the following
v(x, a) + g = max
y∈∆(a)
{
r(x, y) + h(x, y)−KTgNDP} , (4.10)
where
h(x, y) = E
(
KT∑
n=1
ρ(Dn)|X0 = Tx+y, A0 = A
)
.
Here the expectation is taken over all the random arrivals A and the random transitions in
Tx+y.
Next, we show how to solve for the optimal decision that maximizes Eq. 4.10 by greedy
algorithm. Note that can write the right hand side above as a sum of separable functions of
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y(1, t),
r(x, y) + h(x, y) =
T∑
t=1
gt(y(1, t), x).
We need the following notation to show gt explicitly. First define the following random variables:
Pk ∼Poisson(λ
k∑
i=0
fi) (4.11)
B1k(x) ∼
K−k−1∑
i=1
Bin(x(i, 1), fk+i/fi−1), (4.12)
Btk(x) ∼
K−k∑
i=1
Bin(x(i, t), fk+i−1/fi−1), 2 ≤ t ≤ T, (4.13)
R1k(w) ∼Bin(w, fk+1/f0), (4.14)
Rtk(w) ∼Bin(w, fk/f0), 2 ≤ t ≤ T. (4.15)
Here w ∈ N is the value that decision variable y(1, t) can take. For t = 1 we have
g1(w, x) =
K−2∑
k=0
E[ρ(Pk +B
1
k(x) +R
1
k(w))] + ρ (w + x(·, 1))− cd(1)w, (4.16)
and, for 2 ≤ t ≤ T ,
gt(w, x) =
K−1∑
k=0
E[ρ(Pk +B
t
k(x) +R
t
k(w))]− cd(t)w. (4.17)
Note that the difference in gt(w, x) for t = 1 and t ≥ 2 is a result of the random initial state
Tx+y.
We first prove an important property of the gt functions in the lemma below.
Lemma 4.3. For a fixed x ∈ X , gt(w, x) is a concave function of w on N, that is,
gt(w + 1, x)− gt(w, x) ≥ gt(w + 2, x)− gt(w + 1.x). (4.18)
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Proof: Using Eq. 4.2, we have
E(ρ(D)) = pE(D)− cq − c′
∞∑
n=q+1
P (D ≥ n)− (c′′ − c′)
∞∑
n=bγqc+1
P (D ≥ n).
Hence
E(ρ(D + 1)− ρ(D)) = p− c′P (D ≥ q)− (c′′ − c′)P (D ≥ bγqc).
Now, consider random variable Rw that is a sum of a general random variable R0 and an
independent Binomial random variable Bin(w,α) for a fixed α. Then we can construct a
common probability space on which
Rw+1 = Rw + Z
where Z ∼ Bin(1, α). Thus, under this coupling,
P (Rw+1 = Rw + 1) = α, P (Rw+1 = Rw) = 1− α.
Hence
E(ρ(Rw+1)− ρ(Rw)) =αE(ρ(Rw + 1)− ρ(Rw))
=αp− c′P (Rw ≥ q)− (c′′ − c′)P (Rw ≥ bγqc). (4.19)
This is a decreasing function of w, since Rw is stochastically increasing in w. Thus, E(ρ(Rw))
is concave in w. Now it follows from Equations 4.16 and 4.17 that gt(w, x) consists of sums of
terms of the form E(ρ(Rw)) for appropriately chosen Rw’s. Hence gt(w, x) is concave in w.
As a consequence of the above lemma, we see that the optimization problem on the right
hand side of Eq. 4.10 reduces to the maximization of a sum of separable concave functions as
follows: Given x ∈ X and a ∈ N,
max
t∑
t=1
gt(y(1, t), x)
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subject to
T∑
t=1
y(1, t) = a.
It is well known that this problem can be solved by a greedy algorithm in a steps. We need
some notation to describe the algorithm. Define
It(w, x) = gt(w + 1, x)− gt(w, x), 1 ≤ t ≤ T. (4.20)
Given the number of new arrivals A = a, the greedy procedure starts with y = 0 and in a steps
builds the first row of the matrix y ∈ ∆(a). In each step one of the elements in the first row
of y increases by one. The procedure is “greedy” in that at each step it chooses to increment
the element that is feasible and yields the maximum change in the objective function. The
procedure is described below.
Greedy Procedure:
 Given x, a, initialize y = 0;
 While
∑T
t=1 y(1, t) < a do:
– Determine the index t∗ as follows:
t∗ ∈ argmax {It(y(1, t), x) : 1 ≤ t ≤ T} . (4.21)
– Set y(1, t∗) = y(1, t∗) + 1.
 End while loop;
One can use the above algorithm to construct a scheduling policy that operates on an arrival
by arrival basis as follows: when an arrival occurs, we first observe x, the current state of the
schedule. Then we compute It(x) = It(0, x) for all 1 ≤ t ≤ T and then find the t = t∗ for which
the index is the maximum. Then we schedule the first appointment of this new arrival t∗ days
later and update the x matrix by setting x(1, t∗) = x(1, t∗) + 1. Note that we do not need to
know the number of new arrivals at the beginning of the day to implement this algorithm and
we do not keep track of y.
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The function
It(x) = It(0, x)
is called the index of day t in state x. The policy simply assigns an incoming arrival to the
day with the highest index. Hence we call this policy an index policy (IP). To complete the
description of IP, we we need the expressions for It(x). Using Eq. 4.19, we get:
I1(x) =
K−2∑
k=0
fk+1/f0
[
(p− c′′) + (c′′ − c′)P (Pk +B1k(x) ≤ bγqc − 1)
+ c′P (Pk +B1k(x) ≤ q − 1)
]
+ (p− c′′) + (c′′ − c′)1{x(·,1)≤bγqc−1} + c′1{x(·,1)≤q−1} − cd(1),
and for t ≥ 2,
It(x) =
K−1∑
k=0
fk/f0
[
(p− c′′) + (c′′ − c′)P (Pk +Btk(x) ≤ bγqc − 1)
+ c′P (Pk +Btk(x) ≤ q − 1)
]
− cd(t).
4.4.4 Index Policy with Geometric Assumption (GIP)
In this subsection we consider the case of Geometric(α¯) number of visits, as describe in
Section 4.3.1, and show the simplified expressions for the index. Note that the state is now
described by a vector X. For a given vector X = x, the equations 4.11 - 4.13 simplify to
Pk ∼Poisson(λ1− α¯
k+1
1− α¯ ) (4.22)
B1k(x) ∼Bin(x(1), α¯k+1), (4.23)
Btk(x) ∼Bin(x(t), α¯k), (4.24)
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Using these random variables, the index function calculations now simplify to
I1(x) =
∞∑
k=0
α¯k+1
[
(p− c′′) + (c′′ − c′)P (Pk +B1k(x) ≤ bγqc − 1)
+ c′P (Pk +B1k(x) ≤ q − 1)
]
+ (p− c′′) + (c′′ − c′)1{x(·,1)≤bγqc−1} + c′1{x(·,1)≤q−1} − cd(1),
and for t ≥ 2,
It(x) =
∞∑
k=0
α¯k
[
(p− c′′) + (c′′ − c′)P (Pk +Btk(x) ≤ bγqc − 1)
+ c′P (Pk +Btk(x) ≤ q − 1)
]
− cd(t).
We call the policy using the above index function the Geometric Index Policy (GIP).
Note that the summation of the index function here has infinite terms. Numerically, one
can truncate the summation at a k such that α¯k is small enough.
It is clear that both IP and GIP use the information of current scheduling state, arrival
volume, and the profit structure. Also they account for the future arrivals, as well as the
influence of current decision on future profits. Hence we expect IP and GIP to do better
than SQP and NDP. (IP is guaranteed to do better than NDP.) We can also use GIP as an
approximation to IP, by approximating a non-geametric distribution by a geometric distribution
with the same mean. We expect GIP to perform similarly to IP with less computational efforts.
In the next Section 4.5, we show the performances under the four heuristic policies using discrete
event simulation.
4.5 Numerical Examples with Real Data
In this section use the data and parameter estimation from Chapetr 3 and compare of
the performance of policies, evaluate of the benefits of accounting for the series nature of the
patients, and find optimal staffing levels.
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4.5.1 Comparison of Policies
In this section we compare the long run average profits per day earned by the four policies:
NDP, SQP, IP and GIP. We can compute this exactly for the NDP. For the other policies we
estimate this by using simulation. In all our simulations, we use a weekly cycle model with
T = 5, and assume 15% overtime slots are allowed (that is, γ = 1.15). We also consider a
linear delay penalty in the number of days delayed, namely cd(t) = 15(t− 1), for t = 1, · · · , 5.
Specifically, we simulate two systems: the actual system, with λ = 1.2 and a larger (fictitious)
system with with λ = 6. In both systems we assume that the pmf of the number of visits is
as found in data. When simulating the GIP, we approximate this empirical distribution by
a Geometric distribution with parameter α¯ = .82364, so as to keep the means same as the
empirical mean. Note that this leads to the expected total number of visits per day in the two
systems to be λEV = 5.6043 for λ = 1.2 and λEV = 28.0213 for λ = 6.
We consider two choices for the reward/cost parameters:
Case A: p = 100, c = 20, c′ = 30, and c′′ = 200, since the clinics usually pay 50% higher
than the regular salary for overtime work. We assume c′′ = 200 to account for the loss of
revenue, plus the cost of rerouting the overbooked customers to an alternate physical therapy
unit. We numerically compute the optimal staffing level q under NDP as the initial guess:
q = 8 when λ = 1.2 and q = 32 when λ = 6. Thus we have q > λEV for both cases.
Case B: p = 100, c = 70, c′ = 80, and c′′ = 200. Again, we obtain numerically the optimal
staffing level under NDP as the initial guess: q = 7 when λ = 1.2 and q = 28 when λ = 6.
Compared with Case A, the costs of providing service are higher, which leads to the smaller
optimal value of q under NDP. Now we have q < λEV for the large system.
Note that the staffing level q used in the simulations is optimal for the NDP, but need not
be so for the other policies.
We use batch means method to build the 95% confidence intervals for the average profits
under different policies. For each policy, we run the simulation for 5000 days, and the first 1000
days are taken as a warm-up period based on the Welch’s method. (Heidelberger and Welch
(1983)). The batch size is selected to be 100 days. The results are given in Tables 4.1 and
4.2 for cases A and B respectively. In each table, the parameters λ, q and gNDP are given in
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the top row. the ‘Mean’ column records the average daily profit under the three policies. The
‘Diff’ gives the average increase in profit of each policy over that of NDP. The ‘LB’ and ‘UB’
columns give the lower and upper bounds on the 95% confidence interval of this difference.
Setting λ = 1.2, q = 8, gNDP=375.280 λ = 6, q = 32, gNDP=2109.400
Policy Mean Diff LB UB Mean Diff LB UB
IP 398.881 23.601 2.352 44.851 2170.411 61.010 15.173 106.847
GIP 399.733 24.453 3.134 45.771 2171.963 62.561 16.488 108.635
SQP 365.473 -9.807 -30.370 10.756 1881.858 -227.544 -273.647 -181.440
Table 4.1: Average Profits and Improvement from NDP in Case A
Setting λ = 1.2, q = 7, gNDP=9.498 λ = 6, q = 28, gNDP=585.907
Policy Mean Diff LB UB Mean Diff LB UB
IP 56.288 46.792 29.196 64.388 709.763 123.855 104.301 143.410
GIP 56.536 47.041 29.578 64.503 710.195 124.288 104.703 143.873
SQP 29.268 19.772 2.049 37.495 450.320 -135.587 -156.093 -115.082
Table 4.2: Average Profits and Improvement from NDP in Case B
We conclude from the tables that both IP and GIP perform significantly better than SQP
and NDP, since the confidence intervals do not contains 0. The GIP performance is almost the
same as that of IP, and hence GIP is preferable considering its reduced computation cost.
In Case A, we observe that in the small system (left half of the tables), the average profits
under GIP and IP are close, both achieve an improvement of about 6.4% over NDP. In the large
system (right half of tables), the improvements are about 2.9% over NDP. The superiority of the
GIP and IP policies is more pronounced in Case B as compared to Case A. The improvement
is about 494.7% in the small system, and 21.2% in the large system. That is, when the staffing
level is low due to the higher service cost, the GIP and IP are more superior to other policies,
especially in small systems.
The SQP does not perform well compared to IP and GIP, and in most cases does even
worse than NDP. This is due to the fact that SQP ignores the profit structure, especially the
delay cost.
With all these considerations, we recommend the GIP policy in general. IP policy also
performs well but it involves a lot more computation in the form of convolution of multiple
distributions.
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4.5.2 Optimal Staffing
In this subsection we use simulation to find the optimal static staffing level q, assuming we
follow GIP for scheduling. We first compute the optimal q for NDP (see Section 4.4.1) and
then search a small neighborhood of this q and plot the long run average profits of GIP as a
function of q and pick the q that maximizes the profits.
In Figures 4.2 ∼ 4.5, we show the simulated results of applying this procedure in the two
systems for both Case A and Case B. The graphs show the average profits with varying q and
the vertical error bars show the 95% confidence interval. In Case A, the simulated estimate of
the average profits under GIP are maximized at q = 7 and q = 30, for the small and the large
system respectively, which are less that than the optimal q = 8 and q = 32 computed under
NDP. Similarly for the small system in Case B we get an optimal q of 6, while that for NDP is
q = 8. For the large system in Case B, the profits under GIP are maximized at q = 28 which
is the same as that under NDP. Note that this is the only case out of the four with q < λEV .
So when the optimal q under NDP is higher than the actually expected demand, we expect a
smaller q to maximize the profit under GIP. In fact the profits using the optimal q under GIP
are very close to those using the optimal q found under NDP. Thus, the simulation results show
that the initial guess of optimal staffing levels which achieves optimality under NDP are good
approximations to the real optimal staffing level.
Finally, recall in Section 4.5.1 we compare the performance of GIP to that of NDP using q
values that are optimal for NDP, and we find that GIP offers a significant improvement over
NDP. This improvement can only become better if we had carried out the comparison using
the staffing level that is optimal for GIP. This makes our case for GIP even stronger.
4.5.3 Value of Modeling Series Patients
A key contribution of this chapter is that we explicitly model “series” nature of patients. An
alternate solution to this problem is to ignore the “series” nature of the patient appointments
and treat each appointment as an independent new arrival. We run numerical experiments
to evaluate the benefit of taking into account the “series” nature of patient appointments.
To do so, we apply GIP assuming that the daily demand comes from patients with single
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Figure 4.2: Case A, λ = 1.2
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Figure 4.3: Case A, λ = 6
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Figure 4.4: Case B, λ = 1.2
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Figure 4.5: Case B, λ = 6
appointment visits (that is, Geometric with α¯ = 0 instead of Geometric with α¯ = .8236) and
inflating the arrival rate correspondingly to keep the total expected demand for appointments
per day identical to the system with series appointments. In Table 4.3, we compare the profits
under GIP with series appointment assumption (α¯ = .8236, fourth column) and under GIP
without such assumption but inflating λ by multiplying EV (α¯ = 0, fifth column). Simulations
are performed under 4 parameter settings as the previous subsection. We find that treating the
series appointments as independent arrivals reduces the average daily profit by at least 2.7% in
Case A and 25.8% in Case B, compared to the GIP that explicitly considers the series nature
of appointments (Reduction% column). Note that the choice of q in these experiments is a
result of the optimization discussed in the previous subsection.
Thus, capturing the “series” nature of patient appointments leads to a significant improve-
ment in the performance of the system, and hence is important from a practical perspective.
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Table 4.3: Value of Modeling Series Patients
Case λ q GIP (α¯ = .823) GIP (α¯ = 0) Reduction%
A 1.2 7 412.51 401.40 2.7%
A 6 30 2189.05 2079.89 5.0%
B 1.2 6 50.63 -21.28 142.0%
B 6 28 710.20 527.12 25.8%
4.6 Conclusions and Extensions
This work is motivated by the phenomenon that patients need a series of appointments in
many specialty care clinics to fully complete their treatment.
We initially assumed a fixed staffing level, and that each patient needs a random number
of total visits with a constant inter-visit time. We modeled the scheduling system as an MDP,
with the state being a combination of the current schedule and the number of new arrivals.
Since computing the optimal policy is intractable due to the size of state space, we proposed
a heuristic policy called the Index Policy. Setting up the problem as an MDP helps us use the
policy iteration algorithm to design the Index policy. As a result, finding an index in our model
is considerably easier since we can use a greedy algorithm to solve the optimization problem
exactly.
We compared the performance of the Index policy to two other commonly used policies:
the Next Day policy and the Shortest Queue policy. Using the data collected from a local PT
center, we used a simulation study to show that the Index policy performs very well compared
to commonly used policies under different parameter settings. Furthermore, the Index policy
(and its variation called the Geometric Index Policy) can be used for scheduling appointments
on arrival of each patient, i.e., it does not require the knowledge about the total number of
patients arriving on a day while scheduling a patient. Hence, we recommend the Geometric
Index policy for use in practice, due to its superior performance and ease of implementation.
We established that explicitly modeling the series nature of patient appointments leads to more
beneficial policies than approaches that treat each arrival as an independent new arrival. We
also showed that the optimal static staffing level for the GIP can be well approximated by the
optimal static optimal staffing level for the NDP, which can be analytically computed.
We can study the same extensions to Model II as we mentioned in Model I in Chapter 3.
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CHAPTER 5: Optimal policies for Investment Capacity and Timing
5.1 Introduction
When investors or companies plan to introduce a new product or a new technology to the
market, the actual demand is uncertain at the very beginning. After a leader firm initiates an
investment, the competitors start observing the performance of this leader firm and making
their decisions accordingly. In particular, there are two most critical decisions for the follower
firms to make, the first is the investment timing, that is when to enter the market so as to make
profit with enough knowledge about the market; and the second is the investment capacity,
that is how much to invest so as to better suit the unknown market demand.
With a competitive relationship between the leader and the follower firms, the timing and
the capacity decisions interplay with each other and affects the decisions for both firms. For
example, the follower firm may benefit from a late investment time if it can gather more
valuable information from the leader and hence make a wiser decision on how much to invest.
But entering the market earlier can also be beneficial for the follower since waiting does not
provide profits that can otherwise earned from investment. On the other hand, the leader
can invest a smaller amount at the beginning so as to share less information for the follower,
and therefore delay or mislead the follower’s investment decisions. Of course the leader firm
may also earn more profits if the belief in the market is very positive and the leader can do
nothing to delay the follower’s entrance. The existing literature mostly focuses on one of the
two decision making process, investment timing and capacity, separately. To the best of our
knowledge, this is one of the first papers studying the interplay of optimal investment timing
and capacity.
In this chapter, we build models for a duopoly game of investment with timing and capacity
decision options. We assume that the investment is costly, and the firms’ earning processes
are based on their initial investment capacity, that is the maximum earning rates are no more
than the capacities invested at the beginning. The uncertain demand of the new market could
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be one of the binary status: high and low. A leader enters the market at the beginning of
the horizon, and a follower starts its observation of the leader’s earning process and decides on
when and how much to invest. The leader, known that the follower shall adopt the optimal
investment strategy based on the leader’s action, shall also optimize its strategy about how
much to invest.
The two firms are competitive, such that once the follower enters the market, it shall take
part of the market share from the leader, and since then the overflow from either of the firms
cannot be fulfilled by the other party, even the other party has extra supply. Therefore we
consider products or technologies that have a high customer loyalty so that once the customers
subscribe to one of the brands, the chance for them to switch brand is very small. For example,
Amazon is one of the first firms to develop and lunch the smart speaker “Amazon Echo”, which
is a smart device that users can command with their voice, interact and control other devices
around the home (Forbes 2017). Most customers of this smart speaker are Amazon Prime
members, which is another paid service offered by Amazon. To play music with the speaker,
they need Amazon Music accounts. Almost all of the functions are also compatible certain
devices, such that once a customer buys an Amazon Echo and builds a echo-home system, it
will be costly to switch to another brand.
Another competitor, Apple Inc. plans to enter the market in December 2017. After pur-
chasing their smart speaker, it is obvious that the customers will purchase or already have
purchased relevant products from Apple to support the smart speaker, such as Apple TV,
iPhone, iWatch, etc. (New York Times 2017). Since the two companies use different operation
systems (Apple uses IOS, and Amazon uses Fire), plus the $200 value of the smarter speaker
only, converting from one device to another will cost a lot for the customer.
Another example that our model can be applied to, is the market of single-serve coffee
machine. Once the customer purchases a machine from the company Keurig, they start to
constantly purchase the k-cup coffee, and therefore there is little chance for them to switch
brand since the k-cup coffee is only fitted into a Keurig machine. Similarly, our model can help
investors of sports clubs to make their investment decisions. For examples, the two football
teams Manchester City and Manchester United share one sports market: the football fans in
Manchester, UK. Back in 1894, Manchester City football club was founded and acted as a leader
92
in the sports market. By observing the financing situation of Manchester City, the investor of
the Manchester United could learn and optimize the capacity and timing of investment as a
follower. In this example, once a customer decides on supporting one of the team, the team
loyalty would prevent the switching between the two teams, which is similar to a brand loyalty
in the smart speaker market.
Motivated by these real-life examples, we model the firms’ earning process in a continuous
time setting with Brownian model, and update the belief in the uncertain market with Bayesian
learning method. This chapter aims to answer the following questions: (1) When shall the
follower enter the market, and how much shall it invest; (2) Assume the leader firm enters
the market at the beginning of horizon, how much shall it invest to optimize its profit while
delaying the entrance of the follower as much as possible; (3) How does the initial belief in
the uncertain demand affect the follower and leader’s decisions on both investment timing and
capacity. We shall give the main contribution of this chapter in the next subsection, which
includes the answers to the above questions.
5.1.1 Summary of Main Results
We analyze the structural properties of the optimal policies for both follower and leader
firms. In Section 5.3.1 we develop the follower’s policy in equilibrium assuming the investment
capacity of the leader has been given. Proposition 5.2 describes a two-threshold policy for the
follower, which achieves the optimality under given condition. The policy works as follows:
when the initial belief for the uncertain market is no less than an upper threshold, the follower
shall invest immediately with a large capacity; when the initial belief is more than a lower
threshold, the follower shall also invest immediately but with a smaller capacity. If otherwise
the initial belief is between the two thresholds, it is optimal for the follower to wait and observe
the performance of the leader.
In Section 5.3.2, we first analyze the leader’s policy in equilibrium under two limits: if the
noise level is 0 or infinity. Proposition 5.4 shows that the leader shall follow a one threshold
policy under the two limits. By formulating the value function of the leader given the afore-
mentioned two thresholds of the follower, we identify the sufficient conditions under which it
is optimal for the leader to invest with a capacity such that the follower shall always wait and
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observe as long as the initial belief is within its lower and upper thresholds.
One of the most important findings of this chapter is in Proposition 5.6, where we show the
sufficient conditions under which the equilibrium value function of the leader in fact decreases
even with the increasing initial belief of the market. We find such sufficient conditions imply
an unfavorable investment environment for the leader, such as a smaller investment cost of the
follower, and a smaller fraction of market after the follower’s entrance. Under those conditions,
the leader has to make very costly changes to delay follower’s entrance. Numerical examples are
given after the proposition to illustrate such special phenomenon with explanations regarding
the impact of follower’s investment timing on the leader’s value function.
In Section 5.5 we propose a simpler model by assuming a lower bound on the investment ca-
pacity for both leader and follower. Under this assumption, the follower’s policy in equilibrium
reduces to a one-threshold policy, therefore we are able to derive the explicit formula of this
threshold. Again, we obtain the sufficient conditions under which the leader’s value function
can be decreasing in the initial belief. This is given in Proposition 5.9. Another interesting
finding of this chapter is presented in Proposition 5.11 and Corollary 5.1. There we found
that the follower’s threshold is in fact increasing in the initial belief under certain conditions.
Basically, by observing higher initial belief, the follower tends to be more ambitious and sets a
higher investment threshold.
5.1.2 Literature Review
This chapter is closely related to two main streams of literature: learning process with
stopping and capacity management. Optimal stopping problem is an extension of the classic
sequential testing problem. With the objective of minimizing the cost of choosing the incorrect
hypothesis, the probability of correct hypothesis is updated over continuous observation. The
decision maker can choose to reject the null hypothesis, accept the null hypothesis, or continue
with the test for another observation. The pioneer work of this subject has been done by Wald
[1945], where the problem is introduced under a discrete time setting. In the paper by Jensen
[1982], the observation updating is achieved by Bayesian decision models when the profitability
is uncertain during the learning process.
There are a few papers about learning process with stopping times that consider a single
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decision maker. For example, Kwon and Lippman [2011] use Brownian model with Bayesian
updating, study how a single firm expand or exist a market after learning a pilot project. The
learning process is about the unknown market and the firm can only gain information from the
proceeds from the pilot project. Harrison and Sunar [2015] consider a learning process where
the information observed and the cost are both dependent on the discrete learning modes
(similar to the term capacity in this chapter). There is a single firm considered in their model,
whose complete strategy consists of the learning mode plus a stopping time, when the firm
decides either to invest or abandon the project. They study both discounted and undiscounted
problems, and derive the effect of problem parameters on optimal critical beliefs. In the paper
by De´camps et al. [2005], a single firm is involved in the learning process and he needs to decide
on when to stop learning and invest. The investment cost is fixed and the learning process is
independent of how much to invest.
Unlike their work, we have two firms in our model competing with each other. This differs
from their models and results in two closely correlated policies for each firm. In particular,
since we consider a duopoly problem, the critical beliefs of the follower are dependent of the
leader’s investment capacity and hence dependent of the initial belief. But in their papers, the
critical beliefs are independent of initial belief.
When multiple decision makers are planning to invest in the same project with uncertain
profitability, they can learn from the competitors who enter the market earlier. Reinganum
[1989] and Fudenberg and Tirole [1986] are two of the earlier work that apply tools from
economics and game theory in optimal timing problems. One example of the most recent work
in this topic is Kwon et al. [2015]. They examine a duopoly Brownian investment model, where
the second firm can learn about the profitability of the investment by observing the performance
of the first firm. Here both firms optimize each investment timing. They study both negative
and positive externalities between the two firms. Our work is further differentiated from this
literature because we design a learning process that is dependent on the capacity the firms
invest. Below we review literature in this area.
The second stream that is relevant to our work is capacity investment and management.
Van Mieghem and Dada [1999] study a model with a downstream firm (manufacturer) and
an upstream firm (subcontractor), both of them have the option to decide on the two-stage
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adjustment to the investment capacities, production quantities and prices. They emphasize the
impact of price over the sensitivities of capacity and production on uncertainty. Qi et al. [2017]
consider a model with one supplier and two competitive firms to invest the new product from
the supplier. There are two stage of the activity: firms first invest in the supplier, then the
capacity is realized, and firms place orders and serve the market. They focus on the equilibrium
in terms of the number of investing firms and capacity levels. In another example also by Qi
et al. [2015], they study two scenarios for a single firm’s optimal strategy to adjust its capacity:
to adjust once or multiple times, depending on the adjustment cost and managerial hurdles.
Two decisions can be made for the firm: when and how much to invest. They consider multiple
unknown demands over each period without using Brownian process. In Wang [2012], two
market entry strategies are examined and their influences on the optimal capacity levels are
evaluated. But no competition or learning is considered in their model. Overall, the main
distinction of our work from the above papers is that we incorporate timing decisions with
continuous learning process in our capacity management.
The following capacity management related papers also consider the timing factors. Boyacı
and O¨zer [2010] consider a manufacturer who can postpone the capacity investment to acquire
advance sales information through advance selling. Hence the manufacturer decides on when
and how much to invest, as well as the sale price during the normal sales season (after advance
selling). They impose a cost of delaying investment by assuming a nondecreasing investment
cost in time. Unlike our model, they use discrete time stochastic models, and the learning
process is accomplished by updating the cumulative demands during the advance selling period
by period. Swinney et al. [2011] analyze a competitive investment problems with a leader firm
who invests in capacity early when the market is uncertain, and a follower who invest pater
when the uncertainty has been resolved. The two firms include an established firm and a start-
up firm. Therefore their goal is to maximize the probability of survival, while our work focuses
on maximizing the total profits.
Other relevant fields include war of attrition. For example, Thijssen et al. [2006] focus on a
preemption attrition equilibrium with Bayesian learning about the profitability of the project.
Our model is different from their work since they assume that the true market information
is available right after the leaders investment. In the paper by De´camps and Mariotti [2004],
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they also consider a war of attrition game. One difference of their model from ours is that,
besides the shared public information between the leader the follower’s firm, there are private
information about the investment cost within each firm.
In the review paper by Van Mieghem [2003], many topics related to the strategic capacity
management are included, for example, determining the capacity sizes, types, and timing of
capacity adjustments under uncertainty, and partially irreversible capacity investment under
uncertainty. Particularly, our work is most relevant to two sections of this review paper: Sec-
tion 4.3, where he introduces game-theoretic capacity investments by multiple agents but with
stationary constant investment; and Section 5, where the literature with stopping times is in-
cluded. Our model is differentiated from these two streams of literature because we incorporate
capacity management and optimal investment timing strategy by looking at the interactivity
of duopoly firms.
5.2 The Model
There are two competing firms, each deciding a one-time capacity investment to enter a
new market with unknown earning potential. Let i = 1 be the index for the first-mover firm,
i.e., the leader, and i = 2 be the index for the follower. The leader chooses its capacity K1 ≥ 0
and invests at t = 0, while the follower decides both its investment timing τ ≥ 0 and capacity
K2 ≥ 0. The investment is costly: Firm i incurs a lump sum cost of ciKi at the time of its
investment.
We take a probability space (Ω,F ,P) on which independent standard Brownian motions
B1
.
= {B1,t, t ≥ 0} and B2 .= {B2,t, t ≥ 0}, and a binary random variable µ independent of
these Brownian motions are defined.
The leader and the follower sell substitutable products. After the follower’s investment,
firm i’s market size is µi > 0, i = 1, 2; before the follower’s investment, the leader’s market size
is equal to the total market size µ
.
= µ1 + µ2 because the leader is the only firm in the market
for t ∈ [0, τ ].
The leader’s cumulative earning process is represented by X1
.
= {X1,t, t ≥ 0} such that
dX1,t = min(K1, µ)dt+ σdB1,t, t ≤ τ, (5.1)
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and
dX1,t = min(K1, µ1)dt+ σdB1,t, t > τ, (5.2)
where σ is a positive constant. The follower’s cumulative earning process is X2
.
= {X2,t, t ≥ τ}
where
dX2,t = min(K2, µ2)dt+ σdB2,t, t > τ. (5.3)
Note that firm i’s expected earning rate is driven by the minimum of its market size and
capacity, which is the selling quantity of firm i at any given time instant.
The caveat is that the favorableness of the market is unknown to both firms; the market
can be either favorable or unfavorable for firms. If the market is favorable, µ1 = µ1,H and
µ2 = µ2,H ; if it is unfavorable, µ1 = µ1,L and µ2 = µ2,L where µi,j is a positive constant and
µi,H > µi,L for i = 1, 2 and j = H,L. This implies that the total market size µ could be either
µH
.
= µ1,H + µ2,H or µL
.
= µ1,L + µ2,L. Firms initially believe that the market is favorable,
i.e., µ = µH , with probability pi0. This probability will be referred to as the initial belief. The
follower dynamically updates its initial belief based on the leader’s cumulative earning process
X1. Let FX1t ⊆ F be the smallest sub-σ-algebra that satisfies the standard properties such as
completeness and right-continuity, and {X1,s, 0 ≤ s ≤ t} are measurable with respect to FX1t .
Then, FX1 .= {FX1t , t ≥ 0} will be called the natural filtration of the X1 process. In light of
this, we define the follower’s posterior belief process {pit, t ≥ 0} as
pit
.
= P(µ = µH |FX1t ), t ≥ 0.
By Theorem 9.1 of Lipster and Shiryayev [1977], the follower’s posterior belief process evolves
as follows.
Lemma 5.1. For any given capacity K1 ≥ 0 of the leader, the posterior belief process pi =
{pit, t ≥ 0} satisfies the stochastic differential equation
dpit =
√
q(K1)pit(1− pit)dWt, t ≥ 0,
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where
q(K1)
.
=
1
σ2
[min(K1, µH)−min(K1, µL)]2 (5.4)
and W = {Wt, t ≥ 0} is a standard Brownian motion with respect to the filtration
{
FX1t , t ≥ 0
}
.
In particular,
Wt =
1
σ
X1,t − 1
σ
∫ t
0
[pis min(K1, µH) + (1− pis) min(K1, µL)] ds.
The term q(K1) in (5.4) can be interpreted as the signal quality or information quality of
the follower’s observation process X1. By (5.1) and (5.2), the leader’s capacity K1 affects the
evolution of the process X1 which, in turn, impacts the evolution of the follower’s posterior
belief process pi through the signal quality. Hereafter, we will use y0 and y as generic notations
for initial and posterior beliefs, respectively. The posterior belief process is defined for the
entire time horizon [0,∞). This is just for mathematical convenience; our analysis will show
that eventually, only the posterior belief process in [0, τ ] will be relevant.
We now formulate the leader’s and the follower’s expected discounted profits for any dis-
count rate λ > 0. A stopping time τ is called admissible for the follower if it is adopted to the
natural filtration FX1 . Thus, the follower’s feasible strategy is the combination of an admissible
stopping time τ at which the follower stops learning about the favorableness of the market and
invests, and the capacity K2 ≥ 0.
Based on this, for any given K1 ≥ 0, the follower chooses a feasible strategy (τ,K2) to
maximize its expected discounted profit:
max
(τ,K2)
E
[∫ ∞
τ
e−λtdX2,t − e−λτ c2K2 | piτ = y
]
. (5.5)
The follower’s expected discounted profit under a feasible strategy (τ,K2) is called its value
function under that strategy. Considering the follower’s best response for any K1 ≥ 0, the
leader chooses K1 ≥ 0 to maximize its expected discounted profit with the initial belief y0:
max
K1
E
[∫ ∞
0
e−λtdX1,t − c1K1
∣∣∣∣ pi0 = y0] . (5.6)
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Observe from (5.1) and (5.2) that the evolution of X1 depends on τ , which is a decision variable
to the follower. We will also establish later that τ depends on the leader’s capacity choice.
DEFINITION 1. The strategy profile (K˜1, K˜2, τ˜) is an equilibrium if and only if
K˜1 = arg maxK1≥0 E
[∫ ∞
0
e−λtdX(K1,τ˜)1,t − c1K1
∣∣∣∣ pi0 = y0] (5.7)
subject to (τ˜ , K˜2) = arg max(τ,K2) E
[∫ ∞
τ
e−λtdX2,t − e−λτ c2K2 | piK˜1τ = y
]
, (5.8)
where piK˜1 stands for the belief process when the leader’s capacity investment is K˜1, and X
(K1,τ˜)
1
represents the leader’s cumulative earning process with the capacity K1 and the follower’s
investment timing τ˜ .
5.3 Analysis
First, we assume that c2λ < 1 otherwise the follower shall never invest. To characterize
equilibrium strategies of firms, we shall solve backwards. Section 5.3.1 identifies the follower’s
optimal policy for a given K1. Based on this analysis, Section 5.3.2 characterizes equilibrium
strategies of both firms. We begin with the analysis of the follower’s problem.
5.3.1 Follower’s Problem
For any given K1 ≥ 0, define the follower’s optimal value function as
V2(y;K1)
.
= max
(τ,K2)
E
[∫ ∞
τ
e−λtdX2,t − e−λτ c2K2 | piτ = y
]
. (5.9)
If V2(·;K1) is C1 and piecewise C2, V2(·;K1) satisfies the following Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman
(HJB) equation:
0 = max
{
max
K2≥0
{g(y,K2)} − V2(y;K1), 1
2
q(K1)y
2(1− y)2V ′′2 (y;K1)− λV2(y;K1)
}
, (5.10)
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where g(y,K2) is the follower’s total expected discounted profit at τ with capacity K2 and
belief piτ = y, and equal to
E
[∫ ∞
0
e−λtdX2,t − c2K2 | piτ = y
]
=
[
1
λ
[ymin(K2, µ2,H) + (1− y) min(K2, µ2,L)]− c2K2
]
.
(5.11)
Hereafter, we will use the following notation for brevity:
g(y)
.
= max
K2≥0
{g(y,K2)} .
The heuristic derivation of (5.10) can be found in Appendix A.3.1. We will not directly use
the HJB equation (5.10) in our analysis. Rather, we will use (5.10) to come up with a guess
for the follower’s optimal policy. The structural properties of the HJB equation suggest that a
candidate for the follower’s optimal policy is a two-threshold policy.
For a given K1, a two-threshold investment policy is summarized by an upper belief thresh-
old h(K1), a lower belief threshold `(K1), and the follower’s capacity investment. Under such
a policy, the investment time is given by
τ
.
= inf{t ≥ 0 : pit ∈ [0, `(K1)] ∪ [h(K1), 1]},
and the follower’s investment capacity is
K2 =

µ2,L, piτ ∈ [0, `(K1)],
µ2,H , piτ ∈ [h(K1), 1].
Note that both lower and upper belief thresholds depend on K1. Below, we will show the
existence of a two-threshold policy whose value function satisfies certain properties.
Proposition 5.1. If K1 > µL, there exists a two-threshold investment policy (`
∗(K1), h∗(K1))
under which the follower’s value function v(·;K1) is C1, piecewise C2, and satisfies the following
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conditions:
g(y) ≤ v(y;K1), y ∈ (0, 1), (5.12)
1
2
q(K1)y
2(1− y)2v′′(y;K1) ≤ λv(y;K1), y ∈ (0, 1) \ {`∗(K1), h∗(K1)}. (5.13)
Proposition 5.2 proves the optimality of the policy analyzed in Proposition 5.1 by showing
that its value function is an upper bound on the value function of any other feasible policy.
Proposition 5.2. (a) For any given 0 ≤ K1 ≤ µL, it is optimal to invest at τ = 0 with the
following capacity:
K∗2 =

µ2,L, y0 ∈ [0, c2λ],
µ2,H , y0 ∈ (c2λ, 1].
(b) For any given K1 > µL, the two-threshold policy analyzed in Proposition 5.1 is an optimal
policy for the follower. Specifically, for the follower, it is optimal to wait whenever pit ∈
(`∗(K1), h∗(K1)); otherwise, it is optimal to invest the following capacity
K∗2 =

µ2,L, piτ ∈ [0, `∗(K1)],
µ2,H , piτ ∈ [h∗(K1), 1].
Proposition 5.2 shows that the structure of the follower’s optimal policy depends on K1.
For K1 in part (a), the signal quality q(K1) = 0, meaning that the follower does not obtain
any information by waiting and observing the leader’s cumulative earning process. As a result,
it is optimal for the follower to invest immediately to avoid any loss due to discounting. Part
(b) shows that if the leader invests in a capacity that provides information for the follower, it
is optimal for follower to use a two-threshold policy; thus, it is optimal for the follower to wait
as long as the belief is moderate.
In both parts (a) and (b), the follower optimally invests a large (respectively, small) capacity
if its belief is sufficiently large (respectively, small). This is because the follower invests more
if it believes that the market size is larger (i.e., µ2 = µ2,H).
As verified in Proposition A.1, `∗(K1) decreases with the signal quality q(K1) and h∗(K1)
increases with q(K1). (A similar insight is identified by Harrison and Sunar [2015] in a different
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setting that focuses on a single firm.) These findings demonstrate that, as the signal quality
increases, the belief region (`∗(K1), h∗(K1)) becomes wider and the follower is more likely to
follow a two-threshold policy.
The following proposition analyzes the convergence rates of `∗(K1) and h∗(K1), which will
be used later in obtaining the structures of the leader’s policy.
Proposition 5.3. The belief thresholds `∗(K1) and h∗(K1) of the two-threshold policy identified
in Proposition 5.2-(b) satisfy the following properties:
(a) As σ →∞,
c2λ− `∗(K1) = o(σ−1) and h∗(K1)− c2λ = o(σ−1).
(b) As σ → 0,
`∗(K1) = O(σ2) and 1− h∗(K1) = O(σ2).
5.3.2 Leader’s Problem and Equilibrium Strategies
Using the follower’s optimal policy identified in Proposition 5.2 for any given K1 ≥ 0, in
this section, we will identify firms’ equilibrium strategies. To do so, first, we shall provide more
details about the leader’s objective function. Recall from (5.6) that the leader’s equilibrium
profit is given by
V1(y0)
.
= max
K1≥0
H(K1, y0)
.
= max
K1≥0
E
[∫ ∞
0
e−λtdX1,t − c1K1
∣∣∣∣ pi0 = y0] .
Proposition 5.2 proves that under the follower’s optimal policy, the pair (K1, y0) deter-
mines whether τ = 0 or τ > 0, which, in turn, impacts the form of H(K1, y0) through
the leader’s expected earning rate. We will analyze H(K1, y0) under two different cases:
τ = 0 and τ > 0. We begin our analysis with the case τ = 0. By Proposition 5.2, τ = 0
when (a) (K1, y0) ∈ [0, µL] × [0, 1] because the signal quality is 0 in that region, and (b)
(K1, y0) ∈ (µL,∞) × [0, `∗(K1)) ∪ (h∗(K1), 1] by the definition of two-threshold policy. Then,
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for (K1, y0) ∈ {[0, µL]× [0, 1]} ∪ {(µL,∞)× [0, `∗(K1)) ∪ (h∗(K1), 1]}, we have
H(K1, y0) = H0(K1, y0)
.
= E
[∫ ∞
0
e−λt min{K1, µ1}dt+
∫ ∞
0
e−λtσdB1,t − c1K1 | pi0 = y0
]
= E
[
min{K1, µ1}
λ
− c1K1 | pi0 = y0
]
= y0
min{K1, µ1,H}
λ
+ (1− y0)min{K1, µ1,L}
λ
− c1K1. (5.14)
On the other hand, if (K1, y0) ∈ (µL,∞) × (`∗(K1), h∗(K1)), the follower will wait for a
positive time until its posterior belief hits either `∗(K1) or h∗(K1), which implies τ > 0. Thus
this parameter region leads to a different structure of H(K1, y0), which we denote as H1(K1, y0).
Specifically, if (K1, y0) ∈ (µL,∞)× (`∗(K1), h∗(K1)),
H(K1, y0)
= H1(K1, y0)
.
= E
[∫ τ
0
e−λt min{K1, µ}dt+
∫ ∞
τ
e−λt min{K1, µ1}dt+
∫ ∞
0
e−λtσdB1,t − c1K1
∣∣∣∣ pi0 = y0]
(5.15)
= −E
[
min{K1, µ} −min{K1, µ1}
λ
e−λτ
∣∣∣∣ pi0 = y0]
+
1
λ
(y0 min{K1, µH}+ (1− y0) min{K1, µL})− c1K1. (5.16)
Here,
E
[
min{K1, µ} −min{K1, µ1}
λ
e−λτ
∣∣∣∣ pi0 = y0]
=
ξ1(`
∗(K1))− ξ2(`∗(K1))
λ
E
[
e−λτ1{piτ=`∗(K1)} | pi0 = y0
]
+
ξ1(h
∗(K1))− ξ2(h∗(K1))
λ
E
[
e−λτ1{piτ=h∗(K1)} | pi0 = y0
]
, (5.17)
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where
ξ1(y)
.
= ymin{K1, µH}+ (1− y) min{K1, µL}, (5.18)
ξ2(y)
.
= ymin{K1, µ1,H}+ (1− y) min{K1, µ1,L}. (5.19)
Based on (5.17), let
φ`∗(y;K1)
.
= E
[
e−λτ1{piτ=`∗(K1)} | pi0 = y
]
. (5.20)
Then, by Itoˆ’s lemma, φ`∗(y;K1) satisfies the following ODE
λφ`∗(y;K1) =
1
2
q(K1)y
2(1− y)2φ′′`∗(y;K1), (5.21)
subject to these boundary conditions:
φ`∗(`
∗(K1);K1) = 1 and φ`∗(h∗(K1);K1) = 0. (5.22)
The derivation of (5.21) can be found in Appendix A.3.6, and the boundary conditions follow
from the fact that the follower stops learning and invests whenever its belief is `∗(K1) or h∗(K1).
Solving for φ`∗(y;K1) using (5.21) and (5.22), we have
φ`∗(y;K1) = a(`
∗(K1), h∗(K1))y
1+η
2 (1− y) 1−η2 + b(`∗(K1), h∗(K1))y
1−η
2 (1− y) 1+η2 (5.23)
for y ∈ [`∗(K1), h∗(K1)] where
η
.
=
√
1 + 8λ/q(K1) (5.24)
a(x, y) =
(
x
1+η
2 (1− x) 1−η2 − x 1−η2 (1− x) 1+η2
(
y
1− y
)η)−1
, (5.25)
b(x, y) =
(
x
1−η
2 (1− x) 1+η2 − x 1+η2 (1− x) 1−η2
(
1− y
y
)η)−1
. (5.26)
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Similarly, let
φh∗(y;K1)
.
= E
[
e−λτ1{piτ=h∗} | pi0 = y
]
. (5.27)
Then, φh∗(y;K1) satisfies the ODE in (5.21) and the following boundary conditions:
φh∗(`
∗(K1);K1) = 0 and φh∗(h∗(K1);K1) = 1.
Based on these, for y ∈ [`∗(K1), h∗(K1)], we have
φh∗(y;K1) = a(h
∗(K1), `∗(K1))y
1+η
2 (1− y) 1−η2 + b(h∗(K1), `∗(K1))y
1−η
2 (1− y) 1+η2 , (5.28)
where functions a(h∗(K1), `∗(K1)) and b(h∗(K1), `∗(K1)) are given in (5.25) and (5.26). Com-
bining (5.16) and (5.17), H(K1, y0) is equal toH1(K1, y0) for (K1, y0) ∈ (µL,∞)×(`∗(K1), h∗(K1)),
where
H1(K1, y0)
= −ξ1(`
∗(K1))− ξ2(`∗(K1))
λ
φ`∗(y0;K1)− ξ1(h
∗(K1))− ξ2(h∗(K1))
λ
φh∗(y0;K1)
+
ξ1(y0)
λ
− c1K1. (5.29)
Note from (5.18), (5.19),(5.23) and (5.28) that the functions ξ1(·), ξ2(·) φ`∗ and φh∗ all de-
pend on K1 through min{K1, µL}, min{K1, µH}, min{K1, µ1,L} and min{K1, µ1,H}, as well as
through the dependence of `∗ and h∗ on K1.
Remark 5.1. Observe from (5.14) and (5.29) that for K1 > µH , ξ1, ξ2, `
∗, h∗, φ`∗ , φh∗ do not
change with respect to K1, and H(K1, y0) is affected by K1 only via the last term −c1K1. This
implies that the leader shall never invest more than µH in order to maximize its discounted
profit.
Therefore the leader’s equilibrium profit is the maximum of the optimal values of H0 and
H1:
V1(y0) = max
{
max
K1
H0(K1, y0),max
K1
H1(K1, y0)
}
.
If V1(y0) = maxK1 H0(K1, y0) it means that it is optimal for the leader to select an invest-
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ment capacityK1 that leads to the follower’s investment at τ = 0. If V1(y0) = maxK1 H1(K1, y0),
it means that the leader should select an investment capacity K1 that induces the follower to
adopt a two-threshold policy.
Figure1 5.1 shows the feasible regions for H0 and H1 separated by `
∗(K1) and h∗(K1).
Figure 5.1: Feasible Regions for H0 and H1
Parameters used in this figure: λ = 0.1, σ = 1, c1 = c2 = 5, µL = 2, µH = 5, µ1,L = 1, µ1,H = 2.5, µ2,L = 1,
µ2,H = 2.5.
5.3.2.1 Equilibrium
We begin our analysis of the equilibrium investment strategies under the following two
limits of the volatility parameter σ: σ →∞ and σ → 0.
Proposition 5.4. Suppose that σ → 0 or σ →∞. Then, in equilibrium, the leader’s capacity
investment is
K˜1 =

µ1,L, y0 ≤ c1λ,
µ1,H , y0 > c1λ,
and the follower enters the market at τ˜ = 0 and invests
K˜2 =

µ2,L, y0 ≤ c2λ,
µ2,H , y0 > c2λ.
Thus, as σ → 0 or σ → ∞, the follower always invests immediately, and both firms follow
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a one-threshold policy: firm i invests a larger capacity µi,H if the initial belief y0 is high, or
invests a smaller capacity µi,L if the initial belief is low.
Next, we show that, with a moderate σ, there exists a belief region such that τ > 0 with
probability 1 in equilibrium, and the optimal capacity for the leader can take values other than
µ1,L and µ1,H .
Proposition 5.5. Consider σ ∈ (0,∞) and suppose that µL is not extremely large (i.e., µL <
µ1,H). Then, the leader’s equilibrium value function is
V1(y0) =

maxK1≥0 H0(K1, y0) if y0 ≤ α,
maxK1∈C H1(K1, y0) if y0 ∈ (α, α),
maxK1≥0 H0(K1, y0) if y0 > α,
(5.30)
and the leader’s equilibrium capacity investment is
K˜1 =

µ1,L if y0 ≤ min{α, c1λ},
arg maxK1∈C H1(K1, y0) if y0 ∈ (α, α),
µ1,H if y0 > max{α, c1λ},
(5.31)
for some belief thresholds α, α, α and α such that α ≤ α and α ≥ α.
Remark 5.2. If the investment cost per unit capacity is the same for both firms, i.e., c1 = c2,
then max{α, c1λ} = α and min{α, c1λ} = α in (5.31).
Remark 5.3. From Proposition 5.5 we see that there exists a belief region such that τ > 0
w.p.1, therefore K˜1(y0) ∈ (µL, µH ] over this region. We also have K˜1(y0) = µ1,L for small y0
close to 0, which indicates that there is jump from µ1,L to some value above µL (µL > µ1,L) as
y0 increasing from 0.
One interesting finding of this chapter is that, under certain conditions, the optimal profit
of the leader as function of initial belief y0 is not necessarily non-decreasing. We demonstrate
in the next proposition such detailed conditions, which are unfavorable to the leader and thus
leads to the costly behavior of the leader to delay the follower’s entrance.
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Proposition 5.6. Suppose that µL is not extremely large (i.e., µL < µ1,H). Then, with a
moderately large value of σ, there exists an initial belief region such that the leader’s equilibrium
value function V1(y0) decreases in y0, if c2λ < 1/2 and the following condition is satisfied:
µH − µL
µ2,L
<
1− 2c2λ
2c2λ
.
Note that the conditions require small values of c2, µ1,L, and large value of µ2,L, both
indicating a setting that is unfavorable to the leader. In Figure 5.2, the left panel shows the
leader’s equilibrium value function against y0, and we select three initial beliefs labeled in red
stars as examples within the decreasing region. In the right panel, the 3 curves show the LST
of τ defined as EK1(e−λτ |pi0 = y0) corresponding to 3 fixed y0 labeled in the left panel. The red
stars in the right panel also display the equilibrium capacity under the corresponding initial
beliefs.
From the right panel, we find that as y0 increases, the leader has to increase the capacity
so as to delay the follower’s entrance to the market. However, as the curve becoming less
sensitive to the capacity, the leader has to take costly actions and therefore the profits earned
is decreasing even with an increasing belief in market.
Figure 5.2: V1 as Functions of y0, and LST of τ as Function of K1
Parameters used in this figure: λ = 0.1, c1 = c2 = 0.5, σ = 1.5, µL = 1, µH = 9, µ1,L = 0.01, µ1,H = 1.5.
109
5.4 Numerical Experiments
In this section, we focus on several numerical examples to show the structure of the leader’s
equilibrium capacity as function of y0, also the leader and follower’s value function in equilib-
rium, both of which could decrease when y0 increases.
Here we fix the following parameters σ = 1, λ = 0.1, c1 = c2 = 5, µL = 1, µ1,H = 10, µ1,L =
0.5, and display 3 figures of K˜1(y0) with 3 different structures by varying µ1,H (note that
µ2,H = µH − µ1,H is also changing).
Figure 5.3: Leader’s equilibrium capacity K˜1 as functions of y0 by different values of µ1,H
Parameters used in this figure: λ = 0.1, c1 = c2 = 5, σ = 1, µL = 1, µH = 10, µ1,L = 0.5.
In the left panel, µ1,H = 0.8 and the leader is following a Bang-Bang type of policy: invest
at a lower level (µ1,L) when the initial belief is low, and a higher level (µ1,H) when the initial
belief is high. The type of structure happens when µ1,H is very small. Under this condition,
the region (α, α) shrinks to an empty set, hence maxK1ge0H0(K1,y0), hence the leader’s optimal
policy reduces to a one-threshold policy.
In the middle panel we have µ1,H = 1.2. When y0 is very small or very large, the leader
followers the policy with the similar Bang-Bang structure shown in the left panel. When y0
is in a moderate region, the leader’s optimal investment capacity decreases first before it hits
µ1,H and stay µ1,H on a small region around y0 = c2λ, and then increases again. This policy
structure happens more often for mu1,H close to µL. Recall in the proof of Proposition 5.5, we
show H(K1, y0) as function of K1 by different values of y0 in Figure A.10. Note that H(K1, y0)
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contains two pieces: piecewise linear part for K1 ≤ K0(y0), and concave part for K1 > K0(y0).
As mu1,H getting closer to µL, the maximum point at µ1,H of the piecewise part is also closer
to the peak point of the concave part under moderate value of y0, therefore it is easier to
observe the optimality achieved above µ1,H . Besides, we can show that K0(y0) is decreasing
for moderately small y0 < c2λ and increasing for moderately large y0 > c2λ, this leads to the
first decreasing then increasing pattern of the equilibrium capacity.
In the right panel we have a relatively larger µ1,H = 4, the equilibrium capacity shows an in-
creasing pattern on the region with moderate y0. We first observe that H(K1, y0) drops rapidly
after µ1,H , hence the maximum can only be achieved at of before µ1,H . Also as we increase
µ1,H the concavity of H(K1, y0) is reduced for a fixed y0 comparing with earlier smaller values
of µ1,H . Thus the maximum values of H(K1, y0) is more relying on y0, and the equilibrium
capacity can never be decreasing in y0.
5.5 Minimum Capacity Investment Requirement
In this section, unlike in Section 5.2, there is a minimum capacity investment requirement µ
for both firms to enter the market. Thus, unlike Section 5.3, the analysis of this model requires
considering following capacity constraints: K1 ≥ µ and K2 ≥ µ. To study a meaningful setting,
this section considers µ that is not extremely small or extremely large, i.e.,
max
{
µL,
µ2,L
c2λ
, µ2,H
}
< µ < min
{
µ1,H ,
µ2,H
c2λ
}
. (5.32)
The lower bound on µ ensures that it is profitable for the follower to eventually enter the market,
and the follower can learn about the favorableness of the market by observing the leader’s
earning process. The upper bound on µ guarantees that the leader’s investment strategy is
a non-trivial one. Similar to Section 5.3.1, V2(·;K1) represents the follower’s optimal value
function for a given K1 ≥ µ. If V2(·;K1) is C1 and piecewise C2, V2(·;K1) satisfies the following
HJB:
0 =
{
max
K2≥µ
g2(y,K2)− V2(y;K1), 1
2
q(K1)y
2(1− y)2V ′′2 (y;K1)− λV2(y;K1)
}
(5.33)
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Proposition 5.7. Given any fixed capacity of the leader K1 ≥ µ, it is optimal for the follower
to invest at
τ = inf{t ≥ 0 : pit ≥ θ∗(K1)},
where θ∗(K1) is a belief threshold and equal to
θ∗(K1) =
1 +
√
1 + 8λσ
2
(min(K1,µH)−min(K1,µL))2 − 1√
1 + 8λσ
2
(min(K1,µH)−min(K1,µL))2 + 1
µ2,H − c2λµ
c2λµ− µ2,L
−1 . (5.34)
Thus, it is optimal for the follower to invest immediately whenever the belief pit ≥ θ∗(K1), and
wait and learn from the leader’s cumulative earning process whenever pit < θ
∗(K1).
Remark 5.4. The belief threshold θ∗(K1) is increasing in K1. We will later prove in this
section that the leader’s equilibrium capacity K˜1 is dependent on the initial belief y0, which
implies that in equilibrium, belief threshold θ∗(K˜1) is a function that changes with the initial
belief y0. The optimal policy structure we identify has been identified in the literature; in
the literature (see, for instance, Harrison and Sunar [2015]), in different contexts, the belief
threshold for investment is shown to be a scalar that does not change with respect to the initial
belief y0.
Proposition 5.7 establishes the follower’s optimal policy for a given K1 ≥ µ. Given this, we
can now study the equilibrium investment strategies of firms.
Recall from (5.16) that the leader’s value function for a given pair of (K1, y0) is
H(K1, y0) =− E
[
min{K1, µ} −min{K1, µ1}
λ
e−λτ
∣∣∣∣ pi0 = y0]
+
1
λ
(y0 min{K1, µH}+ (1− y0) min{K1, µL})− c1K1. (5.35)
As explained in Section 5.3.1, for a given pair (K1, y0), the leader’s value function can take two
different forms depending on whether E[τ ] > 0 or E[τ ] = 0 with that pair. If (K1, y0) is such
that E[τ ] = 0, then H(K1, y0) = H0(K1, y0) where H0(K1, y0) is as in (5.14). Note that from
Proposition 5.7, a fixed K1 implies a belief threshold θ
∗(K1) such that τ = 0 with probability
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1 if y0 ≥ θ∗(K1). That is, H(K1, y0) = H0(K1, y0) for (K1, y0) ∈ [µ,∞)× (θ∗(K1), 1].
On the other hand, if (K1, y0) ∈ [µ,∞)× (0, θ∗(K1)], which implies τ > 0 with probability
1, the leader’s value function H(K1, y0) takes another form. Specifically, by (5.32), the first
term of H(K1, y0) in (5.35) is given by
E
[
min{K1, µ} −min{K1, µ1}
λ
e−λτ
∣∣∣∣ pi0 = y0] = 1λ (ξ1(θ∗(K1))− ξ2(θ∗(K1)))E [e−λτ ∣∣∣ pi0 = y0] ,
(5.36)
where ξ1(·) and ξ2(·) are as in (5.18) and (5.19). Note that in (5.36),
E
[
e−λτ
∣∣∣ pi0 = y0] = φ(y0)
φ(θ∗(K1))
, (5.37)
where
φ(z) = z
1+η
2 (1− z) 1−η2 . (5.38)
Thus, for any given (K1, y0) ∈ [µ,∞) × (0, θ∗(K1)], the leader’s value function H(K1, y0) is
equal to
H1(K1, y0) (5.39)
= − [ξ1(θ∗(K1))− ξ2(θ∗(K1))] φ(y0)
λφ(θ∗(K1))
+
1
λ
(
y0 min{K1, µH}
+ (1− y0) min{K1, µL}
)
− c1K1. (5.40)
Below, we will identify the leader’s equilibrium value function, and show that in equilibrium,
there exists a region in which V1(y0) = maxK1∈C H1(K1, y0).
Proposition 5.8. The leader’s equilibrium value function is
V1(y0) =

maxK1∈C H1(K1, y0) if y0 ∈ [0, θ∗(µ)] ∪ (y, θ∗(µH)),
maxK1≥0 H0(K1, y0) if y0 > θ∗(µH),
(5.41)
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where
C .=

{K1 : K1 ∈
(
(θ∗)−1(y0), µH
)} if y0 ≥ θ∗(µ),
(µ, µH) if y0 ≤ θ∗(µ).
Remark 5.5. If c1 is not too large, i.e.,
c1 <
1
λ
1 +
√
1 + 8λσ
2
(µ−µL)2 − 1√
1 + 8λσ
2
(µ−µL)2 + 1
µ2,H − c2λµ
c2λµ− µ2,L
−1 ,
y < θ∗(µ) and thus the initial belief interval [0, θ∗(µ)] ∪ (y, θ∗(µH)) in (5.41) reduces to
[0, θ∗(µH)).
The following proposition identifies the conditions under which the leader’s equilibrium
value function decreases with the initial belief.
Proposition 5.9. There exists a belief region such that the leader’s equilibrium value function
V1(y0) decreases in the initial belief y0 if
√
1 +
8λσ2
(µ− µL)2
(
U
V
+ 1
)
− U
V
>
µH − µL
µ2,L
,
where
U
.
= µ2,H − c2λµ and V .= c2λµ− µ2,L. (5.42)
Note that by fixing the other parameter, the condition above can be satisfied more eas-
ily with larger value of µ2,L and µ2,H , or smaller values of c2. All of these indicate that the
market is not in favor of the leader. In Figure 5.2, the left panel shows the leader’s equilib-
rium value function against y0, and we select 4 initial beliefs labeled in red stars as examples
within the decreasing region. In the right panel, the 4 curves show the LST of τ defined as
EK1(e−λτ |pi0 = y0) corresponding to 4 fixed y0 labeled in the left panel. The red stars in the
right panel also display the equilibrium capacity under the corresponding initial beliefs.
From the right panel, we find that as y0 increases, the leader has to increase the capacity
so as to delay the follower’s entrance to the market. However, as the curve becoming less
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sensitive to the capacity, the leader has to take costly actions and therefore the profits earned
is decreasing even with an increasing belief in market.
Figure 5.4: V1 as Functions of y0, and LST of τ as Function of K1
Parameters used in this figure: λ = 0.16, c1 = c2 = 5, µL = 1, µH = 5, µ1,L = 0.4, µ1,H = 3.95, µ = 1.06.
Proposition 5.10 characterizes the leader’s equilibrium capacity for a given initial belief α0.
Proposition 5.10. If the initial belief y0 is relatively high, then the leader’s equilibrium capacity
is either µ1,H or µ. That is,
K˜1(y0) =

µ1,H if y0 ≥ max

1 + UV
√
1+ 8λσ
2
(µH−µL)2
−1√
1+ 8λσ
2
(µH−µL)2
+1
−1 , c1λ

µ if c1λ ≥ y0 ≥
1 + UV
√
1+ 8λσ
2
(µH−µL)2
−1√
1+ 8λσ
2
(µH−µL)2
+1
−1 ,
where U and V are as defined in (5.42). On the other hand, if the initial belief y0 is relatively
low, that is,
y0 ≤
1 + U
V
√
1 + 8λσ
2
(µ−µL)2 − 1√
1 + 8λσ
2
(µ−µL)2 + 1
−1 ,
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the leader’s equilibrium capacity is
K˜1(y0) = max{K∗1 , µ}, (5.43)
where K∗1 is the solution of ∂H1(K∗1 , y0)/∂K1 = 0.
Note that the optimal K1 falls in [µ, µH ], hence the threshold θ falls in[θ(ηmax), θ(ηmin)].
For any y0 ≥ αH , we know the initial belief is always higher than the threshold, that is V1(y0) =
maxK1 H0(K1, y0) and it is optimal for the leader to invest µ1,H . On the other hand, if y0 ≤ αL,
we know the initial belief is always below the threshold, hence V1(y0) = maxK1 H1(K1, y0).
Next proposition describes the monotonicity of the optimal policy K˜1(y0) as function of y0.
Proposition 5.11. The leader’s equilibrium capacity K˜1(y0) is non-decreasing in y0 if condi-
tions in one of the two cases are satisfied:
Case 1: if K˜1 ≤ µ1,H , and
1− µ2,L
µ− µL
η2max − 1
2ηmax
(
U
V
+
ηmax − 1
ηmax + 1
)
> 0, (5.44)
Or,
Case 2: if K˜1 > µ1,H , µ1,H ≤ µL + 3 · µ2,L · η0−1η0+1 · UV , and
1− η
2
0 − 1
2η0
· 1
µ1,H − µL ·
[
µ2,H
(
η0 + 1
η0 − 1 +
V
U
)
+ µ2,L
(
η0 − 1
η0 + 1
+
U
V
)]
> 0, (5.45)
where ηmax and η0 are given in (A.107) and (A.109).
In Case 1, we find that the LHS of the inequality (5.44) is decreasing in the ratio U/V .
Hence the condition can be easily satisfied with a larger c2 and smaller µ2,H . In Case 2, the
LHS of the inequality (5.45) is decreasing in η0, hence the condition can be easily satisfied with
a larger µ1,H . All of these imply a positive investment environment for the leader, therefore
the optimal value function of the leader shall increase as long as the initial belief is increasing.
We can again use Fig 5.4 especially panel (d) to explain such phenomenon. Here we plot the
LST of τ by varying y0 and K1. The solid dots on each curve are the optimal K˜1 with the
corresponding y0. As we increase y0 in the region (0.63, 0.80), where K˜1(y0) is increasing as
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shown in panel (a), we observe that the leader can delay the follower’s entrance by increasing
K1. Besides, the cost of expanding capacity can be easily offset by the higher earning rate and
initial belief.
Followed by this result, we show in the following corollary how the threshold θ changes with
respect to y0 under the optimal policy.
Corollary 5.1. Under the optimal policy and the conditions in Proposition 5.11, the follower’s
investment threshold θ∗(K˜1(y0)) is non-decreasing in the initial belief y0.
It is common in the literature that a investment threshold is stationary and not affected by
the market information. Here due to our special setting of variable capacity, the initial belief
impacts the follower’s optimal policy by first affecting the leader’s investment capacity. Clearly,
as the market information providing more positive prediction of the new market, the follower
tends to be more ambitious and sets a higher threshold in the belief that it can be reached in
a short time horizon.
5.6 Summary
We analyze optimal investment timing and capacity for both the leader and follower firms
in a duopoly game with uncertain market. The follower firm update its belief with a Bayesian
approach based on the performance of the leader firm, and decide on the optimal time to
invest and how much to invest. The leader can impact the follower’s decision through the
“signal quality” by twisting its investment capacity. We study the problem backwards, and
first establish a two-threshold policy for the follower and show its existence and optimality.
Such policy can be characterized by a lower bound `∗ and a upper bound h∗ of the posterior
belief: when the belief is lower than `∗ or higher than h∗, it is optimal to invest immediately
without further learning; otherwise it is valuable to continue the learning process and update
the belief until it hit either of the bounds.
Next we focus on the leader’s problem and first derive the policy in equilibrium under the
two limits of the noise level σ. With a positive finite σ we establish the sufficient conditions for
the leader to invest certain amount so that the follower adopts the non-trivial two-threshold
policy and starts the learning process at the beginning. Furthermore we find the sufficient
117
conditions under which the leader’s equilibrium value function in decreasing in the initial belief
y0. These sufficient conditions imply unfavorable investment opportunities for the leader, hence
result in costly decisions for the leader to delay the follower.
Lastly we add a lower bound constraint on the investment capacity for both leader and
follower. This simplifies the model since the follower’s policy in equilibrium reduces to a
one-threshold policy, and such threshold is established explicitly as function of the leader’s
investment capacity. We find the similar results as in the original model, and show the suffi-
cient conditions under which the leader’s value function is decreasing in the initial belief. More
important, we characterize the leader’s policy in equilibrium explicitly, and show that under
certain conditions the equilibrium capacity is increasing in the initial belief. Another contri-
bution of this chapter is to show how the threshold of the follower with respect to y0 under
the leader’s policy in equilibrium, while most of the literature introduces the thresholds that
cannot be affected by the market status.
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APPENDIX A: APPENDICES
A.1 Appendices for Chapter 2
A.1.1 Additional Plots for Sample Applications
Arrival patterns for applications 10 and 100, in comparison to Figures 2.2 and 2.3 in the
main paper.
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Figure A.1: Arrivals of Application 10
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Figure A.2: Arrivals of Application 100
A.1.2 Proof of monotonicity of truncated negative binomial distribution
Let Xr ∼ NB(r, 1− p) with probability mass function (pmf)
Pk,r = P (Xr = k) =
(
k + r − 1
k
)
pr(1− p)k, k = 0, 1, · · · ,
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and let
f(k, r) = Pk,r/
k∑
i=0
Pi,r.
Theorem A.1. For a fixed r > 0, f(k, r) is a decreasing function of k.
Proof: Let δk = f(k, r)− f(k+ 1, r). We show that δk ≥ 0 for ∀k = 0, 1, · · · . We see that
δk =
(
k+r−1
k
)
pr(1− p)k∑k
i=0
(
i+r−1
i
)
pr(1− p)i −
(
k+r
k+1
)
pr(1− p)k+1∑k+1
i=0
(
i+r−1
i
)
pr(1− p)i
=
(
k + r − 1
k
)
(1− p)k
(
1∑k
i=0
(
i+r−1
i
)
(1− p)i −
k+r
k+1(1− p)∑k+1
i=0
(
i+r−1
i
)
(1− p)i
)
= Ck
(
k+1∑
i=0
(
i+ r − 1
i
)
(1− p)i − k + r
k + 1
k∑
i=0
(
i+ r − 1
i
)
(1− p)i+1
)
,
where
Ck =
(
k+r−1
k
)
(1− p)k∑k
i=0
(
i+r−1
i
)
(1− p)i ·∑k+1i=0 (i+r−1i )(1− p)i .
Now Ck ≥ 0 for ∀k ≥ 0. Hence to show δk ≥ 0, it is suffice to show that:
∆k =
k+1∑
i=0
(
i+ r − 1
i
)
(1− p)i − k + r
k + 1
k∑
i=0
(
i+ r − 1
i
)
(1− p)i+1 ≥ 0.
We first look at the case where 0 < r ≤ 1, and thus (k + r)/(k + 1) ≤ 1. Then we have
∆k =
(
k + r
k + 1
)
(1− p)k+1 +
k∑
i=0
(
i+ r − 1
i
)
(1− p)i
(
1− k + r
k + 1
(1− p)
)
≥
(
k + r
k + 1
)
(1− p)k+1 +
k∑
i=0
(
i+ r − 1
i
)
(1− p)i (1− (1− p)) ≥ 0.
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Now consider the case r ≥ 1. We have
∆k =
k∑
i=0
(
i+ r − 1
i
)
(1− p)i +
(
k + r
k + 1
)
(1− p)k+1
− k + r
k + 1
k−1∑
i=0
(
i+ r − 1
i
)
(1− p)i+1 − k + r
k + 1
(
k + r − 1
k
)
(1− p)k+1
=
k∑
i=0
(
i+ r − 1
i
)
(1− p)i − k + r
k + 1
k−1∑
i=0
(
i+ r − 1
i
)
(1− p)i+1
= 1 +
k∑
i=1
(
i+ r − 1
i
)
(1− p)i − k + r
k + 1
k∑
i=1
(
i+ r − 2
i− 1
)
(1− p)i
= 1 +
k∑
i=1
(
i+ r − 2
i− 1
)
(1− p)i
(
i+ r − 1
i
− k + r
k + 1
)
= 1 +
k∑
i=1
k − i+ 1
k + 1
· r − 1
i
(
i+ r − 2
i− 1
)
(1− p)i
=
1
k + 1
k∑
i=0
(k − i+ 1)
(
i+ r − 2
i
)
(1− p)i
≥ 1
k + 1
k∑
i=0
(
i+ r − 2
i
)
(1− p)i ≥ 0.
This completes the proof.
A.1.3 A3. NHPP Tests on the Arrival Data
Using the results of Brown et al. (2005) we construct the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for
the null hypothesis that arrivals of given types of application form a NHPP. Their approach
addresses the time-varying arrival rate by converting the problem into a standard statistical test
to determine whether inter-arrival times data can be regarded as a sample from a sequence of
independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) random variables with a specified distribution
(see Kim and Ward (2014)). The first step is to approximate the NHPP by a piecewise-
constant (PC) NHPP, by assuming that the arrival rates are constant on each interval. The
second step is to apply the conditional-uniform (CU) transformation to transform the PC
NHPP into a sequence of i.i.d. random variables uniformly distributed on [0, 1]. Because of the
assumption of PC, the NHPP now can be regarded as a homogeneous Poisson process (PP)
over each interval. For a PP on [0, T ], conditioned on the total number of arrivals in that
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interval, the arrival times divided by T are distributed as the order statistics of i.i.d. random
variables uniformly distributed on [0, 1]. Finally, following Brown et al. (2005) we use a scaled
logarithmic transformation of the data, which under the Poisson null hypothesis produces a
sequence of i.i.d. mean-one exponential random variables. Then we apply the KS test with
F (x) = 1− e−x.
Using our data, the first test example includes all the arrivals for application 1 arriving on
every Monday from 14:00 to 14:59, August 1, 2008 to July 31, 2011. In total we have 150 such
Monday one-hour intervals, and 470 arrivals. The respective Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic has
a value of K = 0.0374 (p-value = 0.3811). The second example includes 278 arrivals requesting
for type 2 application on Wednesday Oct 14th, 2009. The interval length is half hour. For this
case we have Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic K = 0.0648 (p-value = 0.18). These results are
typical of those we have obtained from various selections of intervals of the various types of
requests. Thus, overall there is no evidence in this data set to reject the null hypothesis that
the arrival process of application requests is NHPP with PC arrival rates. We also apply the
root-unroot method from Brown et al. (2005) to stabilize the variance.
A.1.4 Additional Simulation Results
Figures A.3 and A.4 show the simulation results obtained under the MX/M/∞ and the
M(t)/G/∞ queue. These figures can be compared with Figure 2.7 in Section 3.7 of the main
paper.
A.2 Appendices for Chapter 3
A.2.1 Proof of Theorem 3.1
Taking the first and second derivatives of Equation 3.6 with regard to q, we get:
G′(q) = (p− c′)γ(1− F (γq))− c′F (q) + c′ − c, (A.1)
G′′(q) = −(p− c′)γ2f(γq)− c′f(q).
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When p > c′, it is obvious that G′′(q) ≤ 0, hence G(·) is concave, which implies that there is a
unique point q∗ where G(·) is maximized. Setting the first derivative in Equation A.1 to be 0,
we get Equation 3.7.
Since F (q∗) ≤ F (γq∗) for γ ≥ 1, by substituting q∗ by γq∗ and conversely in Equation A.1
we have:
(p− c′)γF (γq∗)) + c′F (γq∗) ≥ c′ − c+ (p− c′)γ.
(p− c′)γF (q∗)) + c′F (q∗) ≤ c′ − c+ (p− c′)γ.
Solving the above inequalities, get Equation 3.9.
A.2.2 Proof of Theorem 3.2
Let pi be any stationary policy and (x, a) ∈ X ×A be any initial state. Since the capacity
is infinite, and a patient who needs k appointments stays in the system for at most kT days,
we can bound the number of patients in the system by a recurrent infinite server queue. This
implies that state (0, 0) is recurrent. Then it is straightforward to prove that it is possible
to reach state (0, 0) from any state (x, a) in a finite number of steps: suppose K = max{k :
x(k, t) > 0, t = 1, . . . , T}. Then K <∞ with probability 1, and if there are no arrivals in the
next KT days, all the existing appointments will be no longer on the schedule and the system
state would be (0, 0) after KT days. The probability of this is φKT0 > 0, under any policy pi.
Therefore, we have proved the MDP is indeed uni-chain.
For the similar reason, it is possible to go from state (Xn, An) = (0, 0) to (Xn+1, An+1) =
(0, 0) in one step, as long as Bn = 0 (with probability φ0 > 0). This proves aperiodicity.
A.2.3 Proof of Theorem 3.3
First, we state a useful known result below (see Section 3.2.5 in Boyd and Vandenberghe
(2004)).
Concavity Theorem
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Let g(x, y) be concave in (x, y), and C be a convex nonempty set. Then the function
v(x) = max
y∈C
g(x, y)
is concave in x, provided v(x) > −∞ for all x.
Next we prove Theorem 3.3 by induction on n. For n = 0, we have v0(x, a) = 0, which is
trivially concave in x.
Now we assume that vn−1(x, a) is concave in x for some n ≥ 1. Hence vn−1(Tx+y, a) is
concave in x+y for any given A = a, since the transformation T simply rearranges components
of x+ y. Hence
gn(x+ y) = E(vn−1(Tx+y, A)) =
∑
a∈A
(
vn−1(Tx+y, a)
)
P (A = a)
is concave, since it is a convex combination of concave functions. Using the above Concavity
Theorem for optimization problem P (n), we see that vn(x, a) is concave in x, and hence by
induction, it is concave for all n ≥ 0.
A.2.4 Proof of Theorem 3.4
Let g(x+y) = limn→∞ gn(x+y) = E (v(Tx+y, A)), then P (n) can be written as the following
optimization problem P:
v(x, a) = max{g(x+ y) +R(x+ y) + f(y)}. P
s.t. y ∈ X , (3.16)
ye = a. (3.17)
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Note that the above P with decision variable y is equivalent to the following optimization
problem P* with decision variable z = x+ y
v(x, a) + f(x) = max {g(z) +R(z) + f(z)} P*
s.t. z − x ∈ X , (A.5)
ze = a+ xe. (A.6)
Let the above objective function be g˜(z) = g(z)+R(z)+f(z). It follows from Theorem 3.3 that
g˜(z) is concave, and the constraints A.5 and A.6 are equivalent to 3.16 and 3.17 respectively.
Let Ai be the feasible set given by A.5 and A.6 given x = xi, i = 1, 2. We see that Ai is a
convex set for i = 1, 2.
For i = 1, 2, suppose the optimal solutions to P* with x = xi is zi = xi + yi. We prove the
theorem by showing z1 ∈ A2, and g˜(z2) = g˜(z1). Therefore we can simply take z2 = z1.
First, by condition (c), we see that
x2e = (x1 + h)e = x1e,
hence the right hand side of constraint A.6 remains the same for x = x1 and x = x2. Also
condition (b) implies that z1 − x2 = z1 − x1 − h = y1 − h ∈ X , so we have z1 ∈ A2. We must
have g˜(z2) ≥ g˜(z1) since the objective function is maximized at z2 in A2. The proof will be
completed if we show that g˜(z2) ≤ g˜(z1). We do this by contradiction.
So suppose g˜(z2) > g˜(z1), and let w =
1
2z2 +
1
2z1. Since g˜ is concave, we have
g˜(w) ≥ 1
2
g˜(z1) +
1
2
g˜(z2) > g˜(z1). (A.2)
Note that the linear constraint A.6 satisfied by z1 and z2 will also be satisfied by w.
We also have
w =
1
2
(x1 + h+ y2) +
1
2
(x1 + y1)
= x1 +
1
2
y2 +
1
2
(y1 + h).
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From (b), we see that y1 + h ∈ X . Since y2 ∈ X , we have w − x1 ∈ X , that is w satisfies
constraint A.5 given x = x1. Hence w ∈ A1. However, z1 ∈ A1 is the optimal solution for
x = x1, hence g˜(w) ≤ g˜(z1). This contradicts A.2, and thus completes the proof.
A.2.5 Proof of Theorem 3.5
This follows because in the proof of Theorem 3.4, condition (c) is needed such that con-
straint A.6 remains to be unchanged, and (c’) is a general version of (c).
A.2.6 Proof of Theorem 3.6
We know that the demand on day n ≥ 1 in Equation 3.11 is accumulated from the scheduling
decisions over times {0, 1, · · · , n− 1}.
Note that a new arrival on day j who is given the first appointment on day j + t creates a
demand for one slot on day n if n− j − t = (k− 1)T for some k ≥ 1, and he/she needs at least
k repeat visits. Recall that Yj(k, t) is precisely the number of such patients for 0 < j < n, and
they contribute to the demand on day n if (k, t) ∈ Sn. Besides, X0(kn, tn) = x(kn, tn) of the
patients on the initial schedule also have an appointment on day n. Hence
Dn = x(kn, tn) +
∑
(k,t)∈Sn
Yn−(k−1)T−t(k, t). (A.3)
We see that the only element in the initial state X0 = x involved in the demand on day n
is x(kn, tn).
From Equation 3.19, we see that the random variables Y ’s in Equation A.3 are independent,
since {Bj , 0 ≤ j < n} are i.i.d.. Therefore the generating function for Zn has the product form.
Further, we can compute
E(zYn(k,t)) = E(zB(Bn,fkβt)) = E((zfkβt − fkβt + 1)Bn)
= Φ(zfkβt − fkβt + 1), (A.4)
Finally, Equation 3.21 is obtained by plugging Equation A.4 into Equation A.3.
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A.2.7 Proof of Corollary 3.1
We are given that
λ = E(Bn),
and
E(Vi) =
∞∑
k=1
kpk =
∞∑
k=1
fk.
In the steady state, combining Equation 3.19 and Equation A.3, taking expectations and letting
n→∞, we get:
lim
n→∞E(Zn) = limn→∞E
 ∑
(k,t)∈Sn
B (B(n−(k−1)T−t),k, fkβt)

= lim
n→∞
∑
(k,t)∈Sn
λfkβt =
∞∑
k=1
T∑
t=1
λfkβt = λ
∞∑
k=1
fk = λm.
Next, suppose the total number of patients on the schedule on day 0 is finite, that is,
T∑
t=1
x(1, t) <∞.
Let K be the maximum number of repeat visits needed by any of these initial patients. Then
x(x, t) = 0 for k > K for all 1 ≤ t ≤ T . Hence
lim
n→∞x(kn, tn) = 0.
Hence we get
lim
n→∞E(Dn|X0 = x) = limn→∞x(kn, tn) + E(Zn) = λm.
A.2.8 Proof of Corollary 3.2
Since {Bn, n ≥ 0} are i.i.d. P(λ), we have
Φ(z) = exp(−λ(1− z)).
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Substituting in Equation 3.21, we have
E(zZn) =
∏
(k,t)∈Sn
exp(−λ(1− zfkβt + fkβt − 1) = exp(−(
∑
(k,t)∈Sn
fkβt)(1− z)).
Hence Zn ∼ P(λn), where λn is as given in Equation 3.22.
We have limn→∞ λn = λm. Hence Zn converges to a P(λm) random variable. Finally,
following the proof of Corollary 3.1, we see that finiteness of the number of patients on schedule
on day 0 implies that Dn and Zn have the same limit in distribution.
A.2.9 Proof of Proposition 3.1
First note that the function ρ(z, q) is a concave function in z, which can be seen directly from
the definition and Figure 3.1, as long as p ≥ c′. Since E (ρ(z + Z, q)) is a convex combination
of ρ(z + w, q), w ≥ 0, it follows that gk,t(z) is concave in z.
A.2.10 Proof of Proposition 3.2
Recall Equation 3.30:
Ik(x, t) =
k∑
j=1
(p− c′)Fj,t(γq − x(j, t)− 1) + c′Fj,t(q − x(j, t)− 1)− cd(t),
p1 and p2 can be derived easily. To prove p3, note that Fk,t(·) is a cdf and therefore
non-decreasing, thus for x1(k, t) ≤ x2(k, t) we have
Fk,t(γq − x1(k, t)− 1) ≥ Fk,t(γq − x2(k, t)− 1),
and similarly
Fk,t(q − x1(k, t)− 1) ≥ Fk,t(q − x2(k, t)− 1).
Hence Ik(x1, t) ≥ Ik(x2, t) follows directly.
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A.2.11 Solution to Min-Cost Flow Problem
Now we show how the problem of Equation 3.29 can be solved to optimality by formulating
it as a min-cost flow problem on a network with positive and negative costs. As in the first
step of greedy procedure in Section 3.6, we assume that the current state (x, a) is given and let
K = max{k ≥ 1 : ak > 0}.
The network model for this problem is provided in Figure A.5. This network has K source
nodes, labelled s1, s2, · · · , sK , with node sk having supply a˜k. There are K nodes for each day
t labeled (1, t), · · · , (K, t) and a single sink node t0 with demand a1 =
∑K
k=1 a˜k. The network
contains arcs (sk, (k, t)) with flow y˜(k, t) and zero cost for k = 1, · · · ,K and t = 1, · · · , T ; arcs
((k, t), (k − 1, t)) with flow x(k, t) + y(k, t) and cost −g˜kt(x(k, t), y(k, t)) for i = 2, · · · ,K and
t = 1, · · · , T ; and arcs ((1, t), t0) with flow x(1, t) + y(1, t) and cost −g˜kt(x(1, t), y(1, t)) for
t = 1, · · · , T .
With this formulation, we see that solving the optimization problem is same as finding
the min-cost flow on this network that satisfies all the supply and demand constraints. We
can apply the successive shortest path algorithm for the minimum convex-cost network flow
problem to this network with KT + K + 1 nodes and 2KT arcs to solve this problem. (See
Bazaraa et al. [2011].) At each step we construct a residual network G(x + y, y˜) in which the
cost of an arc with flow x(k, t) + y(k, t) is
∂(−g˜)(x(k, t), y(k, t) + 1) = −g˜(x(k, t), y(k, t) + 1) + g˜(x(k, t), y(k, t)),
and the cost of the reverse arc with flow x(k, t) + y(k, t) > x(k, t) is
−∂(−g˜)(x(k, t), y(k, t)) = g˜(x(k, t), y(k, t))− g˜(x(k, t), y(k, t)− 1).
If x(k, t)+y(k, t) = x(k, t), there is no reverse arc, since the existing scheduling matrix x(k, t)
cannot be rearranged. The approach to solve the optimization problem of Equation 3.29 is to
push flow from sk to t in the reduced network Gk, which omits the source nodes sK down to
sk+1 and their incident arcs. This procedure begins by pushing flow from s1 to t and continues
until we push flow sK to t over the full network. We outline the algorithm below:
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Successive Shortest Path Procedure:
 Initialize y, y˜ = 0;
 For k = 1 to K fo
– While
∑T
t=1 y˜(k, t) < a˜k do
* Determine the shortest path P from node sk to node t in the residual network
Gk(x+ y, y˜) constructed from the reduced network Gk;
* Augment 1 unit of flow along the path P ;
* Update y, y˜ and Gk(x+ y, y˜);
– End while loop;
 End for loop.
The convexity of −g˜k,t(w, ·) ensures that there is no negative cycle in the graph. Con-
sidering the cost of arcs can be negative, we use FIFO modified label correcting algorithm
(see Cherkassky et al. [1996]) to find the shortest path for each repetition in the while loop,
which has a complexity of O((KT )2). Because of the nice structure of each residual graph,
the implementation of the successive shortest paths algorithm has a polynomial complexity of
O(a1K
3T 2).
A.2.12 Proof of Theorem 3.7
We first study SQ policy. It is obvious that the order, and hence the type of arrivals does
not affect the final decision since each decision is dependent only on the first row of current
state, that is the total number of existing appointments on each of the T days. Therefore,
we can formulate the SQ policy as the following optimization problem with decision variable
z = x+ y:
min max{z(1, 1), · · · , z(1, T )}
s.t. z − x ∈ X , (A.5)
ze = a+ xe. (A.6)
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It can be shown straightforwardly that the function max{z(1, 1), · · · , z(1, T )} is convex in z,
therefore the same structural property in Equation 3.18 holds for SQ policy under the same
the conditions (a) - (c) (or (c’)).
Similarly, the decision under MP policy does not depend on the type of arriving patient
either. The equivalent optimization problem under MP policy is:
max
T∑
t=1
ρ(z(1, t), q)− cd(t)z(1, t)
s.t. z − x ∈ X , (A.5)
ze = a+ xe. (A.6)
where the objective function is also concave in z = x+ y. And for MMP policy, the equivalent
problem with concave objective function is:
max
k∑
j=1
T∑
t=1
ρ(z(j, t), q)− cd(t)z(j, t)
s.t. z − x ∈ X , (A.5)
ze = a+ xe. (A.6)
We conclude that, under conditions (a) - (c) (or (c’)), structural property in Equation 3.18
holds for MP and MMP policies.
For the MF policy, recall that it is the optimal solution to the maximization problem in
Equation 3.26, and if we consider the corresponding long run expected net profit vMF , the
problem can be formulated as
vMF (x, a) = max
y∈∆(a)
vfy(x, a) = max
y∈∆(a)
{r(x, y) + E(vf (Tx+y, A))} ,
where vND is the long run expected net profit under ND policy. From equation 3.27, we know
that E(vn−1ND (Tx+y, A)), and hence the limiting E(vND(Tx+y, A)) is also a concave function in
x+y. Therefore the same proof shows that if the change in the initial scheduling state satisfies
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(a) - (c) (or (c’)), the optimal decision made under MF policy also satisfies Equation 3.18.
A.3 Appendices for Chapter 5
A.3.1 The Heuristic Derivation of the HJB Equation (5.10)
Fix any K1 ≥ 0 for the leader’s capacity. Take a small h > 0, and consider the time interval
[0, h]. The follower can take one of the two possible actions during that time interval: The
follower either waits and learns from the leader’s cumulative earnings about the favorableness
of the market without making an investment, or stops learning and invests at t = 0.
First, suppose that during [0, h], the follower decides to wait and learn from the leader’s
cumulative earnings about the favorableness of the market without making an investment.
Then, by Itoˆ’s lemma, we have
E [V2(pih;K1) | pi0 = y] = E
[
V2(y;K1) +
∫ h
0
V ′2(pis;K1)dpis +
1
2
∫ h
0
V ′′2 (pis;K1)(dpis)
2 | pi0 = y
]
= V2(y;K1) +
1
2
q(K1)y
2(1− y)2V ′′2 (y;K1)h+ o(h).
Based on this, if the follower decides not to enter the market during [0, h], its expected
discounted profit is
V2(y;K1) = E
[
e−λhV2(pih;K1) | pi0 = y
]
= (1− λh)E [V2(pih;K1) | pi0 = y] + o(h)
= V2(y;K1) +
[
1
2
q(K1)y
2(1− y)2V ′′2 (y;K1)− λV2(y;K1)
]
h+ o(h).
Subtracting V2(y;K1) from both sides, dividing by h, and letting h→ 0 in the above equation,
we obtain
0 =
1
2
q(K1)y
2(1− y)2V ′′2 (y;K1)− λV2(y;K1). (A.7)
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On the other hand, if the follower decides to invest t = 0, it receives
max
K2≥0
{
E
[∫ ∞
0
e−λtdX2,t − c2K2 | pi0 = y0
]}
= max
K2≥0
{
1
λ
[ymin(K2, µ2,H) + (1− y) min(K2, µ2,L)]− c2K2
}
. (A.8)
Note that the maximizer K∗2 in (A.8) depends on y, c2, and λ:
K∗2 =

µ2,L, 0 ≤ y ≤ c2λ,
µ2,H , c2λ < y ≤ 1.
(A.9)
Plugging the above expression for K∗2 in (A.8), we obtain the follower’s optimal discounted
profit at the stopping:
g(y) =

( 1λ − c2)µ2,L, 0 ≤ y ≤ c2λ,
1
λ(µ2,H − µ2,L)y + 1λµ2,L − c2µ2,H , c2λ < y ≤ 1.
(A.10)
The follower chooses the action (among stopping and waiting) that results in larger payoff.
Thus, by (A.7) and (A.10), we obtain
V2(y;K1) = max
{
g(y), V2(y;K1) +
1
2
q(K1)y
2(1− y)2V ′′2 (y;K1)− λV2(y;K1)
}
.
Subtracting V2(y;K1) from both sides in the above equation, we obtain the HJB equation for
a given K1 ≥ 0:
0 = max
{
g(y)− V2(y;K1), 1
2
q(K1)y
2(1− y)2V ′′2 (y;K1)− λV2(y;K1)
}
.
A.3.2 Proof of Proposition 5.1
Fix capacity K1 > µL for the leader. The outline of our proof is as follows. First, for any
candidate lower critical belief ` ∈ (0, 1), we consider a function f`(·), and show the structural
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properties of this function in Lemmas X and Y. And then we will show that there exists a
particular `∗(K1) ∈ (0, 1) such that f`∗(·) is C2 on (`∗,∞) and f`∗(·) is tangent to g(·) at a
unique point h∗(K1). Using f`∗(·), we will construct a function v(·;K1), which we will show to
be the value function of the two-threshold policy (`∗(K1), h∗(K1)). Finally, using the structural
properties of v(·;K1), we will show that v(·;K1) satisfies said properties in Proposition 5.1.
Fix any ` ∈ (0, 1). Define the function f`(·) : [`, 1] → R as the solution of the following
ODE and boundary conditions:
λf`(y) =
1
2
q(K1)y
2(1− y)2f ′′` (y), (A.11)
f`(`) = g(0) > 0 and f
′
`(`) = 0. (A.12)
Existence of a solution to (A.11) and (A.12) follows from elementary ODE theory. Below,
we will show certain structural properties of f`(·) in Lemmas A.1 and A.2.
Lemma A.1. For any 0 < ` < 1, f ′`(y) > 0 and f
′′
` (y) > 0 for y ∈ (`, 1].
Proof of Lemma A.1: We first prove the strict convexity of f`(·). Suppose for a contradiction
that there exists at least one belief value at which f ′′` (·) ≤ 0. Let ya
.
= min{y ∈ [`, 1] : f ′′` (y) ≤
0}. (The minimum is achieved as f ′′` (·) is continuous.) Because f ′′` (`+) > 0 by (A.11), ya > `.
From (A.11), f ′′` (ya) ≤ 0 implies that
f`(ya) ≤ 0. (A.13)
Then, because f`(`) > 0 and f
′
`(`) = 0, there exists a yb ∈ (`, ya) such that f ′`(yb) < 0.
Furthermore, since f ′`(`) = 0 and f
′
`(yb) < 0, there exists a yc ∈ (`, yb) such that f ′′` (yc) < 0.
As a result, yc < yb < ya contradicts the definition of ya. Thus, f`(·) is strictly convex on (`, 1].
Because f ′`(`) = 0 and f
′′
` (y) > 0 on (`, 1], it immediately follows that f
′
`(y) > f
′
`(`) = 0 on
(`, 1].
Lemma A.2. Consider any given ` ∈ (0, 1). Then,
(a) limy→1 f`(y) =∞,
(b) for  > 0 sufficiently close to zero, f(y) > g(y) for y > , and
(c) fc2λ(y) crosses g(y) at some point y˜ > c2λ.
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Proof of Lemma A.2: Part (a): Recall (A.11) and (A.12). By these equations, we have
f ′′` (y) = λf`(y)/
(
q(K1)y
2(1− y)2) , y ≥ `. (A.14)
Take any y¯ ∈ (0, 1). Then, f ′′` (y) > λf`(y¯)/
(
q(K1)y
2
)
> 0 for y ∈ [y¯, 1). This implies that
f`(y) > f`(y¯) + λf`(y¯) [log(y¯)− log(y)] /q(K1) for y > y¯. Then, because limy→1− log(y) =∞,
it follows that limy→1 f`(y) =∞.
Part (b): If ` > 0 is sufficiently close to zero and y > ` is sufficiently close to `, f ′′` (y) > c/y
2 for
some positive constant c > 0. This implies that for such y and ` values, f ′`(y) > c(y− `)/`2 > k
where k is the slope of the upward portion of g(·). Then, because f`(·) is strictly convex and
increasing, and by (A.12), f`(y) lies above g(y) for y >  if ` > 0 is sufficiently close to zero.
An example of this can be seen Figure A.6.
Part (c): We already know by (A.12) that fc2λ(y) lies below the upward portion of g(·) for
y > c2λ sufficiently close to c2λ. This, the fact that fc2λ(y) strictly increases for y > c2λ by
Lemma A.1 and g(·) is bounded by a finite constant,and part (a) imply part (c). Figure A.7
demonstrates an example of this.
For each for each ` ∈ [0, c2λ], define y` such that f ′`(y`) = k. (The existence of y` follows
from similar arguments in the proof of Lemma A.2-(a).) An example of y` is illustrated for
` = 0.3 in Figure A.8. By definition, f` has the same derivative as the upward portion of g(·)
at y = y`. We now show that there exists a `
∗ < c2λ such that f`∗(·) is tangent to g(·) at a
unique point h∗ .= y`∗ > `∗ and h∗ > c2λ. Specifically, we will show that there exists a pair
(`∗, h∗) and a function f`∗(·) such that
λf`∗(y) =
1
2
q(K1)y
2(1− y)2f ′′`∗(y), (A.15)
f`∗(`
∗) = g(`∗), f ′`∗(`
∗) = g′(`∗) = 0, (A.16)
f`∗(h
∗) = g(h∗), f ′`∗(h
∗) = g′(h∗) = k > 0. (A.17)
This claim immediately follows from Lemma A.4 below. We now state and prove another
lemma which we will use in the proof of Lemma A.4.
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Lemma A.3. Consider K1 > µL that implies q(K1) > 0. The general solution to the ODE
1
2
q(K1)y
2(1− y)2f ′′(y) = λf(y) (A.18)
is given by
f(y) = κ1y
1+η
2 (1− y) 1−η2 + κ2y
1−η
2 (1− y) 1+η2 , (A.19)
where κ1 and κ2 are two constants, and η is as in (5.24).
Proof of Lemma A.3: In the context of XYZ, the form of the general solution of a similar
ODE is stated in Alvares (2003) without a proof. Here, we will verify that (A.19) is indeed the
general solution of (A.18). Suppose the solution to the ODE (A.18) is in the form of
f(y) = ya(1− y)b
Therefore, f ′(y) and f ′′(y) are given by
f ′(y) = aya−1(1− y)b − bya(1− y)b−1,
f ′′(y) = a(a− 1)ya−2(1− y)b − 2abya−1(1− y)b−1 + b(b− 1)ya(1− y)b−2.
By replacing f(y) and f ′′(y) with the above expressions in (A.18), and dividing both sides
of that modified ODE by ya(1− y)b, we obtain
1
2
q(K1)
[
a(a− 1)(1− y)2 − 2aby(1− y) + b(b− 1)y2] = λ.
Rearranging the above equation, we obtain
[a(a− 1) + 2ab+ b(b− 1)]y2 − [2a(a− 1) + 2ab]y + [a(a− 1)− 2λ
q(K1)
] = 0.
For (A.18) to be a solution, the above equation must hold, meaning that all three equations
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below must be satisfied: 
a(a− 1) + 2ab+ b(b− 1) = 0
2a(a− 1) + 2ab = 0
a(a− 1)− 2λq(K1) = 0.
The solutions of these equations are given by
(a, b) ∈
{(
1 + η
2
,
1− η
2
)
,
(
1− η
2
,
1 + η
2
)}
,
which complete the proof.
To state the following lemma, define functions
G¯(`)
.
= f`(y`) and G(`)
.
= g(y`), for ` ∈ [0, c2λ).
Lemma A.4. (a) y` is continuous with respect to `, hence ∆(`)
.
= G¯(`)−G(`) is a continuous
function with respect to `.
(b) There exists an  ∈ (0, c2λ) such that G¯()−G() > 0.
(c) G¯(c2λ)−G(c2λ) < 0.
Proof of Lemma A.4: Part (a): The general solution to the ODE (A.11) is given by
f`(y) = κ1y
1+η
2 (1− y) 1−η2 + κ2y
1−η
2 (1− y) 1+η2 . (A.20)
Then, based on (A.15) through (A.17), we have four unknowns l∗, h∗, κ1, κ2 that should
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satisfy the following four equations:
κ1`
1+η
2 (1− `) 1−η2 + κ2`
1−η
2 (1− `) 1+η2 =
(
1
λ
− c2
)
µ2,L
κ1h
1+η
2 (1− h) 1−η2 + κ2h
1−η
2 (1− h) 1+η2 = µ2,H − µ2,L
λ
h+
1
λ
µ2,L − c2µ2,H
κ1
(
1 + η
2
`
−1+η
2 (1− `) 1−η2 − 1− η
2
`
1+η
2 (1− `)−1−η2
)
+ κ2
(
1− η
2
`
1+η
2 (1− `)− 1−η2 − 1 + η
2
`
1−η
2 (1− `)−1+η2
)
= 0
κ1
(
1 + η
2
h
−1+η
2 (1− h) 1−η2 − 1− η
2
h
1+η
2 (1− h)−1−η2
)
+ κ2
(
1− η
2
h
1+η
2 (1− h)− 1−η2 − 1 + η
2
h
1−η
2 (1− h)−1+η2
)
=
µ2,H − µ2,L
λ
.
Solving for κ1 and κ2, we obtain
κ1 = −1
η
{
(
1
λ
− c2)µ2,L
[
1− η
2
`
−1−η
2 (1− `) 1+η2 − 1 + η
2
`
1−η
2 (1− `)−1+η2
]}
,
and
κ2 =
1
η
{
(
1
λ
− c2)µ2,L
[
1 + η
2
`
−1+η
2 (1− `) 1−η2 − 1− η
2
`
1+η
2 (1− `)−1−η2
]}
,
Note that both κ1 and κ2 are continuous with respect to `. Then, it is trivial to show that
f ′`(y) is thus continuous with respect to `, and y` = f
′−1
` (k) is also continuous with respect to
`. Besides, both f`(y) and g(y) are continuous with respect to y, thus the continuity of G(·)
and G¯(·) follows.
Part (b): This part immediately follows from Lemma A.2-(b). Part (c): This part immedi-
ately follows from Lemma A.2-(c).
Finally, with the existence of solutions (`∗, h∗) and f`∗ , we define function
v(y;K1) =

f`∗(y), y ∈ (`∗, h∗),
g(y), y ∈ [0, `∗] ∪ [h∗, 1].
(A.21)
By definition, v clearly satisfies (5.12), (5.13) and other mentioned properties. Lemma A.5
shows that v(·,K1) is the value function under the two-threshold policy (`∗, h∗). Note that
these lower and upper critical thresholds are both functions of K1; for brevity, we do not
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include K1 as an argument of K1. This completes the proof of Proposition 5.1.
Lemma A.5. v(·;K1) is the follower’s value function (i.e., expected discounted profit) under
the two-threshold policy (`∗, h∗).
Proof of Lemma A.5: By definition A.21, v(·,K1) is C1, piecewise C2 and satisfies the
following relation:
1
2
q(K1)v
′′(y;K1)y2(1− y)2 − λv(y;K1) = 0. (A.22)
It follows from standard probability arguments that the follower’s expected time to invest is
strictly positive under the two -threshold policy (`∗, h∗). Then, by Itoˆ’s lemma, we have
E
[∫ τ
0
d
(
e−λsv(pis,K1)
)]
= E
[
−
∫ τ
0
λe−λsv(pis,K1)ds+
∫ τ
0
e−λs
(
v′(pis,K1)dpis +
1
2
q(K1)v
′′(pis,K1)(dpis)2
)]
= E
[∫ τ
0
e−λs
(
−λv(pis,K1) + 1
2
q(K1)v
′′(pis,K1)
)
ds
]
= 0. (A.23)
The last equation above follows from (A.22). In addition,
E
[∫ τ
0
d
(
e−λsv(pis;K1)
)]
= E
[
e−λτv(piτ ;K1)
]
− v(pi0;K1).
Combining this with (A.23), we have
v(pi0;K1) = E
[
e−λτv(piτ ;K1)
]
. (A.24)
We already know that v(`∗;K1) = g(`∗) and v(h∗;K1) = g(h∗). From Section 3.1, we also
know that
g(y) = E
[∫ ∞
0
e−λtdX2,t − c2K∗2 | piτ = y
]
, y ∈ {`∗, h∗}.
This and (A.24) immediately imply that v(·;K1) is the expected discounted profit under the
two-threshold policy (`∗, h∗).
Lemma A.6. For any given 0 < `1 < `2 < 1, f`1(y) > f`2(y) for y ≥ `2.
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Proof of Lemma A.6: Suppose for a contradiction that there exists at least one belief at
which f`1(·) ≤ f`2(·). Let y1 .= min{y : f`1(y) ≤ f`2(y)}. The aforementioned minimum is
achieved by continuity of f`1 and f`2 . By Lemma A.1, we know that f`1(y) is strictly increasing
in y, hence f`1(`2) > f`1(`1) = f`2(`2). Thus, y1 > `2. By definition of y1 and the fact that
f`1(`2) > f`2(`2), there exists a y2 ∈ (`2, y1) such that f ′`1(y2) < f ′`2(y2). By strict convexity of
f`1 , we have f
′
`1
(`2) > f
′
`1
(`1) = f
′
`2
(`2). This, f
′
`1
(y2) < f
′
`2
(y2), and the continuity of f
′
`1
and
f ′`2 imply that there exists a y3 ∈ (`2, y2) such that f ′′`1(y3) < f ′′`2(y3). Then, by ((A.11)), we
have f`1(y3) < f`2(y3). This contradicts the definition of y1 as y3 < y1.
A.3.3 Proof of Proposition 5.2
We begin with the proof of part (a). Suppose that K1 ≤ µL. Then, by (5.4), q(K1) = 0,
meaning that the leader’s cumulative earning process is uninformative to the follower, and
hence pit = pi0 for t ≥ 0. Then, because of discounting, it is optimal for the follower to invest
immediately, i.e., τ = 0. Thus, V2(y,K1) = g(y) where g(y)
.
= maxK2≥0 g(y,K2) and g(y,K2)
is as in (5.11). As a result, by (A.9), K∗2 = argmaxK2≥0 g(y,K2) is as in part (a).
We now prove part (b). Suppose that K1 > µL. Under this condition, we will show the
optimality of the two-threshold policy constructed in the proof of Proposition 5.1. Recall that
the value function of the policy considered in Proposition 5.1 is denoted by v(y;K1). Then, for
any stopping time T such that E(T ) <∞, we have the following by Ito’s lemma:
E[e−λT v(piT ;K1)] = v(pi0;K1) + E
[∫ T
0
e−λT
(
1
2
q(K1)pi
2
t (1− pit)2v′′(pit;K1)− λv(pit,K1)
)]
,
(A.25)
where {pit, t ≥ 0} is the belief process under any given capacity K1 > µL. From (5.13), the
value function v(y;K1) satisfies
1
2
q(K1)y
2(1− y)2v′′(y;K1)− λv(y;K1) ≤ 0, y ∈ (0, 1) \ {`∗(K1), h∗(K1)}. (A.26)
Note that because |{`∗(K1), h∗(K1)}| < ∞, we can assign a value to v′′(`∗(K1);K1) and
v′′(h∗(K1);K1) such that (A.26) holds for any y ∈ (0, 1). Then, (A.25) and (A.26) lead to
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E
[
e−λT v(piT ;K1)
]
≤ v(pi0;K1). (A.27)
Take T = τ under the two-threshold policy (`∗(K1), h∗(K1)), and let (τˆ , K2) be an arbitrary
admissible policy for the follower. Then, from (A.27),(5.13), and the definition of g(·) in Section
3.1, we have
E[e−λτˆg(piτˆ ,K2)] ≤ E[e−λτˆg(piτˆ )] ≤ v(pi0;K1). (A.28)
Noting that E[e−λτˆg(piτˆ ,K2)] is the follower’s expected net profit under the policy (τˆ , K2)
completes our proof.
A.3.4 Proof of Proposition 5.3
We first prove the monotonicity of `∗ and h∗ as function of q, which guarantees the existence
of the limits. Then we study the asymptotic solutions under the two limits in σ.
Proposition A.1. `∗ is strictly decreasing in q, and h∗ is strictly increasing in q.
Proof: Let q2 > q1 be two values that q(k1) can take. For i ∈ {1, 2}, let li and hi be the two
thresholds under qi, and f
(i)
` be the function defined in (A.11) when q(K1) = qi. We complete
the proof in two steps:
1) We show `2 < `1 by comparing two functions f
(1)
`1
and f
(2)
`1
.
2) We show h2 > h1 by comparing two functions f
(1)
`1
and f
(2)
`2
.
proof of step 1): We first show by contradiction that
f
(1)′
`1
(y) > f
(2)′
`1
(y), y ∈ (`1, 1), (A.29)
(see details below). From this it is obvious that f
(1)
`1
(y) > f
(2)
`1
(y) holds on y ∈ (`1, 1), and since
f
(1)
`1
(y) is tangent to g(y) at h1, f
(2)
`1
(y) has to intersect with g(y) on (`1, h1). From Lemma A.6,
for any ` > `1, f
(2)
` (y) lies below f
(2)
`1
(y) and thus will also intersect with g(y). Hence it has to
be `2 < `1 for f
(2)
`2
(y) to be tangent to g(y).
Now we prove (A.29). We see from the ODE that
f
(1)′′
`1
(`1) > f
(2)′′
`1
(`1)
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since f
(1)
`1
(`1) = f
(2)
`1
(`1) and q1 < q2. Thus ∃η > 0 such that
f
(1)′′
`1
(y) > f
(2)′′
`1
(y), y ∈ (`1, `1 + η),
and therefore
f
(1)′
`1
(y) > f
(2)′
`1
(y), y ∈ (`1, `1 + η).
To prove by contradiction, we assume ∃yn ∈ (`1, 1) such that yn = sup{y : f (1)′`1 (y) <
f
(2)′
`1
(y)}. Otherwise (A.29) holds naturally. Therefore we have
f
(1)′
`1
(yn) =
∫ yn
`1
f
(1)′′
`1
(y)dy + f
(1)′′
`1
(`1) <
∫ yn
`1
f
(2)′′
`1
(y)dy + f
(2)′′
`1
(`1) = f
(2)′
`1
(yn).
Since we have f
(1)′′
`1
(`1) > f
(2)′′
`1
(`1), combing with the above inequality we arrive at
∫ yn
`1
f
(1)′′
`1
(y)dy <
∫ yn
`1
f
(2)′′
`1
(y)dy.
Therefore ∃yp ∈ (`1, yn) such that f (1)′′`1 (yp) < f
(2)′′
`1
(yp). We use the ODE one more time and
consider the fact that q1 < q2, we have
f
(1)
`1
(yp) < f
(2)
`1
(yp).
Again we look at the integrals
f
(1)
`1
(yp) =
∫ yp
`1
f
(1)′
`1
(y)dy <
∫ yp
`1
f
(2)′
`1
(y)dy = f
(2)
`1
(yp),
and find that ∃yq ∈ (`1, yp) such that f (1)′`1 (yq) < f
(2)′
`1
(yq), which contradicts the definition of
yn in the beginning.
proof of step 2): We prove by contradiction. Assume h2 < h1, since f
(1)
`1
(y) > g(y) for
y < h1 we have
f
(2)
`2
(h2) = g(h2) < f
(1)
`1
(h2).
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Also we have
f
(2)
`2
(`1) > f
(2)
`2
(`2) = f
(1)
`1
(`1).
Because both functions are strictly increasing, ∃yr ∈ (`1, h2) uniquely where two functions
intersect. Precisely we have

f
(2)
`2
(y) > f
(2)
`2
(y), y ∈ [`2, yr)
f
(2)
`2
(y) = f
(2)
`2
(y), y = yr
f
(2)
`2
(y) < f
(2)
`2
(y), y ∈ (yr, h2)
(A.30)
Furthermore we have
f
(2)′
`2
(h2) = g
′(h2) = g′(h1) = f
(1)′
`1
(h1) > f
(1)′
`1
(h2),
from which we have
∫ h2
y1
f
(2)′′
`2
(y)dy + f
(2)′′
`2
(yr) >
∫ h2
y1
f
(1)′′
`1
(y)dy + f
(1)′′
`1
(yr).
Note that with f
(1)
`1
(yr) = f
(2)
`2
(yr), q1 < q2 and the ODE each function satisfies, we have
f
(2)′′
`2
(yr) < f
(1)′′
`1
(yr),
we arrive at the inequality
∫ h2
y1
f
(2)′′
`2
(y)dy >
∫ h2
y1
f
(1)′′
`1
(y)dy.
Therefore ∃ys ∈ (yr, h2) such that
f
(2)′′
`2
(ys) > f
(1)′′
`1
(ys),
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and with q2 > q1 and the ODEs we have
f
(2)
`2
(ys) > f
(1)
`1
(ys),
which contradicts (A.30).
Figure A.9 shows how `∗ and h∗ change as function of K1, where c2λ = 0.5 and µL = 1,
µH = 5, σ = 1.
A.3.5 Proof of the Main Result
Proof of Part (a): From Lemma A.1 and the monotone convergence theorem,
limσ→∞ `∗(K1) and limσ→∞ h∗(K1).
We first show that limσ→∞ `∗(K1) = c2λ by contradiction. Suppose for a contradiction
that limσ→∞ `∗(K1) = l0 < c2λ. Select a large enough σ such that the corresponding signal
quality q(K1) = q1 satisfies
q1 <
4λ2g(0)(c2λ− l0)
µ2,H − µ2,L ,
and let l1 be the optimal lower belief threshold `
∗(K1) and h1 be the optimal higher threshold
h∗(K1) when q(K1) = q1. Then, by Lemma A.1, we have l1 ≤ l0, and by the proof of Proposition
5.1, the follower’s value function under the optimal policy satisfy (A.15) through (A.17). Then,
by (A.15), we have the following for y > `1
f ′′l1(y) =
λfl1(y)
q1y2(1− y)2
≥ λg(0)
q1y2(1− y)2 (A.31)
>
µ2,H − µ2,L
4λ2g(0)(c2λ− l0)
λg(0)
y2(1− y)2
≥ µ2,H − µ2,L
(c2λ− l0)λ . (A.32)
Note that (A.31) holds because f`1(·) is strictly increasing by Lemma A.1 and f ′′l1(l1) = g(0)
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by (A.16); (A.32) holds because y(1− y) ≤ 0.5. Therefore, for any y ≥ c2λ we arrive at
f ′`1(y) =
∫ y
`1
f ′′`1(u)du+ f
′
`1(`1) ≥
∫ c2λ
`1
f ′′`1(u)du >
µ2,H − µ2,L
λ
,
which is equivalent to g′(y) for y > c2λ by (A.10). However, this means that f`1(·) can never be
tangent to g(y) at any y > c2λ. This contradicts (A.17). Hence the limit of `
∗(K1) as σ →∞
can only be c2λ.
We now prove that limσ→∞ h∗(K1) = c2λ by contradiction. Suppose for a contradiction
that limσ→∞ h∗(K1) = h0 > c2λ and choose a large enough σ such that the corresponding
signal quality, which is denoted by q2, satisfies
q2 <
4λ2g(0)(h0 − c2λ)
µ2,H − µ2,L .
Let `2 and h2 be the optimal lower and upper belief thresholds when q(K1) = q2. Then, by
Lemma A.1, h2 ≥ h0. From (A.15), for y > `2, we have
f ′′`2(y) =
λf`2(y)
q2y2(1− y)2
>
λg(0)
q2y2(1− y)2
>
µ2,H − µ2,L
4λ2g(0)(h0 − c2λ)
λg(0)
y2(1− y)2
≥ µ2,H − µ2,L
(h0 − c2λ)λ.
Therefore, we arrive at
f ′`2(h2) =
∫ h2
`2
f ′′`2(u)du+ f
′
`2(`2)
≥
∫ h2
c2λ
f ′′`2(u)du
>
µ2,H − µ2,L
λ
which means f`2 is not tangent to g(y) at any h2 > c2λ. Hence, the limit of h
∗(K1) can only
be c2λ as σ →∞.
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Now we show the speeds at which `∗(K1) and h∗(K1) converge to c2λ. Recall from (A.16)
and (A.17) that the value function f`∗(K1)(·) and the optimal belief thresholds `∗(K1) and
h∗(K1) satisfy the following equations:
f`∗(K1)(`
∗(K1)) = g(`∗(K1)) =
(
1
λ
− c2
)
µ2,L, (A.33)
f`∗(K1)(h
∗(K1)) = g(h∗(K1)) =
µ2,H − µ2,L
λ
h∗(K1) +
1
λ
µ2,L − c2µ2,H , (A.34)
f ′`∗(K1)(`
∗(K1)) = g′(`∗(K1)) = 0, (A.35)
f ′`∗(K1)(h
∗(K1)) = g′(h∗(K1)) =
µ2,H − µ2,L
λ
. (A.36)
where
f`∗(K1)(y) = κ1y
1+η
2 (1− y) 1−η2 + κ2y
1−η
2 (1− y) 1+η2 . (A.37)
Define
u
.
=
1 + η
2
, v
.
=
1− η
2
= 1− u, and w(y) .= y
1− y . (A.38)
Note that we have the following as σ →∞
u
σ
= O(1).
Because u/σ = O(1) and `∗(K1) and h∗(K1), in short, `∗ and h∗, depend on σ only through
u by (A.33) through (A.38), analyzing the rate at which `∗ and h∗ converge to c2λ with respect
to u will give us the rate at which `∗ and h∗ converge to c2λ with respect to σ.
Take a large σ such that `∗ and h∗ are sufficiently close to c2λ, and suppose that these
threshold beliefs satisfy the following relations for some finite constants γ` and γh:
h∗ = c2λ+ γh/u+ o(u−1), `∗ = c2λ− γ`/u+ o(u−1).
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Then, by (A.38),
w(h∗) =
c2λ+ γh/u+ o(u
−1)
(1− c2λ)
(
1− γh/u1−c2λ + o(u−1)
) = c2λ+ γh/u+ o(u−1)
1− c2λ
(
1 +
γh/u
1− c2λ + o(u
−1)
)
= w0
(
1 +
wh
u
)
+ o(u−1), (A.39)
where
w0
.
=
c2λ
1− c2λ and wh
.
=
γh
c2λ(1− c2λ) . (A.40)
Similarly,
w(`∗) =
c2λ− γ`/u+ o(u−1)
(1− c2λ)
(
1 + γ`/u1−c2λ + o(u
−1)
) = c2λ− γ`/u+ o(u−1)
1− c2λ
(
1− γ`/u
1− c2λ + o(u
−1)
)
= w0
(
1− w`
u
)
+ o(u−1). (A.41)
where
w`
.
=
γ`
c2λ(1− c2λ) . (A.42)
Assume also that there exist finite coefficients k10 > 0 and k20 > 0 such that
κ1 = k10w
−u
0 and κ2 = k20w
u
0 . (A.43)
Below we will show that there exists γ`, γh, k10 and k20 that satisfy (A.33) through (A.36),
which proves that (A.41), (A.39) and (A.43) provide the perturbation solution of (A.33) through
(A.36). Note that, by (A.37) and (A.38), we have
f`∗(y) = κ1(1− y)w(y)u + κ2yw(y)−u,
and
f ′`∗(y) = κ1w(y)
u
(
u
w(y)
− (1− u)
)
− κ2w(y)−u (uw(y)− (1− u)) .
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Using these relations and the expressions in (A.41), (A.39) and (A.43), (A.35) is equivalent to
f ′`∗(`
∗) = k10w−u0
(
w0(1− w`/u) + o(u−1)
)u( u
w0(1− w`/u) + o(u−1) − 1 + u
)
− k20wu0
(
w0(1− w`/u) + o(u−1)
)−u (
[w0(1− w`/u) + o(u−1)]u− 1 + u
)
= 0.
Diving both sides of the above equation by u and letting u→∞, we get
k10
e−w`
c2λ
− k20 e
w`
1− c2λ = 0. (A.44)
Similarly, we rewrite (A.36) as the following:
f ′`∗(h
∗) = k10w−u0
(
w0(1 + wh/u) + o(u
−1)
)u( u
w0(1 + wh/u) + o(u−1)
− 1 + u
)
− k20wu0
(
w0(1 + wh/u) + o(u
−1)
)−u (
[w0(1 + wh/u) + o(u
−1)]u− 1 + u)
=
µ2,H − µ2,L
λ
.
In the above equation, dividing both sides by u and letting u→∞, we get
k10
ewh
c2λ
− k20 e
−wh
1− c2λ = 0. (A.45)
These lead to
e2w` = e−2wh =
k10(1− c2λ)
k20c2λ
,
hence w` = −wh. This implies by (A.40) and (A.42) that
γ`
c2λ(1− c2λ) = −
γh
c2λ(1− c2λ) .
Then, because γ` ≥ 0, γh ≥ 0, it follows that
γ` = 0 and γh = 0. (A.46)
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Furthermore, we rewrite (A.33) and (A.34) as follows.
f`∗(`
∗) = k10w−u0
(
w0(1− w`/u) + o(u−1)
)u (
1− c2λ+ o(u−1)
)
+ k20w
u
0
(
w0(1− w`/u) + o(u−1)
)−u (
c2λ+ o(u
−1)
)
=
(
1
λ
− c2
)
µ2,L
f`∗(h
∗) = k10w−u0
(
w0(1 + wh/u) + o(u
−1)
)u (
1− c2λ+ o(u−1)
)
+ k20w
u
0
(
w0(1 + wh/u) + o(u
−1)
)−u (
c2λ+ o(u
−1)
)
=
(
1
λ
− c2
)
µ2,L + o(u
−1)
By letting u→∞ and using the fact that w` = wh = 0 by (A.46), both equations above reduce
to
k10(1− c2λ) + k20c2λ =
(
1
λ
− c2
)
µ2,L. (A.47)
Note from (A.44), (A.45) and (A.46) that we also have
k10
c2λ
− k20
1− c2λ = 0.
Using this and (A.47), we obtain the following solution for k10 and k20:
k10 =
µ2,L
2λ
and k20 =
1− c2λ
λ
µ2,L
2c2λ
.
This completely characterizes the asymptotic solution as u → ∞. This and the fact that
u/σ = O(1) complete the proof of part (a).
Proof of Part (b): We will use (A.33) through (A.37) to prove the claim. Recall from the
definition of η in (5.24) that
η =
√
1 +
8λσ2
(min(K1, µH)−min(K1, µL))2
,
which is equivalent to the following by Taylor series expansion around 1 when σ > 0 is suffi-
149
ciently small:
1 +
4λσ2
(min(K1, µH)−min(K1, µL))2
+O(σ4), (A.48)
Define

.
=
2λσ2
(min(K1, µH)−min(K1, µL))2
, (A.49)
which is O(σ2) for σ > 0 sufficiently small. Based on this and (A.48), we can replace η with
1 + 2+O(2) in f`∗(y) and f
′
`∗(y):
f`∗(y) = κ1y
1++O(2)(1− y)1−−O(2) + κ2y−−O(2)(1− y)1++O(2)
= κ1y
(
y
1− y
)+O(2)
+ κ2(1− y)
(
1− y
y
)+O(2)
(A.50)
= κ1y
(
1 + log
(
y
1− y
)
+O(2)
)
+ κ2(1− y)
(
1− log
(
y
1− y
)
+O(2)
)
= κ1y + κ2(1− y) + [κ1y − κ2(1− y)] log
(
y
1− y
)
+O(2), and (A.51)
f ′`∗(y) = κ1 − κ2 +
[
κ1
1− y −
κ2
y
+ (κ1 + κ2) log
(
y
1− y
)]
+O(2). (A.52)
We now characterize a solution to (A.33) through (A.37) when  > 0 is sufficiently small. To
do so, we first consider a candidate solution that has a particular relationship with , and then
we will show that there exists a unique solution in the class of candidate solutions. This and
the fact that there exists a unique solution to (A.33) through (A.37) prove that the candidate
solution is indeed the solution of(A.33) through (A.37) when  > 0 is sufficiently small.
Consider the following candidate solution to (A.33) through (A.37) for some finite constants
α01, α02, α11, α12, H, L, l0 and h0 when  > 0 is sufficiently small:
κ1 = α01 + α11+O(
2) (A.53)
κ2 = α02 + α12+O(
2) (A.54)
`∗ = L+ l0+O(2) (A.55)
h∗ = H − h0+O(2). (A.56)
150
Because lim→0 `∗ ∈ [0, c2λ] and lim→0 h∗ ∈ [0, c2λ] and lim→0 h∗ ∈ [c2λ, 1], there can be
four main cases related to L and H. Later, we will analyze the candidate solution in said four
cases. Before the analysis of the cases, we first introduce some preliminary analysis that will
be repeatedly used in the remainder of the proof.
Using (A.53) and (A.54) in (A.51) and (A.52), f`∗(·) and f ′`∗(·) reduce to
f`∗(y) = (α01 + α11) y + (α02 + α12) (1− y)
+ [(α01 + α11) y − (α01 + α11) (1− y)] log
(
y
1− y
)
+O(2)
= α01y + α02(1− y) +
[
α11y + α12(1− y) + (α01y − α02(1− y)) log
(
y
1− y
)]
+O(2),
(A.57)
f ′`∗(y) = (α01 + α11)− (α02 + α12)
+
[
(α01 + α11)
1− y −
(α02 + α12)
y
+ (α01 + α02 + (α11 + α12)) log
(
y
1− y
)]
+O(2)
= α01 − α02 +
[
α11 − α12 + α01
1− y −
α02
y
+ (α01 + α02) log
(
y
1− y
)]
+O(2).
Moreover, the limit of f ′`∗(x) as → 0 at `∗ and h∗ satisfy the following relations:
lim
→0
f ′`∗(`
∗) = lim
→0
{
α01 − α02 +
[
α11 − α12 + α01
1− `∗ −
α02
`∗
+ (α01 + α02) log
(
`∗
1− `∗
)]

}
= lim
→0
{
α01 − α02 +
[
−α02
`∗
+ (α01 + α02) log
(
`∗
1− `∗
)]

}
= lim
→0
{
α01 − α02 +
[
−α02 + (α01 + α02)`∗ log
(
`∗
1− `∗
)]

`∗
}
(A.58)
The second equation above holds because α11−α12 + α011−`∗ is bounded on [α11−α12 +α01, α11−
α12+
α01
1−c2λ ]. Similarly, since α11−α12− α02h∗ is bounded on
[
α11 − α12 − α02, α11 − α12 − α02c2λ
]
,
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we also have
lim
→0
f ′`∗(h
∗) = lim
→0
{
α01 − α02 +
[
α11 − α12 + α01
1− h∗ −
α02
h∗
+ (α01 + α02) log
(
h∗
1− h∗
)]

}
(A.59)
= lim
→0
{
α01 − α02 +
[
α01
1− h∗ + (α01 + α02) log
(
h∗
1− h∗
)]

}
(A.60)
= lim
→0
{
α01 − α02 +
[
α01 + (α01 + α02)(1− h∗) log
(
h∗
1− h∗
)]

1− h∗
}
(A.61)
We will also use the following limits in the analysis of cases.
lim
x→0
x log
(
x
1− x
)
= lim
x→0
log
(
x
1−x
)
1/x
= lim
x→0
1−x
x
1
(1−x)2
−1/x2 = limx→0
−x
1− x = 0, (A.62)
and
lim
x→1
(1− x) log
(
x
1− x
)
= lim
x→1
log
(
x
1−x
)
1/(1− x) = limx→1
1−x
x
1
(1−x)2
1/(1− x)2 = limx→1
1− x
x
= 0, (A.63)
We now study the four different cases for L and H below to conclude that the only possibility
is that L = 0 and H = 1.
Case I: Suppose that L > 0 and H < 1. Then, (A.35), (A.36) and the limits of f ′`∗(·) in (A.58)
and (A.61) produce:
lim
→0
f ′`∗(`
∗) = α01 − α02 = 0, and
lim
→0
f ′`∗(h
∗) = α01 − α02 = µ2,H − µ2,L
λ
> 0,
which is a contradiction.
Case II: Suppose that L > 0 and H = 1. Then, by (A.58),(A.61), (A.35), (A.36) and (A.63),
we have
lim
→0
f ′`∗(`
∗) = α01 − α02 = 0,
lim
→0
f ′`∗(h
∗) = α01 − α02 + α01 lim
→0

1− h∗ = α01 − α02 + α01
1
h0
=
µ2,H − µ2,L
λ
.
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Also from (A.57), (A.33) and (A.34), we have
lim
→0
f`∗(`
∗) = α01L+ α02(1− L) = α01 =
(
1
λ
− c2
)
µ2,L
lim
→0
f`∗(h
∗) = lim
→0
{
α01h
∗ + α02(1− h∗)
+
[
α11h
∗ + α12(1− h∗) + (α01h∗ − α02(1− h∗)) log
(
h∗
1− h∗
)]

}
= lim
→0
{
α01 + α01(1− h0+O(2)) log
(
1− h0+O(2)
h0+O(2)
)

}
= α01
=
(
1
λ
− c2
)
µ2,H .
This leads to the contradiction since µ2,H > µ2,L.
Case III: Suppose that L = 0 and H < 1. Then, by (A.61), (A.35), (A.36) and (A.63), we
have:
lim
→0
f ′`∗(`
∗) = α01 − α02 − α02 lim
→0

`∗
= α01 − α02 − α02 1
l0
= 0,
lim
→0
f ′`∗(h
∗) = α01 − α02 = µ2,H − µ2,L
λ
. (A.64)
Also, from (A.57), (A.33) and (A.34), it follows that
lim
→0
f`∗(`
∗) = lim
→0
{
α01`
∗ + α02(1− `∗)
+
[
α11`
∗ + α12(1− `∗) + (α01`∗ − α02(1− `∗)) log
(
`∗
1− `∗
)]

}
(A.65)
= lim
→0
{
α02 − α02(1− l0+O(2)) log
(
l0+O(
2)
1− l0+O(2)
)

}
= α02
=
(
1
λ
− c2
)
µ2,L, (A.66)
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and
lim
→0
f`∗(h
∗) = α01H + α02(1−H) = µ2,H − µ2,L
λ
H +
1
λ
µ2,L − c2µ2,H . (A.67)
Note from (A.64) and (A.66) that
(α01 − α02)H + α02 = µ2,H − µ2,L
λ
H +
(
1
λ
− c2
)
µ2,L >
µ2,H − µ2,L
λ
H +
1
λ
µ2,L − c2µ2,H ,
which contradicts (A.67).
Case IV: Suppose that L = 0 and H = 1. Then, by (A.35), (A.36), (A.62) and (A.63), we
have:
lim
→0
f ′`∗(`
∗) = α01 − α02 − α02 lim
→0

`∗
= α01 − α02 − α02 1
l0
= 0,
lim
→0
f ′`∗(h
∗) = α01 − α02 + α01 lim
→0

1− h∗ = α01 − α02 + α01
1
h0
=
µ2,H − µ2,L
λ
.
Also, by (A.57), (A.33) and (A.34), we have
lim
→0
f`∗(`
∗) = α02 =
(
1
λ
− c2
)
µ2,L,
lim
→0
f`∗(h
∗) = α01
= lim
→0
µ2,H − µ2,L
λ
(1− h0) + µ2,L
λ
− c2µ2,H +O(2)
=
(
1
λ
− c2
)
µ2,H
The above equations lead to the following set of solutions for the coefficients α01, α02, `0
and h0:
α01 =
(
1
λ
− c2
)
µ2,H ,
α02 =
(
1
λ
− c2
)
µ2,L,
`0 =
µ2,L
µ2,H − µ2,L ,
h0 =
(
1
c2λ
− 1
)
µ2,H
µ2,H − µ2,L .
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Next we derive α11 and α12 as follows. Note that from (A.50) we have
f`∗(y) = κ1y
(
y
1− y
)+O(2)
+ κ2(1− y)
(
1− y
y
)+O(2)
,
and with `∗ = `0+O(2) and h∗ = 1− h0+O(2), we have the following two limits:
(
`0
1− `0
)
= `0
(1− `0)−
= 1 +  log `0 + o();
Similarly
(
h0
1− h0
)
= h0
(1− h0)−
= 1 +  log h0 + o().
Hence, we have
f`∗(`
∗) = (α01 + α11)`0(1 +  log `0) + (α02 + α12)(1− `0)(1−  log `0) + o()
= α02 + (α01`0 − α02`0 − α02 log `0 + α12)+ o()
=
(
1
λ
− c2
)
µ2,L,
which gives us
α12 = −α01`0 + α02`0 + α02 log `0
= −
(
1
λ
− c2
)(
1− log µ2,L
µ2,H − µ1,L
)
µ2,L.
Similarly,
f`∗(h
∗) = (α01 + α11)(1− h0)(1− log h0) + (α02 + α12)(h0)(1 + log h0) + o()
= α01 + (−α01h0 + α02h0 − α01 log h0 + α11)+ o()
=
(
1
λ
− c2
)
µ2,H − µ2,H − µ2,L
λ
h0+ o(),
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which leads to
α11 = −µ2,H − µ2,L
λ
h0 + α01h0 − α02h0 + α01 log h0
=
(
1
λ
− c2
)(
−1 + log µ2,H(1− c2λ)
(µ2,H − µ1,L)c2λ
)
µ2,H .
Then, based on the analysis in Cases I through IV, when  > 0 is sufficiently small, the
solution of (A.33) through (A.36) is in the form (A.53) through (A.56). This and the fact that
 is O(σ2) complete the proof of part (b).
A.3.6 The Heuristic Derivation and the Solution of (5.21)
For notational brevity, we use the following notation by suppressing the dependence of the
function φ`∗ on K1:
φ`∗(y) = φ`∗(y;K1).
Take an interval [0, h] for a small h > 0. By an application of the Ito’s lemma, we have
E [φ`∗(pih) | pi0 = y]
= E
[
φ`∗(y) + (dpih)φ
′
`∗(y) +
1
2
(dpih)
2φ′′`∗(y)
]
+ o(h)
= φ`∗(y) +
1
2
q(K1)y
2(1− y)2φ′′`∗(y)h+ o(h).
Note that the expected discounted earning is
φ`∗(y) = E
[
e−λhφ`∗(pih) | pi0 = y
]
= (1− λh)E [φ`∗(pih) | pi0 = y] + o(h)
= φ`∗(y) +
[
1
2
q(K1)y
2(1− y)2φ′′`∗(y)− λφ`∗(y)
]
h+ o(h).
Subtracting φ`∗(y) from both sides , dividing by h, and letting h → 0, we obtain the ODE in
(5.21).
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From Lemma A.3, the general solution to the ODE (5.21) is of the following form:
φ`∗(y) = Ay
1+η
2 (1− y) 1−η2 +By 1−η2 (1− y) 1+η2 ,
with A and B are coefficients to be determined from the boundary conditions. From the
boundary conditions in (5.22), we have

φ`∗(`
∗) = A`∗
1+η
2 (1− `∗) 1−η2 +B`∗ 1−η2 (1− `∗) 1+η2 = 1,
φ`∗(h
∗) = Ah∗
1+η
2 (1− h∗) 1−η2 +Bh∗ 1−η2 (1− h∗) 1+η2 = 0.
Solving for A and B using the above equations, we obtain A = a(`∗, h∗) and B = b(`∗, h∗)
where a(`∗, h∗) and b(`∗, h∗) are as in (5.23).
A.3.7 Proof of Proposition 5.4
To prove the claim, we will first state and prove Lemma A.7 below. As σ → ∞ or σ → 0,
the follower invests at t = 0 in equilibrium by Lemma A.7. Thus, K˜2 is as in Proposition 5.2-(a)
and the leader’s equilibrium value function with capacity K1 is (5.14). Then, from standard
optimization arguments, K˜1 is as in Proposition 5.4.
Lemma A.7. In equilibrium, as σ → ∞ or σ → 0, the follower’s investment timing τ˜ → 0
with probability 1.
Proof of Lemma A.7: We will first prove the lemma when σ → ∞. Consider any finite
σ > 0. With such σ > 0, there can be two possibilities related to the leader’s capacity
investment in equilibrium: 0 ≤ K˜1 ≤ µL or µL < K˜1 ≤ µH . (We have already explained right
after Proposition 5.2 that it is never optimal for the leader to invest in a capacity more than
µH .)
Because the leader do not invest more than µH in equilibrium, the leader’s equilibrium
capacity investment with any σ is bounded and takes a value in [0, µH ]. This and Proposition
5.3-(a) that proves limσ→∞ `∗(K1) = limσ→∞ h∗(K1) = c2λ for any K1 immediately imply that
limσ→∞ τ˜ = 0 for any given initial belief pi0 ∈ [0, 1].
We now analyze the case when σ → 0. Recall from Lemma 5.1 that for any given K1, the
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posterior belief process pit satisfies the following differential equation:
dpit =
√
q(K1)pit(1− pit)dWt, t ≥ 0.
Then, by Itoˆ’s formula, we have
d
(
log
(
pit
1− pit
))
= −1
2
q(K1)(1− 2pit)dt+
√
q(K1)dWt.
Taking the integral on both sides above, we obtain
log
(
pit
1− pit
)
− log
(
pi0
1− pi0
)
= −1
2
q(K1)
∫ t
0
(1− 2piu)du+
√
q(K1)Wt, (A.68)
where pi0 is the initial belief.
Take a small t = s > 0. Then, by (A.68),
log
(
pis
1− pis
)
= −1
2
q(1− 2pi0)s+ I(s, q(K1)) +
√
q(K1)Zs + log
pi0
1− pi0 ,
where I(s, q(K1)) is the integral approximation error due to approximating
1
2q(K1)
∫ t
0 (2piu − 1)du.
Therefore,
pis = 1−
[
1 +
pi0
1− pi0 exp
(
−1
2
q(K1)(1− 2pi0)s+ I(s, q(K1)) +
√
q(K1)Ws
)]−1
.
Note that Ws ∼ N(0, s), and hence
pis = 1−
[
1 +
pi0
1− pi0 exp(Z)
]−1
,
where Z ∼ N
(
−12q(K1)(1− 2pi0)s+ I(s, q(K1)),
√
q(K1)s
)
. In equilibrium, if limσ→0 K˜1 ≤
µL, then it immediately follows from Proposition 5.2-(a) that limσ→0 τ˜ = 0 with probability 1.
We now analyze the alternative case in which limσ→0 K˜1 ∈ (µL, µH ]. In this case, according to
Proposition 5.2-(b), the follower uses a two-threshold policy (`∗, h∗). We state and prove below
that limσ→0 P(pis ∈ (`∗(K1), h∗(K1))|pi0 ∈ (`∗(K1), h∗(K1))) = 0 for K1 ∈ (µL, µH ]. This and
the fact that K˜1 is bounded immediately imply that limσ→0 τ˜ = 0 with probability 1.
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We now show our claim that limσ→0 P(pis ∈ (`∗(K1), h∗(K1))|pi0 ∈ (`∗(K1), h∗(K1))) = 0
for K1 ∈ (µL, µH ]. Take any K1 ∈ (µL, µH ] and a sufficiently small σ > 0. Suppose also that
the initial belief pi0 ∈ (`∗(K1), h∗(K1)). Then, we have
P(pis ∈ (`∗(K1), h∗(K1))) = P
(
`∗(K1) < 1−
[
1 +
pi0
1− pi0 exp(Z)
]−1
< h∗(K1)
)
= P
(
1
1− `∗(K1) < 1 +
pi0
1− pi0 exp(Z) <
1
1− h∗(K1)
)
= P
(
log
(
`∗(K1)(1− pi0)
(1− `∗(K1))pi0
)
< Z < log
(
h∗(K1)(1− pi0)
(1− h∗(K1))pi0
))
=
∫ log (h∗(K1)(1−pi0)
(1−h∗(K1))pi0
)
log
(
`∗(K1)(1−pi0)
(1−`∗(K1))pi0
) 1√
2piq(K1)s
e
−(z+
1
2 q(K1)(1−2pi0)s+I(s,q(K1)))
2
2q(K1)s
2 dz
Note that
P(pis ∈ (`∗(K1), h∗(K1))) ≤
∫ log (h∗(K1)(1−pi0)
(1−h∗(K1))pi0
)
log
(
`∗(K1)(1−pi0)
(1−`∗(K1))pi0
) 1
s
√
2piq(K1)
dz
=
1
s
√
2piq(K1)
[
log
(
h∗(K1)(1− pi0)
(1− h∗(K1))pi0
)
− log
(
`∗(K1)(1− pi0)
(1− `∗(K1))pi0
)]
=
1
s
√
2piq(K1)
[
log
(
h∗(K1)
1− h∗(K1)
)
− log
(
`∗(K1)
1− `∗(K1)
)]
≤ 1
s
√
2piq(K1)
[
log
(
1
1− h∗(K1)
)
− log `∗(K1)
]
.
Using the same  defined in (A.49) and the solution of `∗(K1) and h∗(K1) in (A.55) and
(A.56) with L = 0 and H = 1 (from Case IV of the proof of Proposition 5.3-(b)), we have
lim
σ→0
P(pis ∈ (`∗(K1), h∗(K1))) ≤ lim
→0
√

4λ
1
s
[
log
(
1
1− h∗(K1)
)
− log `∗(K1)
]
= lim
→0
√

4λ
1
s
[− log(h0+O(2)
)− log (l0+O(2))]
= 0.
The last equation holds because
lim
x→0
√
x log x = lim
x→0
log x
x−1/2
= lim
x→0
x−1
−0.5x−3/2 = limx→0−2x
1/2 = 0, (A.69)
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Therefore, for any K1 ∈ (µL, µH ] and s > 0,
lim
σ→0
P(pis ∈ (`∗(K1), h∗(K1))) = 0.
This completes the proof of the proposition.
A.3.8 Proof of Proposition 5.5
We first state and prove Lemma A.8. That result will be used in the remainder of the proof.
Lemma A.8. (a) H1(K1, y0) > H0(K1, y0) for (K1, y0) ∈ (µL,∞)× (`∗(K1), h∗(K1)).
(b) For a given y0, the unconstrained optimizer of H0(K1, y0) is
arg max
K1≥0
H0(K1, y0) =

µ1,H if y0 > c1λ,
µ1,L if y0 ≤ c1λ.
Proof of Lemma A.8: We begin with the proof of part (a). By proposition 5.2, the invest-
ment timing of the follower, that is, τ , is strictly positive with probability 1. Then, because
e−λt min{K1, µ} > e−λt min{K1, µ1} with probability 1 for any t > 0, it follows from (5.15)
and (5.14) that H1(K1, y0) > H0(K1, y0) for y0 ∈ (`∗(K1), h∗(K1)). We now show part (b).
For any fixed y0, H0(K1, y0) as a function of K1 is as follows by (5.14).
H0(K1, y0) =

(
1
λ − c1
)
K1 if 0 < K1 ≤ µ1,L(
1
λy0 − c1
)
K1 + (1− y0)µ1,Lλ if µ1,L < K1 ≤ µ1,H
−c1K1 + y0 µ1,Hλ + (1− y0)
µ1,L
λ if K1 > µ1,H .
Because ∂H0(K1, y0)/∂K1 > 0 for 0 < K1 ≤ µ1,L and ∂H0(K1, y0)/∂K1 > 0 for µ1,L < K1 ≤
µ1,H if and only if y0 > c1λ, part (b) follows.
Lemma A.9. There exist initial beliefs α and α such that the leader’s equilibrium value function
is
V1(y0) = max
K1≥0
H0(K1, y0), for y0 ∈ [0, α) ∪ (α, 1], (A.70)
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and the leader’s equilibrium capacity is
K˜1 =

µ1,L if y0 ≤ min{c1λ, α},
µ1,H if y0 ≥ max{c1λ, α}.
(A.71)
Proof of Lemma A.9: We claim and show below that `∗(K1) > 0 and h∗(K1) < 1 for any
given K1. This and the fact that K˜1 ∈ [µL, µH ] imply that `∗(K˜1) is bounded below and
h∗(K˜1) is bounded above in equilibrium. We already know that `∗(K1) and h∗(K1) depend on
K1 only through the signal quality q(K1), which is increasing in K1. In addition, recall from
the proof of Proposition 5.2 that `∗ decreases in the signal quality while h∗ increases in that.
Thus, `∗(K˜1) ≥ α .= `∗(µH) > 0 and h∗(K˜1) ≤ α .= h∗(µH) > 0. Then, by Proposition 5.2,
in equilibrium, the follower invests at τ = 0 for y0 ∈ [0, α) ∪ (α, 1] regardless of the leader’s
capacity K1. Thus, for y0 ∈ [0, α) ∪ (α, 1], the leader’s value function with capacity K1 is
H0(K1, y0), and hence the leader’s equilibrium value function is as in (A.70). This and Lemma
A.8-(b) immediately imply (A.71).
It only remains to prove our above claim that `∗(K1) > 0 and h∗(K1) < 1 for any given
K1 > µL. Recall the function f`(·) we used to construct the optimal value function in the proof
of Proposition 5.2. We already know from Lemma A.2-(b) that `∗(K1) cannot be 0 or close
to 0 because for ` sufficiently close to zero f`(·) cannot touch g(·) at a point in the increasing
portion of g(·). Similarly, by Lemma A.2-(c), h∗(K1) cannot be 1 or very close to 1 because
it h∗(K1) were 1, neither the value-matching condition or the smooth-pasting condition would
have been met at y = h∗(K1). This completes the proof of our claim.
Given Lemma A.9, it only remains to show statements related to y0 ∈ (α, α) in Proposition
5.5. To characterize the leader’s equilibrium value function, we will evaluate H0(K1, y0) and
H1(K1, y0) by fixing an initial belief y0. As explained in the proof of Lemma A.9, `
∗(K1)
decreases continuously and monotonically from c2λ to `
∗(µH), and h∗(K1) increases contin-
uously and monotonically from c2λ to h
∗(µH) as K1 increases from µL to µH . Also, by the
proof of Proposition 5.2-(b), we have 0 < `∗(µH) < c2λ and c2λ < h∗(µH) < 1. Therefore,
if y0 ∈ (`∗(µH), c2λ], there exists a K0(y0) such that `∗(K0(y0)) = y0, and hence τ = 0 with
probability 1 for K1 ≤ K0(y0) and τ > 0 with probability 1 for K1 > K0(y0). Similarly, when
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y0 ∈ [c2λ, h∗(µH)), there exists a K0(y0) such that h∗(K0(y0)) = y0, and thus τ = 0 with
probability 1 for K1 ≤ K0(y0) and τ > 0 with probability 1 for K1 > K0(y0). That is
H(K1, y0) =

H0(K1, y0) 0 < K1 ≤ K0(y0),
H1(K1, y0) K1 > K0(y0),
Therefore, the leader’s equilibrium capacity K˜1(y0) is determined by comparing the maxi-
mum of H0(K1, y0) over K1 ≤ K0(y0) and the maximum of H1(K1, y0) over K1 > K0(y0).
We show in Figure A.10 as an example that how the value function H(K1, y0) varies by K1
for different fixed y0.
Recall the unconstrained optimizer of H0(K1, y0) from Lemma A.8-(b). Suppose that
K0(y0) < µ1,H . We claim and show below that this condition is equivalent to y0 ∈ (ya, yb)
for some ya and yb.
The condition K0(y0) < µ1,H implies the leader’s value function H(K1, y0) = H1(K1, y0)
in a region including µ1,H . Hence, by Lemmas A.8-(a) and A.8-(b), we have the following for
y0 > c1λ:
max
K1>K0(y0)
H1(K1, y0) ≥ H1(µ1,H , y0) > H0(µ1,H , y0) > max
K1≤K0(y0)
H0(K1, y0). (A.72)
Note that H1 is continuous in y0, H0(µ1,L, y0) does not change with y0, and H0(K1, y0) increases
in y0 for any given K1 ∈ (µ1,L, µ1,H ]. Then, from (A.72), there exists y < c1λ such that
max
K1>K0(y)
H1(K1, y) = H0(µ1,H , c1λ) =
(
1
λ
− c1
)
µ1,L = max
K1≤K0(y)
H0(K1, y),
and
max
K1>K0(y0)
H1(K1, y0) > max
K1≤K0(y0)
H0(K1, y0)
for y0 > y. Combining this and the fact that K0(y0) < µ1,H is equivalent to y0 ∈ (ya, yb) for
some ya and yb, we conclude that if y0 ∈ (α, α) where α .= max{ya, y} and α .= yb, then the
leader’s equilibrium capacity K˜1(y0) > K0(y0) and hence τ > 0 with probability 1.
It only remains to prove our above claim that K0(y0) < µ1,H can be written as y0 ∈ (α, α)
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for some α and α. For y0 ∈ (c2λ, h∗(µH)), K0(y0) < µ1,H is equivalent to y0 = h∗(K0(y0)) <
h∗(µ1,H). On the other hand, for y0 ∈ (`∗(µH), c2λ), K0(y0) < µ1,H is equivalent to y0 =
`∗(K0(y0)) > `∗(µ1,H). Letting ya
.
= `∗(µ1,H) and yb
.
= h∗(µ1,H) completes the proof of the
claim.
A.3.9 Proof of Proposition 5.6
We will prove this proposition in three steps. In Step A, we will derive an expression for
∂H1(K1,y0)
∂y0
, that will be used in the remainder of the proof. In Step B, using Proposition 5.3,
we get alternative expressions for various terms of ∂H1(K1,y0)∂y0 for large σ. Using the expressions
derived in Steps A and B, in Step C, we will drive sufficient conditions stated in the proposition.
Step A: Recall from (5.15) the definition of H1(K1, y0). Then,
∂H1(K1, y0)
∂y0
= −ξ1(`
∗(K1))− ξ2(`∗(K1))
λ
∂φ`∗(y0;K1)
∂y0
− ξ1(h
∗(K1))− ξ2(h∗(K1))
λ
∂φh∗(y0;K1)
∂y0
+
K1 − µL
λ
,
(A.73)
where, by (5.18) and (5.19),
ξ1(`
∗(K1))− ξ2(`∗(K1))
=

µ2,L(1− `∗(K1)) if µ1,H > µL and µL < K1 ≤ µ1,H
µ2,L(1− `∗(K1)) + (K1 − µ1,H)`∗(K1) if K1 > µ1,H > µL or µ1,H ≤ µL,
and
ξ1(h
∗(K1))− ξ2(h∗(K1))
=

µ2,L(1− h∗(K1)) if µ1,H > µL and µL < K1 ≤ µ1,H
µ2,L(1− h∗(K1)) + (K1 − µ1,H)h∗(K1), if K1 > µ1,H > µL or µ1,H ≤ µL.
Let
f1(y)
.
= y
1+η
2 (1− y) 1−η2 and f2(y) .= y
1−η
2 (1− y) 1+η2 .
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Then, we have
f ′1(y) =
η + 1
2
(
y
1− y
) η−1
2
+
η − 1
2
(
y
1− y
) η+1
2
> 0,
f ′2(y) = −
η − 1
2
(
1− y
y
) η+1
2
− η + 1
2
(
1− y
y
) η−1
2
< 0.
Recall (5.23) through (5.27). Then,
∂φ`∗(y0;K1)
∂y0
= a(`∗(K1), h∗(K1))f ′1(y0) + b(`
∗(K1), h∗(K1))f ′2(y0),
∂φh∗(y0;K1)
∂y0
= a(h∗(K1), `∗(K1))f ′1(y0) + b(h
∗(K1), `∗(K1))f ′2(y0).
Recall also (5.24) and define
β
.
=
`∗(K1)(1− h∗(K1))
h∗(K1)(1− `∗(K1)) < 1, (A.74)
A1
.
= `∗(K1)a(`∗(K1), h∗(K1)) + h∗(K1)a(h∗(K1), `∗(K1))
=
(
β
−η
2 − β η2
)−1( `∗(K1)
1− `∗(K1)
) 1
2
(
1− h∗(K1)
h∗(K1)
) η
2 [
β
−1−η
2 − 1
]
> 0,
B1
.
= `∗(K1)b(`∗(K1), h∗(K1)) + h∗(K1)b(h∗(K1), `∗(K1))
=
(
β
−η
2 − β η2
)−1( `∗(K1)
1− `∗(K1)
) 1
2
(
1− h∗(K1)
h∗(K1)
)− η
2 [
1− β −1+η2
]
> 0,
A2
.
= (1− `∗(K1))a(`∗(K1), h∗(K1)) + (1− h∗(K1))a(h∗(K1), `∗(K1))
=
(
β
−η
2 − β η2
)−1(1− `∗(K1)
`∗(K1)
) 1
2
(
1− h∗(K1)
h∗(K1)
) η
2 [
β
1−η
2 − 1
]
> 0,
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B2
.
= (1− `∗(K1))b(`∗(K1), h∗(K1)) + (1− h∗(K1))b(h∗(K1), `∗(K1))
=
(
β
−η
2 − β η2
)−1(1− `∗(K1)
`∗(K1)
) 1
2
(
1− h∗(K1)
h∗(K1)
)− η
2 [
1− β 1+η2
]
> 0.
Using these and (A.73), we get
∂H1(K1, y0)
∂y0
=

−µ2,L
λ (A2f
′
1(y0) +B2f
′
2(y0)) +
1
λ(K1 − µL),
if µ1,H > µL and µL < K1 ≤ µ1,H
−µ2,L
λ (A2f
′
1(y0) +B2f
′
2(y0))−
(K1−µ1,H)(A1f ′1(y0)+B1f ′2(y0))
λ +
(K1−µL)
λ ,
if K1 > µ1,H > µL or µ1,H ≤ µL.
For notational brevity, hereafter, we will drop the argument K1 from `
∗ and h∗.
Step B: Recall Proposition 5.3 and the notation β from (A.74). Let `∗ = c2λ − δ` and h∗ =
c2λ+ δh where δ` > 0 and δh > 0. Then,
β =
`∗(1− h∗)
h∗(1− `∗) =
(c2λ− δ`)(1− c2λ− δh)
(c2λ+ δh)(1− c2λ+ δ`)
=
c2λ− δ`
(1− c2λ)(1 + δ`1−c2λ)
· 1− c2λ− δh
c2λ(1 +
δh
c2λ
)
=
1
c2λ(1− c2λ)(c2λ− δ`)(1− c2λ− δh)
(
1− δ`
1− c2λ +O(δ
2
` )
)(
1− δh
c2λ
+O(δ2h)
)
= 1− δ` + δh
c2λ(1− c2λ) +O(δ
2
` ) +O(δ
2
h) +O(δ`δh).
This, the generalized binomial theorem and the fact that η = O(σ) imply that as σ → ∞, we
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have
β−η/2 = 1 +
δ` + δh
2c2λ(1− c2λ)η +O(σδ
2
` ) +O(σδ
2
h) +O(σδ`δh) (A.75)
βη/2 = 1− δ` + δh
2c2λ(1− c2λ)η +O(σδ
2
` ) +O(σδ
2
h) +O(σδ`δh) (A.76)
β−(η+1)/2 = 1 +
δ` + δh
2c2λ(1− c2λ)(η + 1) +O(σδ
2
` ) +O(σδ
2
h) +O(σδ`δh) (A.77)
β(−1+η)/2 = 1− δ` + δh
2c2λ(1− c2λ)(η − 1) +O(σδ
2
` ) +O(σδ
2
h) +O(σδ`δh) (A.78)
β(1−η)/2 = 1 +
δ` + δh
2c2λ(1− c2λ)(η − 1) +O(σδ
2
` ) +O(σδ
2
h) +O(σδ`δh) (A.79)
β(η+1)/2 = 1− δ` + δh
2c2λ(1− c2λ)(η + 1) +O(σδ
2
` ) +O(σδ
2
h) +O(σδ`δh). (A.80)
Step C: Using these expressions, we now prove the main result via Envelope Theorem. Recall
that the function H1(·, ·) is only defined for the initial belief in the continuation region. We
also know from the proof of Proposition 5.2 that c2λ always lies in the continuation region.
We already know from the proof of Proposition 5.5 that K˜1(c2λ) > µL when µL < µ1,H .
Thus, under that condition, H(K˜1(c2λ), c2λ) = H1(K˜1(c2λ), c2λ) and K˜1(c2λ) is an optimizer
of H1(K1, c2λ). Then, if H1(K1; c2λ) is differentiable at K˜1(c2λ), then by Envelope Theorem,
V ′1(c2λ) =
∂H1(K1, c2λ)
∂y0
∣∣∣∣
K1=K˜1(c2λ)
.
We claim and show at the end of the proof that H1(K1; c2λ) is differentiable for any K1 ∈
(µL, µH) except at most one point, that is, µ1,H . Because the parameter set in which K˜1(c2λ) =
µ1,H is Lebesgue measure zero, in our analysis we focus on the case where K˜1(c2λ) ∈ (µL, µH)\
{µ1,H}. Below, we will analyze ∂H1(K1,c2λ)∂y0
∣∣∣∣
K1=K˜1(c2λ)
under two cases and show that in each
case, ∂H1(K1,c2λ)∂y0
∣∣∣∣
K1=K˜1(c2λ)
< 0 under the sufficient conditions stated in Proposition 5.6:
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Case I: Suppose that µL < K˜1(c2λ) < µ1,H . Under this case, we have
∂H1(K1, c2λ)/∂y0
∣∣∣
K1=K˜1(c2λ)
= −µ2,L
λ
(
A2f
′
1(c2λ) +B2f
′
2(c2λ)
)
+
1
λ
(K1 − µL)
=
(K˜1(c2λ)− µL)
λ
− µ2,L
2λ
(
1− `∗
`∗
)1/2
[(
β−η/2 − βη/2
)−1 (
β
1−η
2 − 1
)(1− h∗
h∗
)η/2( c2λ
1− c2λ
)η/2
×
(
(η + 1)
(
c2λ
1− c2λ
)−1/2
+ (η − 1)
(
c2λ
1− c2λ
)1/2)
(A.81)
−
(
β−η/2 − βη/2
)−1 (
1− β 1+η2
)( h∗
1− h∗
)η/2(1− c2λ
c2λ
)η/2
(A.82)
×
(
(η − 1)
(
1− c2λ
c2λ
)1/2
+ (η + 1)
(
1− c2λ
c2λ
)−1/2)]
. (A.83)
Note from (A.75), (A.76) and (A.79), we have
lim
σ→∞
(
β−η/2 − βη/2
)−1 (
β
1−η
2 − 1
)
= lim
σ→∞
(
(δ` + δh)η
c2λ(1− c2λ) +O(σδ
2
` ) +O(σδ
2
h) +O(σδ`δh)
)−1
(
(δ` + δh)(η − 1)
2c2λ(1− c2λ) +O(σδ
2
` ) +O(σδ
2
h) +O(σδ`δh)
)
(A.84)
=
1
2
. (A.85)
Similarly, it follows from (A.75), (A.76) and (A.80) that
lim
σ→∞−
(
β−η/2 − βη/2
)−1 (
1− β 1+η2
)
= lim
σ→∞−
(
(δ` + δh)η
c2λ(1− c2λ) +O(σδ
2
` ) +O(σδ
2
h) +O(σδ`δh)
)−1
×
(
(δ` + δh)(η + 1)
2c2λ(1− c2λ) +O(σδ
2
` ) +O(σδ
2
h) +O(σδ`δh)
)
(A.86)
=− 1
2
. (A.87)
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In addition,
lim
σ→∞
(
1− h∗
h∗
c2λ
(1− c2λ)
)η/2
= lim
σ→∞
(
1 +
c2λ− h∗
(1− c2λ)h∗
) η
2
= lim
σ→∞
(
1 +
η
2
c2λ− h∗
(1− c2λ)h∗
)
= 1.
(A.88)
The last equation above is because η = O(σ) and, by Proposition 5.4, h∗ = o(σ−1). Combining
(A.82) through (A.88), we have
lim
σ→∞ ∂H1(K1, c2λ)/∂y0
∣∣∣
K1=K˜1(c2λ)
= lim
σ→∞
(K˜1(c2λ)− µL)
λ
− µ2,L
4λ
[
(η + 1)
(
1− 2c2λ
c2λ
)
+ (η − 1)
(
2c2λ− 1
c2λ
)]
= lim
σ→∞
(K˜1(c2λ)− µL)
λ
− (1− 2c2λ)µ2,L
2c2λ2
.
Note that the above limit is strictly negative if
µH − µL
µ2,L
<
1− 2c2λ
2c2λ
. (A.89)
Case II: Suppose that K˜1(c2λ) ∈ (µ1,H , µH). Under this case, we have
∂H1(K1, c2λ)/∂y0
∣∣∣
K1=K˜1(c2λ)
= − 1
λ
[
µ2,L
(
A2f
′
1(c2λ) +B2f
′
2(c2λ)
)
+ (K˜1(c2λ)− µ1,H)
(
A1f
′
1(c2λ) +B1f
′
2(c2λ)
)]
+
1
λ
(K˜1(c2λ)− µL).
Note that compared to Case I, under this case, the only term that differs in ∂H1(·, ·)/∂y0|K1=K˜1(c2λ)
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is −(K˜1(c2λ)− µ1,H) (A1f ′1(c2λ) +B1f ′2(c2λ)) /λ. Thus, below we will analyze that term:
− (K˜1(c2λ)− µ1,H)
(
A1f
′
1(c2λ) +B1f
′
2(c2λ)
)
/λ
= −K˜1(c2λ)− µ1,H
2λ
(
`∗
1− `∗
)1/2
[(
β−η/2 − βη/2
)−1 (
β
−1−η
2 − 1
)(1− h∗
h∗
)η/2( c2λ
1− c2λ
)η/2
×
(
(η + 1)
(
c2λ
1− c2λ
)−1/2
+ (η − 1)
(
c2λ
1− c2λ
)1/2)
(A.90)
−
(
β−η/2 − βη/2
)−1 (
1− β −1+η2
)( h∗
1− h∗
)η/2(1− c2λ
c2λ
)η/2
(A.91)
×
(
(η − 1)
(
1− c2λ
c2λ
)1/2
+ (η + 1)
(
1− c2λ
c2λ
)−1/2)]
. (A.92)
Then, it follows from (A.75), (A.76), (A.77) and (A.78) that
lim
σ→∞
(
β−η/2 − βη/2
)−1 (
β
−1−η
2 − 1
)
=
1
2
, and lim
σ→∞−
(
β−η/2 − βη/2
)−1 (
1− β −1+η2
)
= −1
2
.
As a result,
lim
σ→∞ −(K˜1(c2λ)− µ1,H)
(
A1f
′
1(c2λ) +B1f
′
2(c2λ)
)
/λ
= lim
σ→∞−
K˜1(c2λ)− µ1,H
4λ
(
c2λ
1− c2λ
)1/2
[(
(η + 1)
(
c2λ
1− c2λ
)−1/2
+ (η − 1)
(
c2λ
1− c2λ
)1/2)
−
(
(η − 1)
(
1− c2λ
c2λ
)1/2
+ (η + 1)
(
1− c2λ
c2λ
)−1/2)]
(A.93)
= −K˜1(c2λ)− µ1,H
2λ
(
1− c2λ
1− c2λ
)
. (A.94)
Note that the expression on the last line is negative if
c2λ < 1/2. (A.95)
Then, the analysis in Cases I and II shows that if µ1,H > µL, and (A.89) and (A.95) hold,
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except on a set of measure zero, V ′1(c2λ) < 0 for large values of σ. This and the continuity of
H1(·, ·) in y0 immediately imply the existence of a initial belief region that contains c2λ such
that V ′1(y0) < 0.
It only remains to show our earlier claim that H1(K1, y0) in (5.29) is differentiable at all
K1 ∈ (µL, µH) except at µ1,H . Observe from (5.29) that both φ`∗ and φh∗ are differentiable in
K1 for K1 ∈ (µL, µH ] based on the fact that `∗(K1) and h∗(K1) are differentiable in K1. Then,
by (5.18), it follows that ξ1(y) is also differentiable on K1 ∈ (µL, µH). Finally, from (5.19),
we know that ξ2(y) is differentiable on K1 ∈ (µL, µ1,H) ∪ (µ1,H , µH ], therefore H1(K1, y0) is
differentiable in K1 on (µL, µ1,H) ∪ (µ1,H , µH ], that is µH1, H is the only non-differentiable
point for any y0.
A.3.10 Proof of Proposition 5.7
Let f(·) : [0, 1]→ R and θ∗ ∈ (0, 1) be the solutions to the following ODE
0 =
1
2
q(K1)y
2(1− y)2f ′′(y)− λf(y) (A.96)
subject to these boundary conditions:
f(θ∗) = g(θ∗) and f ′(θ∗) = g′(θ∗), (A.97)
where
g(y)
.
= max
K2≥µ
g2(y,K2) =
µ2,H − µ2,L
λ
y +
µ2,L
λ
− c2µ.
Note that the following function satisfies (A.96):
f(y) = κy
1+η
2 (1− y) 1−η2 .
Using this general form and (A.97), we now solve for the two unknowns θ∗ and f(·). It follows
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from (A.97) that
κθ∗
1+η
2 (1− θ∗) 1−η2 = µ2,H − µ2,L
λ
θ∗ +
µ2,L
λ
− c2µ, (A.98)
κ
(
η + 1
2
(
θ∗
1− θ∗
) η−1
2
+
η − 1
2
(
θ∗
1− θ∗
) η+1
2
)
=
µ2,H − µ2,L
λ
. (A.99)
The equation (A.98) is equivalent to
κ
(
θ∗
1− θ∗
) η−1
2
=
1
θ∗
(
µ2,H − µ2,L
λ
θ∗ +
µ2,L
λ
− c2µ
)
⇔
κ
(
θ∗
1− θ∗
) η+1
2
=
1
1− θ∗
(
µ2,H − µ2,L
λ
θ∗ +
µ2,L
λ
− c2µ
)
.
Combing these with (A.99), we obtain the solution θ∗ as function of K1:
θ∗(K1) =
(
1 +
η − 1
η + 1
µ2,H − c2λµ
c2λµ− µ2,L
)−1
,
which is equivalent to the following by (5.24):
θ∗(K1) =
1 + (µ2,H − c2λµ
c2λµ− µ2,L
) √1 + 8λσ2min(K1,µH)−min(K1,µL) − 1√
1 + 8λσ
2
min(K1,µH)−min(K1,µL) + 1
−1 .
It is perhaps worth noting that θ∗(K1) < 1 because
µ2,H−c2λµ
c2λµ−µ2,L > 0 by (5.32). Furthermore, by
(A.99), we have
κ =
(
η + 1
2
(
θ∗(K1)
1− θ∗(K1)
) η−1
2
+
η − 1
2
(
θ∗(K1)
1− θ∗(K1)
) η+1
2
)−1
µ2,H − µ2,L
λ
.
Define
f̂(y)
.
=

f(y), y < θ∗(K1),
g(y), y ≥ θ∗(K1).
(A.100)
Using similar arguments as in the proof of Proposition 5.1, it is straightforward to show
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that f̂(·) is the follower’s value function under the single-threshold investment strategy, which
consists of the follower’s capacity investment µ and investment timing
τ = inf{t ≥ 0 : pit ≥ θ∗(K1)},
and f̂(·) satisfies the following conditions:
f̂(y) ≥ g(y), y ∈ [0, 1]
0 ≤ 1
2
q(K1)y
2(1− y)2f̂ ′′(y)− λf̂(y), y ∈ (0, 1) \ {θ∗(K1)}.
Using these conditions, from similar arguments in the proof of Proposition 5.2, it follows that
f̂(y) is larger than the follower’s value function at y under any other feasible investment policy.
Hence, the aforementioned single-threshold policy is optimal for the follower.
A.3.11 Proof of Proposition 5.8
This proof uses the similar arguments explained in the proof of Proposition 5.5. Note that
the following variant of Lemma A.8 holds: H1(K1, y0) > H0(K1, y0) for (K1, y0) ∈ (µL,∞) ×
(0, θ∗(K1)).
Fix an initial belief y0 ∈ (0, 1). We now evaluate H0(K1, y0) and H1(K1, y0). First note
that θ∗(K1) increases continuously and monotonically from θ∗(µ) to θ∗(µH) as K1 increases.
If y0 < θ
∗(µ), clearly, τ > 0 with probability 1 whereas if y0 > θ∗(µH), the follower
immediately invests, that is, τ = 0 with probability 1.
We now focus on y0 ∈ (θ∗(µ), θ∗(µH)). From the structural properties of θ∗(·), for any given
such y0, there exists a unique K0 such that θ
∗(K0) = y0. Thus, if K1 ≤ K0(y0), τ = 0 with
probability 1; otherwise, τ > 0 with probability 1. This implies that
H(K1, y0) =

H0(K1, y0) if µ < K1 ≤ K0(y0),
H1(K1, y0) if K1 > K0(y0),
Therefore, the equilibrium capacity K˜∗1 (y0) is identified by comparing the maximum of
H0(K1, y0) over µ ≤ K1 ≤ K0(y0) and the maximum of H1(K1, y0) over K1 > K0(y0). By
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(5.14), for any fixed y0,
H0(K1, y0) =

(
1
λy0 − c1
)
K1 + (1− y0)µ1,Lλ if µ < K1 ≤ µ1,H
−c1K1 + y0 µ1,Hλ + (1− y0)
µ1,L
λ if K1 > µ1,H .
Fix any initial belief y0 ≥ c1λ. Then, by standard optimization arguments,
H0(µ1,H , y0) = max
K1≥0
H0(K1, y0), for y0 ∈ [c1λ, 1].
If µ < K0(y0) < µ1,H then µ1,H lies in the region where H1(K1, y0) > H0(K1, y0), and hence
max
K1>K0(y0)
H1(K1, y0) ≥ H1(µ1,H , y0) > H0(µ1,H , y0) ≥ max
K1≤K0(y0)
H0(K1, y0).
We now consider the scenario where y0 < c1λ. There can be two cases related to that:
Either there exists a least one initial belief y0 < c1λ such that maxK1>K0(y0)H1(K1, y0) <
maxK1≤K0(y0)H0(K1, y0) or maxK1>K0(y0)H1(K1, y0) < maxK1≤K0(y0)H0(K1, y0) for all y0 <
c1λ. If it is the latter, then y
.
= θ∗(µ). If it is the former scenario, then by the continuity
of maxK1>K0(y0)H1(K1, y0), and from the fact that the capacity that maximizes H0(K1, y0)
remains the same for y0 < c1λ, there exists an y < c1λ such that
max
K1>K0(y0)
H1(K1, y0) ≥ max
K1≤K0(y0)
H0(K1, y0), y0 ≥ y.
Combining all, for y0 ∈ (0, θ∗(µ) ∪ [y, θ∗(µH)), we have H(K˜1(y0), y0) = H1(K˜1(y0), y0).
A.3.12 Proof of Proposition 5.9
We will use the Envelope Theorem to prove the result. Recall from (5.40) that
H1(K1, y0)
= − [ξ1(θ∗(K1))− ξ2(θ∗(K1))] φ(y0)
λφ(θ∗(K1))
+
1
λ
(y0 min{K1, µH}+ (1− y0) min{K1, µL})− c1K1,
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where ξ1 and ξ2 are given in (5.18) and (5.19), and φ is as in (5.38). Hence, the partial derivative
of H1 with respect to y0 is given by
∂H1(K1, y0)
∂y0
=− ξ1(θ
∗(K1))− ξ2(θ∗(K1))
λφ(θ∗(K1))
(
η + 1
2
(
y0
1− y0
) η−1
2
+
η − 1
2
(
y0
1− y0
) η+1
2
)
+
K1 − µL
λ
,
(A.101)
and H1 is concave in y0:
∂2H1(K1, y0)
∂y20
=− ξ1(θ
∗(K1))− ξ2(θ∗(K1))
λφ(θ∗(K1))
1
(1− y0)2
(
η + 1
2
η − 1
2
(
y0
1− y0
) η−3
2
+
η − 1
2
η + 1
2
(
y0
1− y0
) η−1
2
)
< 0,
Recall that we would like to identify sufficient conditions under which V ′1(y0) < 0, which
is equivalent to the following by the Envelope Theorem if K˜1(y0) is an interior capacity in
(K0(y0), µH):
V ′1(y0) =
∂H1(K1, y0)
∂y0
∣∣∣
K1=K˜1(y0)
. (A.102)
Because H1 is concave in y0, for any given K1 and y0 ∈ (θ∗(µ), θ∗(µH)),
∂H1(K1, y0)
∂y0
∈
(
∂H1(K1, θ
∗(K1))
∂y0
,
∂H1(K1, θ
∗(µ))
∂y0
)
.
This suggests that a sufficient condition for (A.102) is
∂H1(K1, θ
∗(µ))/∂y0 < 0 for K1 ∈ (µ, µH),
174
which is equivalent to
η + 1
2
(
θ∗(µ)
1− θ∗(µ)
) η−1
2
+
η − 1
2
(
θ∗(µ)
1− θ∗(µ)
) η+1
2
 [ξ1(θ∗(µ))− ξ2(θ∗(µ))]
> (K1 − µL)φ(θ∗(µ)),
which, by expanding φ(·), can be simplified to
[
η + 1
2θ∗(µ)
+
η − 1
2(1− θ∗(µ))
] [
ξ1(θ
∗(µ))− ξ2(θ∗(µ))
]
> K1 − µL. (A.103)
Define U
.
= µ2,H − c2λµ and V .= c2λµ− µ2,L. Then, by (5.34),
η + 1
2θ∗(µ)
+
η − 1
2(1− θ∗(µ)) = η +
(η − 1)
2
U
V
+
(η + 1)
2
V
U
, (A.104)
and
ξ1(θ
∗(µ))− ξ2(θ∗(µ)) =

(1− θ∗(µ))µ2,L, if K1 ≤ µ1,H
θ(K1 − µ1,H) + (1− θ∗(µ))µ2,L, if K1 > µ1,H .
≥ (1− θ∗(µ))µ2,L. (A.105)
In addition, because K1 < µH ,
K1 − µL < µH − µL. (A.106)
Using (A.104) through (A.106), the following condition implies (A.103):
η + 1
2
(1− θ∗(µ))
θ∗(µ)
+
η − 1
2
>
µH − µL
µ2,L
,
which is guaranteed by the condition that
√
1 +
8λσ2
(µ− µL)2
(
U
V
+ 1
)
− U
V
>
µH − µL
µ2,L
.
175
This completes our argument for this proof.
A.3.13 Proof of Proposition 5.11.
We first give the following definition for algebra convenience.
ηmax :=
√
1 +
8λσ2
(µ− µl)2 , (A.107)
ηmin :=
√
1 +
8λσ2
(µh − µl)2 . (A.108)
ηmin :=
√
1 +
8λσ2
(µ1,h − µl)2 . (A.109)
Assume the optimal K˜1(y0) takes value in an interior region of the initial belief, let
F (K1, y0) =
∂H1(K1, y0)
∂K1
,
the first order condition gives us F (K˜1(y0), y0) = 0. From the implicit function theorem, we
have
dK˜1
dy0
= −
∂F (K1,y0)
∂y0
∂F (K1,y0)
∂K1
∣∣∣
K˜1(y0)
= −
∂2H(K1,y0)
∂y0∂K1
∂2H(K1,y0)
∂K21
∣∣∣
K˜1(y0)
Note that since K˜1(y0) is the maximum point, we have
∂2H(K˜1(y0), y0)
∂K1
2 < 0,
therefore the sign of dK˜1(y)dy0 has is same as that of the numerator
∂2H(K1,y)
∂y∂K1
. We derive the
explicit formulation of the cross derivative ∂
2H1
∂y∂K1
and prove that it is positive.
Recall (A.101), the partial derivative of H1 with respect to y0 is given by
∂H1(K1, y0)
∂y0
= −ξ1(θ)− ξ2(θ)
λφ(θ)
φ′(y0) +
K1 − µL
λ
,
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where θ is function of K1 via the link η, and
φ(y) = y
1+η
2 (1− y) 1−η2
and hence
φ′(y) =
(
η + 1
2
(
y
1− y
) η−1
2
+
η − 1
2
(
y
1− y
) η+1
2
)
.
Besides, in (5.18) and (5.19), we have
ξ1(θ)− ξ2(θ) := δm(K1, θ) =

(1− θ)µ2,L, K1 ≤ µ1,H ;
θ(K1 − µ1,H) + (1− θ)µ2,L, K1 > µ1,H .
Hence δm is a function of θ and K1. Besides θ can be written as function of η, hence we have
∂
∂η
[
δm(K1, θ)
φ(θ)
φ′(y0)
]
=
∂
∂η
[
δm(K1, θ)
φ(θ)
]
φ′(y0) +
[
δm(K1, θ)
φ(θ)
]
∂φ′(y0)
∂η
. (A.110)
To obtain (A.110), we need the following partial derivatives:
 (1)
∂
∂η
[
1
φ(θ)
]
 (2)
∂δm(K1, θ)
∂η
 (3)
∂
∂η
[
δm(K1, θ)
φ(θ)
]
 (4)
∂φ′(y0)
∂η
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Derivation of (1)
∂φ(θ)−1
∂η
=
∂
∂η
(θ(1− θ))−1/2
(
1− θ
θ
)η/2
=
(
1− θ
θ
)η/2 [
−1
2
(1− 2θ)(θ(1− θ))−3/2θ′(η)
]
+
(
1− θ
θ
)η/2
(θ(1− θ))−1/2
[
− 1
θ2
θ
1− θ
η
2
θ′(η) +
1
2
ln
(
1− θ
θ
)]
= −1
2
φ(θ)−1
[
1− 2θ + η
θ(1− θ) θ
′(η)− ln
(
1− θ
θ
)]
.
Here we need the generalized power rule for the second equation.
Derivation of (2)
∂δm(K1, θ)
∂η
=

−µ2,Lθ′(η), K1 ≤ µ1,H ;
(K1 − µ1,H − µ2,L)θ′(η), K1 > µ1,H .
: = δ(K1)θ
′(η),
where
δ(K1) =

−µ2,L, K1 ≤ µ1,H ;
(K1 − µ1,H − µ2,L), K1 > µ1,H .
Derivation of (3)
∂
∂η
[
δm(K1, θ)
φ(θ)
]
= −δm(K1, θ)
2φ(θ)
[
1− 2θ + η
θ(1− θ) θ
′(η)− ln
(
1− θ
θ
)]
+
δ(K1)θ
′(η)
φ(θ)
=
δm(K1, θ)
2φ(θ)
ln
(
1− θ
θ
)
+
θ′(η)
φ(θ)
[
−δm(K1, θ)
2
1− 2θ + η
θ(1− θ) + δ(K1)
]
,
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Derivation of (4)
∂φ′(y0)
∂η
=
1
2
[(
y0
1− y0
) η−1
2
+
η + 1
2
(
y0
1− y0
) η−1
2
ln
(
y0
1− y0
)
+
(
y0
1− y0
) η+1
2
+
η − 1
2
(
y0
1− y0
) η+1
2
ln
(
y0
1− y0
)]
=
1
2
[(
y0
1− y0
) η+1
2
+
(
y0
1− y0
) η−1
2
]
+
1
2
ln
(
y0
1− y0
)
φ′(y0).
Combing (1) - (4), we obtain
∂
∂η
[
δm(K1, θ)
φ(θ)
φ′(y0)
]
=
∂
∂η
[
δm(K1, θ)
φ(θ)
]
φ′(y0) +
[
δm(K1, θ)
φ(θ)
]
∂φ′(y0)
∂η
=
δm(K1, θ)
2φ(θ)
ln
(
1− θ
θ
)
φ′(y0) +
θ′(η)
φ(θ)
[
−δm(K1, θ)
2
1− 2θ + η
θ(1− θ) + δ(K1)
]
φ′(y0)
+
δm(K1, θ)
2φ(θ)
[(
y0
1− y0
) η+1
2
+
(
y0
1− y0
) η−1
2
]
+
δm(K1, θ)
2φ(θ)
ln
(
y0
1− y0
)
φ′(y0)
=
φ′(y0)δm(K1, θ)
2φ(θ)
ln
[
(1− θ)y0
θ(1− y0)
]
+
δm(K1, θ)
2φ(θ)
[(
y0
1− y0
) η+1
2
+
(
y0
1− y0
) η−1
2
]
+
φ′(y0)θ′(η)
φ(θ)
[
−δm(K1, θ)
2
1− 2θ + η
θ(1− θ) + δ(K1)
]
(A.111)
For the last term in the above equation, we use the explicit solution of θ and obtain
−ξ1(θ)− ξ2(θ)
2
1− 2θ + η
θ(1− θ) + δ(K1) =

−12(η + 1)
µ2,L
θ , K1 ≤ µ1,H ,
−12
[
(η − 1)K1−µ1,H1−θ + (η + 1)
µ2,L
θ
]
, K1 > µ1,H .
Note that the above term, as well as δm(K1, θ) and δ(K1) depends on the relation of K1 and
µ1,H or K1 > µ1,H .
Next we derive the following cross partial derivative.
∂2H1(K1, y0)
∂y∂K1
= − ∂η
∂K1
× ∂
∂η
[
δm(K1, θ)
λφ(θ)
φ′(y0)
]
− ∂δm(K1, θ)
∂K1
× φ
′(y0)
λφ(θ)
+
1
λ
. (A.112)
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To complete, we need a few more partial derivatives:
 (5)
∂δm(K1, θ)
∂K1
 (6)
θ′(η) =
∂
∂η
(
1 +
η − 1
η + 1
· U
V
)−1
 (7)
∂η
∂K1
Derivation of (5)
∂δm(K1, θ)
∂K1
=

0, K1 ≤ µ1,H ,
θ, K1 > µ1,H .
Derivation of (6)
θ′(η) = −
(
1 +
η − 1
η + 1
· U
V
)−2
· U
V
· 2
(η + 1)2
= − 2Uθ
2
V (η + 1)2
= −2θ(1− θ)
η2 − 1 .
Derivation of (7)
∂η
∂K1
=
∂
∂K1
√
1 +
8λσ2
(K1 − µL)2 = −
η2 − 1
η(K1 − µL) .
In the rest of the section, we study the cross derivative in (A.112) by looking at the two
different cases: K1 ≤ µ1,H and K1 > µ1,H .
Case I. K˜1(y0) ≤ µ1,H
180
Under this assumption, (A.111) can be written as
∂
∂η
[
δm(K1, θ)
φ(θ)
φ′(y0)
]
=
φ′(y0)δm(K1, θ)
2φ(θ)
ln
[
(1− θ)y0
θ(1− y0)
]
+
δm(K1, θ)
2φ(θ)
[(
y0
1− y0
) η+1
2
+
(
y0
1− y0
) η−1
2
]
+
φ′(y0)
φ(θ)
−2θ(1− θ)
η2 − 1
(
−η + 1
2
· δm(K1, θ)
θ(1− θ)
)
=
δm(K1, θ)
2φ(θ)
[(
η + 1
2
z
η−1
2 +
η − 1
2
z
η+1
2
)(
ln
[
1− θ
θ
z
]
+
2
η − 1
)
+ z
η+1
2 + z
η−1
2
]
,
here, for the algebra convenience, let
z =
y0
1− y0 .
Note that since y0 ∈ [0, θ], we have z ∈ [0, θ1−θ ].
Hence, the cross derivative in (A.112) (multiplied by a constant λ) can be expressed as
λ
∂2H(K1, y)
∂y∂K1
=− ∂η
∂K1
× ∂
∂η
[
δm(K1, θ)
φ(θ)
φ′(y0)
]
− ∂δm(K1, θ)
∂K1
× φ
′(y0)
φ(θ)
+ 1
=1− ∂η
∂K1
δm(K1, θ)
2φ(θ)
f1(z),
where
f1(z) =
(
η + 1
2
z
η−1
2 +
η − 1
2
z
η+1
2
)(
ln
[
1− θ
θ
z
]
+
2
η − 1
)
+ z
η+1
2 + z
η−1
2 ,
is the only part in the cross derivative that depends on z. Next we find the minimum of f1
over z by looking at its first derivative. We obtain
f ′1(z) =
(
z
η−3
2 + z
η−1
2
)[η2 − 1
4
(
ln
[
1− θ
θ
z
]
+
2
η − 1
)
+ η
]
,
and let z1 satisfy
η2 − 1
4
(
ln
[
1− θ
θ
z1
]
+
2
η − 1
)
+ η = 0,
hence f ′1(z) < 0 for z < z1, and f ′1(z) < 0 for z > z1. The minimum of f1 is thus achieved at
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z = z1. Note that z1:
ln
[
1− θ
θ
z1
]
= −2(3η + 1)
η2 − 1 < 0. (A.113)
Now let z = z1, we have
f1min = f1(z1) = −
(
η + 1
η − 1z
η−1
2
1 +
η − 1
η + 1
z
η+1
2
1
)
.
Hence, combing the result (7) we obtain
(
λ
∂2H(K1, y)
∂y∂K1
)
min
=1 +
∂η
∂K1
δm(K1, θ)
2φ(θ)
(
η + 1
η − 1z
η−1
2
1 +
η − 1
η + 1
z
η+1
2
1
)
=1− η
2 − 1
2η
µ2,L
K1 − µL
(
1− θ
θ
z1
) η+1
2
(
η + 1
η − 1z
η−1
2
1 +
η − 1
η + 1
z
η+1
2
1
)
=1− η
2 − 1
2η
µ2,L
K1 − µL
(
η + 1
η − 1 ·
1− θ
θ
(
1− θ
θ
z1
) η−1
2
+
η − 1
η + 1
(
1− θ
θ
z1
) η+1
2
)
.
From (A.113) we see that 1−θθ z1 < 1, hence
(
λ
∂2H(K1, y)
∂y∂K1
)
min
>1− η
2 − 1
2η
µ2,L
K1 − µL
(
η + 1
η − 1 ·
1− θ
θ
+
η − 1
η + 1
)
=1− µ2,L
K1 − µL
η2 − 1
2η
(
U
V
+
η − 1
η + 1
)
.
It is trivial to show that
η2 − 1
2η
(
U
V
+
η − 1
η + 1
)
=
η2 − 1
2η
(
U
V
+ 1− 2
η + 1
)
is increasing in η, hence
η2 − 1
2η
(
U
V
+
η − 1
η + 1
)
<
η2max − 1
2ηmax
(
U
V
+
ηmax − 1
ηmax + 1
)
,
where
ηmax =
√
1 +
8λσ2
(µ− µL)2 .
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Also we have
µ2,L
K1 − µL <
µ2,L
µ− µL .
Together we obtain a lower bound of the cross derivative:
(
λ
∂2H(K1, y)
∂y∂K1
)
min
> 1− µ2,L
µ− µL
η2max − 1
2ηmax
(
U
V
+ 1− 2
ηmax + 1
)
.
Therefore, under the condition that
1− µ2,L
µ− µL
η2max − 1
2ηmax
(
U
V
+ 1− 2
ηmax + 1
)
> 0,
we have the cross derivative being positive for any (K1, y0) including the equilibrium (K˜1(y0), y0),
hence the equilibrium capacity is increasing in y0.
Case II. K˜1(y0) > µ1,H
Under this assumption, (A.111) can be written as
∂
∂η
[
δm(K1, θ)
λφ(θ)
φ′(y0)
]
=
φ′(y0)δm(K1, θ)
2φ(θ)
ln
[
(1− θ)y0
θ(1− y0)
]
+
δm(K1, θ)
2φ(θ)
[(
y0
1− y0
) η+1
2
+
(
y0
1− y0
) η−1
2
]
+
φ′(y0)
φ(θ)
−2θ(1− θ)
η2 − 1
(
−η − 1
2
· K1 − µ1,H
1− θ −
η + 1
2
· µ2,L
θ
)
=
1
2φ(θ)
(θ(K1 − µ1,H) + (1− θ)µ2,L)
[(
η + 1
2
z
η−1
2 +
η − 1
2
z
η+1
2
)
ln
(
1− θ
θ
z
)
+ z
η+1
2 + z
η−1
2
]
+
1
2φ(θ)
(
2
η + 1
θ(K1 − µ1,H) + 2
η − 1(1− θ)µ2,L
)(
η + 1
2
z
η−1
2 +
η − 1
2
z
η+1
2
)
.
Then combining the above with results (5) and (7), we have
λ
∂2H(K1, y)
∂y∂K1
=1− ∂η
∂K1
× ∂
∂η
[
δm(K1, θ)
φ(θ)
φ′(y0)
]
− ∂δm(K1, θ)
∂K1
× φ
′(y0)
φ(θ)
=1 +
1
φ(θ)
f2(z),
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where
f2(z) =
{
1
2
(
− ∂η
∂K1
)[(
ln
(
1− θ
θ
z
)
+
2
η + 1
)
θ(K1 − µ1,H)
+
(
ln
(
1− θ
θ
z
)
+
2
η − 1
)
(1− θ)µ2,L
]
− θ
}
×
(
η + 1
2
z
η−1
2 +
η − 1
2
z
η+1
2
)
+
1
2
(
− ∂η
∂K1
)
× [θ(K1 − µ1,H) + (1− θ)µ2,L]×
(
z
η−1
2 + z
η+1
2
)
.
Furthermore we have
f ′2(z) =
(
z
η−3
2 + z
η−1
2
)
f3(z),
where
f3(z) =
η2 − 1
4
{
1
2
(
− ∂η
∂K1
)
[(
ln
(
1− θ
θ
z
)
+
2
η + 1
)
θ(K1 − µ1,H) +
(
ln
(
1− θ
θ
z
)
+
2
η − 1
)
(1− θ)µ2,L
]
− θ
}
+ η
[
1
2
(
− ∂η
∂K1
)
[θ(K1 − µ1,H) + (1− θ)µ2,L]
]
.
Note that f3 is increasing in z, hence if we assume at z = z2, f3(z2) = 0, then f2 is
decreasing for z < z2 and increasing for z > z2. Now we compare z2 with
θ
1−θ , which is the
upper bound of z. We complete the comparison by evaluating f3
(
θ
1−θ
)
. We show below that
under the given sufficient conditions, this value is positive, hence z2 <
θ
1−θ , thus the minimum
of f2 has definition and can be achieved at z2.
f3(
θ
1− θ ) =
η2 − 1
4
{
1
2
(
− ∂η
∂K1
)[
2θ(K1 − µ1,H)
η + 1
+
2(1− θ)µ2,L
η − 1
]
− θ
}
+ η
[
1
2
(
− ∂η
∂K1
)
[θ(K1 − µ1,H) + (1− θ)µ2,L]
]
=
1
2
(
− ∂η
∂K1
)[
3η − 1
2
θ(K1 − µ1,H) + 3η + 1
2
(1− θ)µ2,L
]
− η
2 − 1
4
θ
=
η2 − 1
2η(K1 − µL)
[
3η − 1
2
θ(K1 − µ1,H) + 3η + 1
2
(1− θ)µ2,L − η
2
θ(K1 − µL)
]
.
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For the last term being positive, it is equivalent to show that
K1 >
3η − 1
2η − 1µ1,H −
3η + 1
2η − 1
1− θ
θ
µ2,L − η
2η − 1µL,
or it is sufficient to show the following:
µ1,H ≥ 3η − 1
2η − 1µ1,H −
3η + 1
2η − 1
1− θ
θ
µ2,L − η
2η − 1µL.
Hence we obtain the first condition required for case II:
µ1,H ≤ µL + 3 · µ2,L · η0 − 1
η0 + 1
· U
V
.
Now we obtain the minimum of f2 at z2 as follows
f2min = f2(z2) =
∂η
∂K1
· [θ(K1 − µ1,H) + (1− θ)µ2,L] ·
(
η + 1
2(η − 1)z
η−1
2
2 +
η − 1
2(η + 1)
z
η+1
2
2
)
,
and
(
λ
∂2H(K1, y)
∂y∂K1
)
min
=1 +
1
φ(θ)
f2min
=1− η
2 − 1
2η
· 1
K1 − µL ·
θ(K1 − µ1,H) + (1− θ)µ2,L
θ
1+η
2 (1− θ) 1−η2
(
η + 1
η − 1z
η−1
2
2 +
η − 1
η + 1
z
η+1
2
2
)
=1− η
2 − 1
2η
· 1
K1 − µL ·
((
1− θ
θ
) η+1
2
(K1 − µ1,H) +
(
1− θ
θ
) η−1
2
µ2,L
)
×
(
η + 1
η − 1z
η−1
2
2 +
η − 1
η + 1
z
η+1
2
2
)
=1− η
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2η
· 1
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[
(K1 − µ1,H)η + 1
η − 1
(
1− θ
θ
z2
) η−1
2
+ µ2,L
η − 1
η + 1
(
1− θ
θ
z2
) η+1
2
+ (K1 − µ1,H)η − 1
η + 1
θ
1− θ
(
1− θ
θ
z2
) η+1
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η + 1
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θ
(
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θ
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]
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Note that with 1−θθ z2 < 1, the above minimum value has the following lower bound:
(
λ
∂2H(K1, y)
∂y∂K1
)
min
> 1− η
2 − 1
2η
· 1
K1 − µL ·
[
(K1 − µ1,H)
(
η + 1
η − 1 +
V
U
)
+ µ2,L
(
η − 1
η + 1
+
U
V
)]
Furthermore, note that η
2−1
2η is increasing in η, and both
η2 − 1
2η
· η + 1
η − 1 =
(η + 1)2
2η
=
1
2
(η + 2 +
1
η
)
and
η2 − 1
2η
· η − 1
η + 1
=
(η − 1)2
2η
=
1
2
(η − 2 + 1
η
)
are increasing in η, with K˜1 > µ1,H and η < η0 we have
1− η
2 − 1
2η
· 1
K1 − µL ·
[
(K1 − µ1,H)
(
η + 1
η − 1 +
V
U
)
+ µ2,L
(
η − 1
η + 1
+
U
V
)]
>1− η
2
0 − 1
2η0
· 1
K1 − µL ·
[
(K1 − µ1,H)
(
η0 + 1
η0 − 1 +
V
U
)
+ µ2,L
(
η0 − 1
η0 + 1
+
U
V
)]
>1− η
2
0 − 1
2η0
· 1
µ1,H − µL ·
[
µ2,H
(
η0 + 1
η0 − 1 +
V
U
)
+ µ2,L
(
η0 − 1
η0 + 1
+
U
V
)]
where η0 is given in (A.109).
Therefore if we have
1− η
2
0 − 1
2η0
· 1
µ1,H − µL ·
[
µ2,H
(
η0 + 1
η0 − 1 +
V
U
)
+ µ2,L
(
η0 − 1
η0 + 1
+
U
V
)]
> 0,
then the cross derivative is always positive. Now we have completed the proof.
186
Hour in Day
0 5 10 15 20 25
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y 
of
 D
el
ay
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
Mean Forecasting Level
(a)
SIPP, MA
SDPP, MA
SIPP, SVDSDPP, SVD
Hour in Day
0 5 10 15 20 25
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y 
of
 D
el
ay
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
Upper Bound of 95% Forecast Interval
(b)
SIPP, MA
SDPP, MA
SIPP, SVDSDPP, SVD
Hour in Day
0 5 10 15 20 25
Bl
oc
ki
ng
 P
ro
ba
bi
lity
0
0.005
0.01
0.015
0.02
0.025
0.03
0.035
0.04
0.045
(c)
Hour in Day
0 5 10 15 20 25
Bl
oc
ki
ng
 P
ro
ba
bi
lity
#10 -3
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
(d)
Hour in Day
0 5 10 15 20 25
Av
er
ag
e 
Nu
m
be
r o
f O
N 
Se
rv
er
s
0
100
200
300
400
500
(e)
Hour in Day
0 5 10 15 20 25
Av
er
ag
e 
Nu
m
be
r o
f O
N 
Se
rv
er
s
0
100
200
300
400
500
(f)
Figure A.3: Simulation Results of MX/M/∞ Queue
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Figure A.4: Simulation Results of M(t)/G/∞ Queue
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Figure A.5: Network Model of Optimization Problem
Figure A.6: f`(y) exploding with ` = 0.01 Figure A.7: fc2λ(y) crossing g(y).
Parameters used in Figure A.6 and A.7 λ = 0.1, σ = 1, c1 = 5, c2 = 4, µL = 2, µH = 4.3, µ1,L = 1,
µ1,H = 3, µ2,L = 1, µ2,H = 1.3, K1 = 3.5
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Figure A.8: Illustration of y` for ` = 0.3 and c2λ = 0.4. Parameters used in this figure: λ = 0.1, σ = 1,
c1 = 5, c2 = 4, µL = 2, µH = 4.3, µ1,L = 1, µ1,H = 3, µ2,L = 1, µ2,H = 1.3, K1 = 3.5
Figure A.9: Thresholds `∗ and h∗ as function of K1. Parameters used in this figure: λ = 0.1, σ = 1,
c1 = c2 = 5, µL = 2, µH = 5, µ1,L = 1, µ1,H = 2.5, µ2,L = 1, µ2,H = 2.5.
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Figure A.10: The Leader’s Value Function H(K1, y0) as Function of K1 for Different y0. Parameters
used in this figure: λ = 0.1, σ = 1, c1 = c2 = 5, µL = 1, µH = 10, µ1,L = .5, µ1,H = 2,
µ2,L = .5, µ2,H = 8.
191
REFERENCES
Abernathy, W. J., Baloff, N., Hershey, J. C. and Wandel, S. [1973], ‘A three-stage manpower
planning and scheduling modela service-sector example’, Operations Research 21(3), 693–
711.
Adan, I. J., Kulkarni, V. G. and van Wijk, A. [2013], ‘Optimal control of a server farm’, INFOR:
Information Systems and Operational Research 51(4), 241–252.
Akcsin, O. Z. and Karaesmen, F. [2007], ‘Characterizing the performance of process flexibility
structures’, Operations Research Letters 35(4), 477–484.
Aksin, Z., Armony, M. and Mehrotra, V. [2007], ‘The modern call center: A multi-disciplinary
perspective on operations management research’, Production and operations management
16(6), 665–688.
Bassamboo, A., Randhawa, R. S. and Van Mieghem, J. A. [2008], ‘A little flexibility is all you
need: Optimality of tailored chaining and pairing’, Preprint .
Bazaraa, M. S., Jarvis, J. J. and Sherali, H. D. [2011], Linear programming and network flows,
John Wiley & Sons.
Bosch, P. M. V. and Dietz, D. C. [2000], ‘Minimizing expected waiting in a medical appointment
system’, Iie Transactions 32(9), 841–848.
Boyacı, T. and O¨zer, O¨. [2010], ‘Information acquisition for capacity planning via pricing and
advance selling: When to stop and act?’, Operations Research 58(5), 1328–1349.
Brown, L., Gans, N., Mandelbaum, A., Sakov, A., Shen, H., Zeltyn, S. and Zhao, L. [2005],
‘Statistical analysis of a telephone call center: A queueing-science perspective’, Journal of
the American statistical association 100(469), 36–50.
Cayirli, T. and Veral, E. [2003], ‘Outpatient scheduling in health care: a review of literature’,
Production and operations management 12(4), 519–549.
Chen, B. P. and Henderson, S. G. [2001], ‘Two issues in setting call centre staffing levels’,
Annals of operations research 108(1), 175–192.
Cherkassky, B. V., Goldberg, A. V. and Radzik, T. [1996], ‘Shortest paths algorithms: Theory
and experimental evaluation’, Mathematical programming 73(2), 129–174.
Chiang, W.-C., Chen, J. C. and Xu, X. [2006], ‘An overview of research on revenue management:
current issues and future research’, International journal of revenue management 1(1), 97–
128.
Davis, A., Mehrotra, S., Holl, J. and Daskin, M. S. [2014], ‘Nurse staffing under demand
uncertainty to reduce costs and enhance patient safety’, Asia-Pacific Journal of Operational
Research 31(01), 1450005.
De´camps, J.-P. and Mariotti, T. [2004], ‘Investment timing and learning externalities’, Journal
of Economic Theory 118(1), 80–102.
De´camps, J.-P., Mariotti, T. and Villeneuve, S. [2005], ‘Investment timing under incomplete
information’, Mathematics of Operations Research 30(2), 472–500.
192
Feldman, J., Liu, N., Topaloglu, H. and Ziya, S. [2014], ‘Appointment scheduling under patient
preference and no-show behavior’, Operations Research 62(4), 794–811.
Fudenberg, D. and Tirole, J. [1986], ‘A theory of exit in duopoly’, Econometrica: Journal of
the Econometric Society pp. 943–960.
Gandhi, A., Harchol-Balter, M. and Adan, I. [2010], ‘Server farms with setup costs’, Perfor-
mance Evaluation 67(11), 1123–1138.
Gandhi, A., Harchol-Balter, M., Das, R. and Lefurgy, C. [2009], Optimal power allocation
in server farms, in ‘ACM SIGMETRICS Performance Evaluation Review’, Vol. 37, ACM,
pp. 157–168.
Gandhi, A., Harchol-Balter, M., Raghunathan, R. and Kozuch, M. A. [2011], Distributed,
robust auto-scaling policies for power management in compute intensive server farms, in
‘Open Cirrus Summit (OCS), 2011 Sixth’, IEEE, pp. 1–5.
Green, L., Kolesar, P. and Svoronos, A. [1991], ‘Some effects of nonstationarity on multiserver
markovian queueing systems’, Operations Research 39(3), 502–511.
Green, L. V., Kolesar, P. J. and Soares, J. [2001], ‘Improving the sipp approach for staffing
service systems that have cyclic demands’, Operations Research 49(4), 549–564.
Green, L. V., Kolesar, P. J. and Whitt, W. [2007], ‘Coping with time-varying demand when
setting staffing requirements for a service system’, Production and Operations Management
16(1), 13–39.
Green, L. V. and Savin, S. [2008], ‘Reducing delays for medical appointments: A queueing
approach’, Operations Research 56(6), 1526–1538.
Hancock, W. M., Magerlein, D. B., Storer, R. H. and Martin, J. B. [1978], ‘Parameters affecting
hospital occupancy and implications for facility sizing.’, Health Services Research 13(3), 276.
Harrison, J. M. [1988], Brownian models of queueing networks with heterogeneous customer
populations, in ‘Stochastic differential systems, stochastic control theory and applications’,
Springer, pp. 147–186.
Harrison, J. M. [2000], ‘Brownian models of open processing networks: Canonical representation
of workload’, Annals of Applied Probability pp. 75–103.
Harrison, J. M. and Sunar, N. [2015], ‘Investment timing with incomplete information and
multiple means of learning’, Operations Research 63(2), 442–457.
Ibrahim, R., Ye, H., LEcuyer, P. and Shen, H. [2016], ‘Modeling and forecasting call cen-
ter arrivals: A literature survey and a case study’, International Journal of Forecasting
32(3), 865–874.
Iravani, S. M., Kolfal, B. and Van Oyen, M. P. [2007], ‘Call-center labor cross-training: Itsa
small world after all’, Management Science 53(7), 1102–1112.
Ittig, P. T. [1978], ‘A model for planning ambulatory health services’, Management Science
24(10), 1001–1010.
193
Jensen, R. [1982], ‘Adoption and diffusion of an innovation of uncertain profitability’, Journal
of economic theory 27(1), 182–193.
Jongbloed, G. and Koole, G. [2001], ‘Managing uncertainty in call centres using poisson mix-
tures’, Applied Stochastic Models in Business and Industry 17(4), 307–318.
Jordan, W. C. and Graves, S. C. [1995], ‘Principles on the benefits of manufacturing process
flexibility’, Management Science 41(4), 577–594.
Kao, E. P. and Queyranne, M. [1985], ‘Budgeting costs of nursing in a hospital’, Management
Science 31(5), 608–621.
Klassen, K. J. and Rohleder, T. R. [1996], ‘Scheduling outpatient appointments in a dynamic
environment’, Journal of operations Management 14(2), 83–101.
Kolesar, P. [1970], ‘A markovian model for hospital admission scheduling’, Management Science
16(6), B–384.
Kwon, H. D. and Lippman, S. A. [2011], ‘Acquisition of project-specific assets with bayesian
updating’, Operations Research 59(5), 1119–1130.
Kwon, H. D., Xu, W., Agrawal, A. and Muthulingam, S. [2015], ‘Impact of bayesian learning
and externalities on strategic investment’, Management Science 62(2), 550–570.
Lipster, R. and Shiryayev, A. [1977], Statistics of Random Processes I: General Theory,
Springer, Berlin.
Liu, Y. and Whitt, W. [2011], ‘A network of time-varying many-server fluid queues with cus-
tomer abandonment’, Operations Research 59(4), 835–846.
Liu, Y. and Whitt, W. [2012], ‘The gt/gi/st+ gi many-server fluid queue’, Queueing Systems
71(4), 405–444.
Liu, Y., Whitt, W. et al. [2014], ‘Many-server heavy-traffic limit for queues with time-varying
parameters’, The Annals of Applied Probability 24(1), 378–421.
Luo, J., Kulkarni, V. G. and Ziya, S. [2012], ‘Appointment scheduling under patient no-shows
and service interruptions’, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 14(4), 670–684.
Luo, J., Kulkarni, V. G. and Ziya, S. [2015], ‘A tandem queueing model for an appointment-
based service system’, Queueing Systems 79(1), 53–85.
Puhalskii, A. A., Reed, J. E. et al. [2010], ‘On many-server queues in heavy traffic’, The Annals
of Applied Probability 20(1), 129–195.
Qi, A., Ahn, H.-S. and Sinha, A. [2015], ‘Investing in a shared supplier in a competitive market:
Stochastic capacity case’, Production and Operations Management 24(10), 1537–1551.
Qi, A., Ahn, H.-S. and Sinha, A. [2017], ‘Capacity investment with demand learning’, Opera-
tions Research 65(1), 145–164.
Qu, X., Rardin, R. L., Williams, J. A. S. and Willis, D. R. [2007], ‘Matching daily healthcare
provider capacity to demand in advanced access scheduling systems’, European Journal of
Operational Research 183(2), 812–826.
194
Rath, S., Rajaram, K. and Mahajan, A. [2015], ‘Integrated staff and room scheduling for
surgeries: Methodology and application’.
Reinganum, J. F. [1989], ‘The timing of innovation: Research, development, and diffusion’,
Handbook of industrial organization 1, 849–908.
Rohleder, T. R. and Klassen, K. J. [2000], ‘Using client-variance information to improve dy-
namic appointment scheduling performance’, Omega 28(3), 293–302.
Shen, H. and Huang, J. Z. [2008], ‘Interday forecasting and intraday updating of call center
arrivals’, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 10(3), 391–410.
Swinney, R., Cachon, G. P. and Netessine, S. [2011], ‘Capacity investment timing by start-ups
and established firms in new markets’, Management Science 57(4), 763–777.
Talluri, K. T. and Van Ryzin, G. J. [2006], The theory and practice of revenue management,
Vol. 68, Springer Science & Business Media.
Thijssen, J. J., Huisman, K. J. and Kort, P. M. [2006], ‘The effects of information on strategic
investment and welfare’, Economic Theory 28(2), 399–424.
Thompson, G. M. [1993], ‘Accounting for the multi-period impact of service when determining
employee requirements for labor scheduling’, Journal of Operations Management 11(3), 269–
287.
Tijms, H. C. [2003], A first course in stochastic models, John Wiley and sons.
Van Mieghem, J. A. [2003], ‘Commissioned paper: Capacity management, investment, and
hedging: Review and recent developments’, Manufacturing & Service Operations Manage-
ment 5(4), 269–302.
Van Mieghem, J. A. and Dada, M. [1999], ‘Price versus production postponement: Capacity
and competition’, Management Science 45(12), 1639–1649.
Wald, A. [1945], ‘Sequential tests of statistical hypotheses’, The Annals of Mathematical Statis-
tics 16(2), 117–186.
Wang, Y. [2012], ‘Capacity investment under responsive pricing: Implications of market entry
choice’, Decision Sciences 43(1), 107–140.
Weinberg, J., Brown, L. D. and Stroud, J. R. [2007], ‘Bayesian forecasting of an inhomogeneous
poisson process with applications to call center data’, Journal of the American Statistical
Association 102(480), 1185–1198.
Whitt, W. [2007], ‘What you should know about queueing models to set staffing requirements
in service systems’, Naval Research Logistics (NRL) 54(5), 476–484.
195
